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IT'S ALL DIFFERENT WITH PENGUINS 
  
 
On their migration across the glaciers 
the last penguins will be the first, 
                     and, like the Nazarene, 
they allow the children to come to them 
and let all of them be themselves, even those 
                                   whom marriage does not suit. 
No one needs to be a mate of darkness and carry 
               an iceberg the size of the national bank, 
  
               for the heavy and the light are equitably shared. 
  
Thus, dear readers, if you are penguins, 
thank your lucky stars and bless this 
               freezing outpost. 
  
(Blesséd be the ice under our feet! Benedictus!) 
 
 
Helena Sinervo, Ihmisen kaltainen, 2000, trans. Anselm Hollo 
 
Abstract 
 
This study explores the usefulness of Michel Foucault’s theoretical tools in 
feminism, especially in questions concerning the aesthetic subject. The overriding 
emphasis in my investigation is on a question: How does Foucault’s analyses of 
the subject, together with some contemporary feminist insights, offer explanations 
of how individuals may escape the homogenizing tendencies of power in modern 
societies through the assertion of their aesthetic constitution of their selves?  
 
In addressing this issue, I on the one hand seek to investigate how the problem of 
the aesthetic constitution of the subject (or the self) relates to questions of the 
politics of identity and representation, of the body, and of power, and on the other 
hand, how aesthetic (re)formation of the subject could function as a source of 
critical action and resistance. My basic thesis is that even though there are some 
gender problems in Foucault’s theorizations, his insights nevertheless offer a set 
of useful tools for critical analysis of the current problems suffered by women, 
and even provides some interesting practical suggestions that might help in the re-
creation of our ideas concerning the formation of our female subjectivities and 
selves.  
 
With this in mind, I also suggest that Foucault’s theorizations of the aesthetic 
subject might create more space for a truly heterogeneous society – a society in 
which individuals, women and men alike, are better allowed to do their self-
transforming work on the grounds of their own choices, pleasures and desires. As 
I argue, in this respect Foucault’s aesthetic theory attempts to fulfil the same 
utopian task as both Kant’s and Baudelaire’s critical modernity did in their own 
time, although in somewhat different terms. It works to set individuals free from 
the normative and oppressing structures of everyday life and to create space for a 
more autonomous and creative culture. Such a culture would, through the concrete 
experimental aesthetic practices of our selves, allow us more space to study the 
critical questions both Kant and Baudelaire addressed to critical modernity: What 
is our own era and how are we to constitute ourselves as subjects under its 
conditions? 
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Study Questions 
 
The question of the aesthetic formation of the subject, its past development and 
current manifestations, has reappeared as a fundamental problem in aesthetics at 
the turn of the twenty-first century, whether this problem is discussed in terms of 
aesthetics of the self, individual style, the politics of identity, or the 
aestheticization process.1 The connections between the aesthetic problematization 
of the subject and the emergence of modern culture have long been recognized.2 
Yet in the present day, not only do these connections seem more problematic and 
complex than was previously realized, but we see that a rethinking of them in the 
present age must go hand in hand with a reworking of the basic premises of 
aesthetic analysis itself.  
 
This new complexity in issues concerning the aesthetic formation of the subject – 
or, alternatively, the self, by which I, like Foucault, refer to the relation of oneself 
to oneself – arises from some more extensive changes in Western cultures that 
have opened up new perspectives on the heterogeneity of subjects (the women’s 
liberation movement and movements promoting sexual and ethnic minorities, for 
example), but also from changes in philosophical aesthetics itself. During the 
1980s and 1990s, the perspective of philosophical aesthetics (meaning here, 
mainly, analytical aesthetics) came to include new aspects of thought along the 
development of critical post-modern theory, post-structuralism, deconstruction, 
phenomenology, psychoanalysis, neo-Marxism, cultural theory, and feminist 
thinking. As a result, issues such as the body, sexuality, otherness, difference, 
power and ideology were brought to the forefront of aesthetic research.  
 
This change was so remarkable that it can be described, following Thomas 
Kuhn’s renowned analysis of the development of scientific research, as a 
paradigmatic shift inside the tradition of philosophical aesthetics. Earlier views on 
the “pureness” of aesthetic discipline were largely replaced by the new idea of 
aesthetics as intrinsically connected with questions of ethics, the environment, 
society, sex(uality) and politics. Alternatively put, the analytical viewpoint and 
the tendency to sort out and classify specifically aesthetic phenomena were 
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replaced by a more synthetic viewpoint and a tendency to analyze connections 
between things and value spheres rather than to separate them.3 Perhaps partly due 
to this, the age-old question of the aesthetic formation of the self also came up 
again, showing why the notion of aesthetic subjectivity should be linked to 
questions of ethics and politics.4 
 
Undoubtedly one of the key challenges that have come up during this crisis in 
aesthetic theory concerns the supposed universality and neutrality of the aesthetic 
subject. According to the earlier tradition of aesthetics – based on the work of 
Immanuel Kant, Edmund Burke, and some other eighteenth-century aestheticians 
– the apprehension of aesthetic qualities transcends all personal interests and 
concentrates one’s attention on the object of aesthetic appreciation itself. 
Consequently, pure (rein) aesthetic attention has been conceived to be 
incompatible with interest in other values, including social and ethical values, as 
well as cognitive concerns for truth and falsity. Preoccupation with one’s own 
particular situation, interest or gender has therefore been a standard mark of 
nonaesthetic attention. (Korsmeyer 1993, vii-viii.) As a result, major aspects of 
subjectivity such as sexuality, pleasure and social position have been excluded 
almost totally from the domain of aesthetic research on the grounds of irrelevance. 
 
Against this view, a vast number of contemporary aestheticians (from many 
schools of thought, not only post-modern and post-structuralist) have pointed out, 
at least since the 1980s, that aspects of human existence such as power, sexuality 
and gender are present in all conceptual schemes, no matter how masked they 
may be by claims of the subject’s universality and generality. Moreover, the study 
of the aesthetic subject has become more complex because of the better awareness 
of the influence of constructors such as ethnicity, class and other differences on 
aesthetic perception, values and self-images.  
 
Carolyn Korsmeyer crystallizes this shift in aesthetic theory in her Aesthetics in 
Feminist Perspective (1993) in the following words: “Gone is the idea that we can 
speak of ‘the’ act of appreciation and perception, and in its place is a complex 
model of readers and beholders whose particular genders, histories, and other 
‘differences’ such as race and cultural situation frame interpretation and ascription 
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of value” (Korsmeyer 1993, viii). On the other hand, as Korsmeyer continues, 
gone also is the earlier stress on the “purity” of aesthetic discipline, the idea that 
“matters of ‘aesthetic’ quality can be isolated from their traditional contraries: 
practical or instrumental value, moral significance, the exercise of political power. 
The answers to the questions posed from feminist perspectives are far from 
settled, but the framework within which they are formulated has altered the 
landscape of inquiry.” (Ibid.)  
 
As I will explicate in this dissertation, the aesthetic writings of the French 
historian and philosopher Michel Foucault represent a very similar attempt to re-
define and politicise the subject, although in slightly different terms. Throughout 
his career, Foucault continually investigated how human beings constitute 
themselves as subjects on the one hand, and how they treat each other as objects 
on the other. This problem was so central for him that he even stated that the 
general theme of his whole oeuvre was the subject (SP 209).5 Bearing this in 
mind, I will suggest that Foucault’s work not only includes implicit arguments 
and assumptions about the subject, even in cases in which the actual object of 
study is elsewhere – for example in art, power, systems of thought, the history of 
madness and sexuality – but that he also constantly attempted to re-write the 
notion of the subject to include aspects of life that earlier philosophy and 
aesthetics have typically ignored.6  
 
I therefore maintain that Foucault’s inquiries on the subject are particularly 
relevant to contemporary philosophical aesthetics as well, and not only to the 
philosophy of the subject. By repeatedly situating his analyses of the subject in the 
context of aesthetics and art, and by extending the scope of the subject to include 
aspects of the body, sexuality, society, transgression, discourse, and power, he 
drives aesthetic research to reconsider, and even go beyond, its most common 
objects of study, that is, the general principles of art and beauty. As I will point 
out, in his early archaeological writings on avant-garde literature Foucault 
concentrates on redefining the aesthetic subject through the terminology of 
transgression, sexuality and affectiveness. Later on, he takes up the notion of 
aesthetics again, now in the ancient context of the aesthetics of the self, arts of 
living and the aesthetics of existence. In this late phase of his work, the notion of 
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the subject is largely replaced by the term ’self’ (soi), that is now put at the core of 
critical activity. 
 
I will show how, in Foucault’s late aesthetics, the project of turning one’s life into 
a work of art came to represent for him an attempt to liberate the modern 
individual to exist in alternative ways than she/he is perhaps supposed to exist. He 
found much in our self-understanding that is not voluntary and consciously 
chosen, even though to term it involuntary would miss the extent to which we 
constitute our identities by conforming ourselves to tacitly understood practices 
and generally accepted norms. (Hoy 1999, 15.) Foucault’s talk about self-
understanding thus refers – not to the Cartesian knowledge that the self can have 
of itself – but to the study of observable manifestations of situated and historically 
limited experiences of the self. When understood in this way, self-understanding 
is not a matter of autonomous decision, or of knowing the essential nature of 
one’s natural self, but a matrix of social and discursive practices that vary 
historically, just as self-understanding does. (Ibid. 17-18.) 
 
The practices and aesthetic techniques individuals might use to reshape their lives 
and selves represent for Foucault practices of freedom (pratiques de la liberté) 
that include important ethical and political promises of more free and autonomous 
ways of living.7 Expressions he uses, such as autonomy or self, are not grounded 
on the idea of an innate or essential subject that would precede aesthetic 
judgement, however. I will rather suggest that, when using these terms, he was 
attempting to describe modes of being oneself from the perspective of the oneself 
(meaning here an abbreviation of the self as relation to itself). This oneself is not 
an entity, but rather pure practice, always in a specific mode. Individual existence 
is therefore always in the form of conduct stylization in Foucault’s later work, for 
it is exactly conduct that individualises individuals who wish “to give their 
existence the most graceful and accomplished form possible” (UP 250-251).8 
Hence Foucault’s idea that this oneself is human existence in an aesthetic mode 
(Boothroyd 1996, 362). 
 
In my reading of Foucault’s texts on the aesthetics of the self, I attempt to identify 
some structuring features at the core of his thinking. I will argue, for example, that 
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his thinking interacts not only with the focus in Enlightenment philosophy on the 
emancipation of the individual (an issue that is relevant to the actual emancipation 
of women as a larger whole as well), but also with developments in avant-garde 
aesthetics aimed at overcoming the isolation and alienation of the modern subject 
(urban, rational, productive, utilitarian) by turning his or her life into a work of 
art. Paying attention to these connections is to re-assess the thesis often made of 
Foucault, that he is an anti-Enlightenment thinker (Merquior 1985, 159; Wright 
1986, 16). With this in mind, I argue that Foucault’s late writings on aesthetics do 
not simply reject Enlightenment values (as his early aesthetics clearly does), but 
rather rework some of its central categories, such as the interrelated notions of the 
self, autonomy and emancipation (McNay 1992, 5).  
 
Although my enquiry into Foucault’s analyses of the aesthetic subject is the major 
component of the study at hand – the other major focus being on the feminist 
debate on the same issue – my intention is not to provide a systematic account of 
Foucault’s work in this respect, nor to provide a methodological inquiry into his 
oeuvre from the viewpoint of feminist theory. The overriding emphasis in my 
investigation is rather on two more limited questions. Firstly, what sort of 
theoretical tools do Foucault’s analyses of the subject and the self offer in terms of 
feminist attempts to rethink the aesthetic subject in ways that enable political 
subjects to transcend the homogenizing tendencies of power in modern societies? 
Secondly, how does the problem of the aesthetic constitution of the subject/self 
relate to the politics of identity, the body, the politics of representation, ethics, and 
questions of power and resistance, which are so important to all critical thinking? 
 
As I will show, Foucault’s thought parallels contemporary feminist theory in its 
attempt to reconsider the subject of the Enlightenment. Influenced by critical post-
modern theory, post-structuralism and post-colonialism, much of feminist inquiry 
has come to operate within the so-called post-feminist position, which has 
broadened the notion of female subjects (women) by paying attention not only to 
gender differences, but also to differential factors of identity among women such 
as ethnicity, class and sexual differences.9 This broadening has even led to 
declarations that the female subject is dead, and that it is a position instead of a 
person (Christian 1997, 68). In this work, I do not intend to examine the complex 
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philosophical context in which post-feminism functions, however. Rather, I will 
try to critically scan some of its basic assumptions concerning the subject, which 
have also led to reconsideration of the aesthetic, ethical and political aspects of 
feminism. 
 
As I will suggest, the development of feminist theory towards a post-feminist 
perspective has also brought to the fore the validity of the philosophical tradition 
of aesthetics. In my view, this has happened largely because, in contemporary 
thinking according to which the female subject is no longer explained as a natural 
or innate entity but seen far more in terms of cultural performance and different 
cultural positions adopted by different kinds of women, the idea of personal style, 
as well as of aesthetic technologies of gender, have assumed major significance 
(Heinämaa 1996 and de Lauretis 1987).  
 
In elaborating this idea, I will show that Foucault’s work on aesthetics includes 
material, the significance of which has not yet been fully recognized. I propose 
that this is obvious when we come to terms with his theorizations of aesthetic 
limit-attitudes and their key role in contemporary attempts to politicise and 
reconstruct the notions of gender identity and aesthetic subjectivity. There are, for 
sure, some inspiring comments on Foucault’s aesthetics, but none of them, as far I 
as I know, situate his insights explicitly within the canon of philosophical 
aesthetics, nor do they include a coherent view of his interest in the relations 
between aesthetics, the subject, power and the body.10  
 
On several occasions, like Foucault and many contemporary feminists, I make 
references to social aspects not in order to provide a full account of aesthetics in 
this respect, but to show the symptomatic relation between aesthetic theory and 
social phenomena. It is also in this context that I will make some critical 
comments on Foucault’s work. Following the lines of contemporary post-feminist 
thought, I will focus my attention especially on the relation of gender and 
sexualising power, and try to find out its position in modern theories of the subject 
and aesthetics of the self – an issue that is somewhat problematic in Foucault’s 
own account as well. My primal aim is not to record some possible chauvinism in 
Foucault or in any other male thinker, however. Rather, I intend to point out 
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where critical feminist re-visioning of the philosophical reconsideration of the 
notion of the subject is needed, and how this re-visioning is practised in the work 
of some contemporary feminist intellectuals. 
 
Because my intention is not to be simply for or against Foucault, but rather to 
move beyond polarized views on his work, I have chosen a method of research 
that illuminates his aesthetic writings on the subject and the body on the one hand, 
and that scans their usefulness for feminist theory on the other hand. In doing this, 
I will discuss Foucault’s work from many different standpoints, some of which 
will show its applicability to feminist thinking, while some others critically point 
out his indifference to gender politics and women’s historically lower status in the 
field of aesthetic subjectivity. The aim of this sort of research method is to address 
the strengths and weaknesses of Foucault’s aesthetics at the same time, and to 
provide some tools for moving beyond him when needed. 
 
My conclusions on Foucault’s usefulness for feminist thinking are clearly 
positive, however. Like Jana Sawicki, one of the most influental spokespersons 
for radically pluralist feminism, I will suggest that the tools he provides can be 
used for feminist ends despite some evident gender-related problems in his 
thinking. Yet, as I will propose, critical and supplementary views are also 
necessary, at least when we discuss Foucault’s work in the context of actual 
feminist problems. 
 
 
Foucault and the Tradition of Philosophical Aesthetics 
 
Ever since Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement (Kritik der Urteilskraft 1790), 
the tradition of aesthetics has been understood as exclusively a philosophy of the 
disinterested aesthetic mind and the specificity of aesthetic perception, or 
alternatively, as a philosophy of the specific (formal) qualities of aesthetic 
objects.11 Foucault, however, connects the term ’aesthetic’ to alternative forms of 
existing, as well as to questions of ethics and politics. In this respect, he uses the 
term ‘aesthetics’ in much the same way as proponents of the counter-tendencies 
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that have sought to extend the focus of philosophical aesthetics to include areas of 
life that the defenders of disinterested aesthetics have mainly excluded from high 
art (schöne Kunst) or pure aesthetics (rein Ästhetik). I am thinking here, for 
example, of Friedrich Schiller and his shift first from artistic to political and then 
to pedagogical art, and finally to the art of life (Lebenskunst), Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s fundamentalization of aesthetic activity, Søren Kierkegaard and his 
description of aesthetic existence, and John Dewey’s integration of art and life.  
 
In challenging the defenders of pure autonomous aesthetics, Foucault takes up two 
arguments. Firstly, he claims that the notion of the subject is never at one with 
permanent structures that constitute or condition reality, but is produced 
historically in and through its social world. What this means, in concrete terms, is 
that the subject of aesthetics is also historically and socially shaped, and thus 
cannot express disinterested or universal perceptions and statements, as 
spokespersons for autonomous aesthetics have largely believed. Already in his 
archaeological period, Foucault pointed out that all knowledge simultaneously 
presupposes and constitutes power relations, which are relayed though different 
discourses be they aesthetic, philosophical or something else. His primary interest 
was not to record the ideological or political basis of disinterested aesthetics, 
however, but to show how the subjects of knowledge are constituted, and how this 
constitution is related to the historically varying issues of art, truth, knowledge 
and power. This is largely the same as saying that, in his thinking, the perceiving, 
acting and knowing subject becomes politicized.12 
 
The second critical aspect of Foucault’s thought concerns the tendency in 
philosophical aesthetics to associate art either with artists or with fixed art objects 
that are to be contemplated in sterile venues such as art galleries and museums. 
On this subject, he offers a polemical comment:  
 
What strikes me is that fact that in our society, art has become something 
which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is 
something which is specialized or which is done by experts who are artists. 
But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or 
the house be an art object, but not our life? (GE 236.)13 
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Although Foucault himself never made straight references to the tradition of 
philosophical aesthetics, his usage of the term ‘aesthetics’ finds legitimation not 
only as part of the counter-tendencies of aesthetics I mentioned above, but also 
with respect to the older tradition, according to which the word ‘aesthetics’ is 
associated with the Greek word class aisthanomai, aistheta, aisthesis, 
aisthanestai, aisthetos and aisthetikos, in other words, with expressions that 
designate sensation and perception altogether, prior to all artistic meanings.14  
 
This usage is also to be found in Alexander Baumgarten, one of the most 
renowned pioneers of philosophical aesthetics.15 I suggest that Foucault’s interest 
in aesthetics as aisthesis was already evident in his early writings on artistic 
transgression, for example in “The Preface to Transgression” (1963), in which he 
attempts to liberate the rational subject to better cope with the affective and sexual 
aspects of being. Later on, when coming to terms with the history of sexuality and 
aesthetics of the self, he strengthened his position through his linking of sexual 
pleasure and aesthetic self-realization with individual autonomy and critique. 
 
Finally, when located in the context of philosophical aesthetics, Foucault’s usage 
of the term ‘aesthetic’ might also be connected to current usage of the term, which 
is not restricted to the analysis of the disinterested character of aesthetic 
judgments, or to feelings associated with beauty. It has rather come to designate a 
branch of research that may include notions of aesthetic behavior or aesthetic 
lifestyle, environmental aesthetics, political art, aesthetic ideology, aesthetic 
peculiarities of contemporary mass media, feminist issues, and the increasing 
aestheticization of the world, to give just a few examples. Wolfgang Welsch talks 
about these new domains of aesthetic research in terms of “new states of 
aisthesis,” which, for him, present one of the most challenging tasks of 
contemporary aesthetics. To cite Welsch: 
 
Aesthetics should make these new states of aisthesis and the accompanying 
transformation of cultural patterns the object of its analyses. By doing so it 
could presumably also help us carry out these transformation processes in a 
clearer and more reliable way. Besides, therein lies a chance for aesthetics 
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to change from a rather dusty old discipline to being an interesting field of 
contemporary analysis and discussion again. (Welsch 1997, 87.) 
 
As this dissertation will show, Foucault’s aesthetics offers one challenging 
example of this sort of contemporary aesthetic theory, which does not perhaps fit 
some of our earlier suppositions concerning aesthetics and art, but rather demands 
serious re-consideration of the basic premises of aesthetic research itself. 
Moreover, his thinking also offers a challenging background for a contemporary 
feminist aesthetician to test the functioning of her/his theoretical tools in the 
present age. What the grasping of Foucault’s aesthetics demands, in my view, is a 
move towards what Carolyn Korsmeyer calls an “interdisciplinary viewpoint,” 
which may also include aspects of thought from such areas of research as 
sexuality, the body, pleasure, ethics, politics, sociology or feminism (Korsmeyer 
1993, ix). 
 
 
Foucault and Feminism 
 
In this study, the connecting of Foucault’s aesthetics with contemporary feminist 
theory is primarily meant to demonstrate how his insights are compatible with 
theories of female aesthetic subjectivity, be the discussion focused on the subject 
or the self, the body, gender, or sexuality. Moreover, given that he is one of the 
major figures in recent discussions of the aesthetics of the self, all considerations 
of Foucault’s work almost necessarily have to take into account contemporary 
feminist questions concerning the subject.  
 
What makes the connection between these two discourses even stronger is the fact 
that Foucault’s work has inspired a large number of feminists to rethink their 
conceptions of the subject and the self, as well as their views of the body, power, 
and language. Yet, at the same time, feminist debate has brought to the light some 
serious problems in Foucault’s thinking. In discussing this, I intend to show how 
Foucault offers a set of adequate tools for re-constructing feminist views on the 
aesthetic construction of the subject and the self, on the one hand, and how, on the 
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other hand, his work requires critique and reformulation when brought together 
with feminist insights. 
 
The engagement between the thought of Foucault and feminist theory has tended 
to focus on the work of his middle-years, most notably Discipline and Punish 
(Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison, 1975) and the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality (Histoire de la sexualité, I: la Volonté de savoir, 1976).16 In 
this period of writing, usually described as his genealogical phase, Foucault 
presents his famous theory of power, which feminists have used to explain some 
aspects of women’s oppression.  
 
Despite the fact that Foucault himself mainly ignores the question of the equality 
of the sexes, or, better, makes only some rather superficial references to the issue, 
his suggestion that sexuality is not a natural or innate quality of the body, but 
rather the effect of historically specific power relations, embodied in the 
individual’s process of subjection, has provided feminists with a fresh analytical 
framework through which to explain how women’s experience is controlled and 
impoverished within certain culturally-determined stereotypes of female sexuality.  
 
Moreover, his idea that the self and the body are produced through power, and 
thus are primarily cultural not natural entities, has made a significant contribution 
to feminist efforts to overcome the older essentialist ideas of women. (McNay 
1992, 3.) As Jana Sawicki puts it, the importance of Foucault’s account for 
feminism lies in the fact that he does not provide an alternative theory of the self, 
but rather “a way of looking at our theories of self and society and a method for 
re-evaluating them, for freeing up possibilities for new forms of experience that 
might lead to a different understanding of theory, of ourselves, of reality” 
(Sawicki 1991, 11). 
 
For Foucault, it is first of all discourse that constitutes the bridge between the 
material and the theoretical (Braidotti 1991: 78-79, 88-89), in other words, 
discourse is productive not only of statements, but also of the subject as both the 
target and the object of power. So conceived, the subject is seen as a performative, 
discursive site, which is implicated in the very same power relationships that 
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allow the theoretical text to function. This analysis, as Mariam Fraser notes, has 
influenced feminist scholars because it “allows the material effects of discourse to 
be taken seriously, while at the same time, given the changing conditions of 
discourse, renders these effects contingent” (Fraser 1997, 24). More simply put, 
while the materiality of conceptions such as women is not denied, the notion of 
women as a foundational category that is fixed across cultures and through time is 
called into question. 
 
What is relevant to feminist theory is also Foucault’s genealogical claim that 
power is always productive and not only suppressive, because it affects the 
constitution of our selves through various forms of knowledge, norms, ideals, 
stereotypes, laws, habits and discursive practices. Applied to the social norms and 
laws of heterosexualising Western culture, for example, this means that our being 
or becoming women (and men) is defined from birth to death by a complex 
network of limiting practices (such as what is considered to be normal), 
discourses, and ways of thinking and representing, which we cannot ignore even if 
we would like to. According to Foucault, normality and stereotypical views on 
sexuality are constituted in this network of power that models our subjectivity.  
 
Seen in this way, individual identity, or one’s being male or female, or feminine 
or masculine, is not grounded on any innate or natural self, but becomes 
constantly produced and re-produced in and through different strategic cultural 
models and discursive practices that vary historically. For Foucault, these 
practices and strategies represent power relations, which are intimately connected 
to political power. At the same time, however, it is exactly these models and 
practices that may be used to disturb the existing limits and norms imposed on 
individuals, assuming that they are used creatively and in unexpected ways. To 
give one concrete and simple example, the representation of the female body and 
sexuality can also be reproduced and represented in ways that disrupt the 
stereotypical and normative ways of “looking like a woman.” 
 
The active aesthetic disturbance of the stereotypical ways of representing and 
reproducing women is not, of course, valuable only for its own sake. In the 
contemporary West, it could rather be seen as one effective means of creating 
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representational space for different kinds of women, many of which do not fit the 
stereotypical picture. In other words, disturbing representations of women are part 
of their cultural idealization and are, in this respect, also effective political tools, 
because they have the power to challenge the look of the perceiver and show 
things otherwise. With this in mind, Kaja Silverman notes: “Visual texts are 
important because they have the power to re-educate the look” (Silverman 1996, 
5). 
 
Despite the fact that feminists have been mainly interested in Foucault’s 
genealogical work, and often ignore his early archaeology as well as his late 
writings on the aesthetics of the self, I will suggest that there are interesting 
connections between these phases and feminist theory. As I intend to explicate in 
the first part of this study, Foucault’s archaeological critique of the rational 
subject and his ideas of transgressive aesthetic subjectivity are parallel in many 
respects to the critique of feminists such as Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous who, 
like Foucault, attempt to open up a space in which to consider difference and 
otherness in the context of rationality.  
 
In Foucault’s view, the greatest problem of our time is the inability to think 
difference, and the fear to conceive of the Other in the context of our own thought 
(AK 12).  His example of this Other is not woman, however, as in Irigaray and 
Cixous, but a madman (and later on, in his aesthetics of the self, a homosexual), 
whose exclusion from and shutting out of history is the dark reverse side of the 
creation of rational subjectivity, who represents itself through the history of the 
Same – that is, the history of the rational order and identity imposed on things 
(OT, xxiv). The archaeological method is, in a nutshell, Foucault’s early attempt 
to unpack the discursive regularities that underlie the thought of the same, or the 
identity logic of Enlightenment rationality (McNay 1994, 48-49). As I will 
suggest, a similar theme is taken up in Irigaray and Cixous in terms of the 
reconsideration of the importance of “sexual difference” in philosophical thinking 
(which, according to Irigaray, is the fundamental philosophical question of our 
era) and women’s otherness; women who have been, just like Foucault’s madmen 
and homosexuals, excluded from the history of the sameness of rational male 
subjectivity.17  
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Foucault’s early ideas on transgressive subjectivity and limit-attitudes led him to 
connect his visions to the creation of an avant-garde language in which the 
speaking subject is re-positioned and re-defined as an unstable linguistic structure 
that tends to disappear into the textual voids of avant-garde literature. Again, the 
same gesture is repeated in Irigaray’s and Cixous’s work. They also seek traces of 
the new feminine subjectivity from experimental avant-garde language (in 
Irigaray’s advocacy of parler femme and Cixous’s notion of écriture féminine as 
speaking to a kind of feminine unconsciousness), which ought to directly mirror 
female physical morphology, be this expressed through the linguistic experiences 
of feminine sexual jouissance, or in terms of some more focused parts of women’s 
genitals (in Irigaray, the “lips that speak,” for example).  
 
The specific female style that both Irigaray and Cixous seek is, in principle, 
available to both men and women, but becomes associated strongly with the 
female body. The new subject who writes or speaks the feminine avant-garde 
language is, in their view, not attempting to master the objects of her knowledge, 
but creates instead openings and free space for the other and difference to emerge. 
It is a question of a specific feminine language, which overcomes the traditional 
hierarchies (between rational and sensuous, for example) and leads the way for 
more ethical modes of communication. So conceived, the constitution of the 
“new” subject is understood in Irigaray and Cixous, just as in early Foucault, as 
primarily an aesthetic experience in that it occurs at the point at which rational 
language, and along with it rational and coherent identity, break down into “raw” 
affective aesthetic material. Avant-garde literature thus becomes the site of the 
dissolution of the subject for both archaeological Foucault and “woman-centred” 
French feminism. 
 
What is problematic in these accounts, in my view, is that despite their useful 
critique of the rational master-subject, early Foucault, and Irigaray and Cixous 
alike, end up idealizing experimental writing as a privileged medium of change 
and transgression. In other words, their radicalisation of the subject is linked to 
the radicalization of artistic language, but this analysis fails to offer any adequate 
perspectives on the institutional locations and broader ideological networks that 
frame textual production and perception – also when coming to terms with 
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experimental avant-garde texts (Felski 1989; Singer 1989). Therefore, I will argue 
that both archaeological Foucault and women-centred French feminism can be 
criticized for a tendency to aestheticize ideas of the transgressive subject, 
difference and otherness in ways that do not give enough attention to the 
ideological basis of their own critique or partly as a result of this, to the social and 
political problems of different groups of people for whom the idea of 
experimental writing does not seem to offer any adequate form of liberation (the 
non-educated, the non-white, the non-artistic, for example).  
 
In other words, I claim that the avant-garde aesthetics of early Foucault and his 
feminist corollaries is problematic because it tends to generalize the experiences 
of a small aesthetic/literary elite to represent the new transgressive subject. Due to 
the elitist nature of their account, a huge number of individuals become excluded 
from the position of aesthetic subjects, and are implicitly denied all possibilities to 
respond critically to the specific limits imposed on their existence: at least, it is 
hard to see how this could happen through the visions of early Foucault and the 
French feminists mentioned above.  
 
Later on in his oeuvre, when coming to terms with the aesthetics of the self, 
Foucault again takes up the notion of the aesthetic and represents it as a central 
theme in the idea of the reinvention of the self that takes the form of art of living 
or the aesthetics of existence. In this scheme, the subject no longer loses itself to 
avant-garde language, as was the case in Foucault’s archaeological writings. 
Rather, through the process of aesthetic stylization of one’s life, the individual 
takes him/her self as an object of complex and difficult elaboration, which 
Foucault also terms a work of art. He thus understands this kind of individual 
activity as a type of creative action and artistry.  
 
Just like some earlier avant-gardists (dadaists, International Situationists, and 
Joseph Beuys, for example), Foucault does not take the creation of an individual 
lifestyle as merely a question of aesthetics, however. He rather considers the 
aesthetics of the self a term that designates a continuous attempt to criticize and 
break up social practices and power relations. In this respect, it is, again, a 
question of aesthetic limit-attitudes and transgressive subjectivity. In Foucault’s 
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view, power can be shaken only when people become conscious of it and create 
an individual lifestyle, which seeks new, alternative ways of acting, speaking, 
thinking and relating. This individual lifestyle is like an artwork, not in the fixed, 
framed and stable sense of the term, but rather as an open process, as an ability to 
create unexpected relations to reality and to give artistic form to one’s existence.  
 
Seen in this way, philosophy comes to mean for Foucault a form of critical 
activity that is intimately connected to the individual’s life and to creativeness. In 
this context, the stylization of one’s self thus does not merely concern the 
“surface” or body aesthetics of the individual, but touches all levels of identity: 
the notion of style is intimately connected to the individual’s moral and political 
existence, as well as to self-understanding. So conceived, style is a lifelong 
project of giving shape to the individual’s existence, and it may involve the use of 
different kinds of technologies or techniques of the self. 
 
Aesthetics, in this context, is used as a term that refers not to fixed artworks or to 
specialists called artists, but rather to different sorts of ethical practices that were 
meant to give individual life a certain aesthetic style and shape. To see how all-
encompassing one’s individual aesthetic style might be, we only need to look at 
Foucault’s list of types of human endeavour and the different types of 
technologies developed to ease their pursuance.  
 
For Foucault, the individual’s style of existing, or alternatively, art of living, 
involves all the technologies that human beings have devised for shaping 
themselves and the world around them. There are four main categories in 
Foucault’s analysis of the different technologies that might be used by the 
individual: 1) technologies of production, which permit them to produce, 
transform, or manipulate things, 2) technologies of sign systems, which permit 
them to use signs, meanings and symbols 3) technologies of power, which 
determine their conduct, and submit them to certain ends or domination, an 
objectivizing of the subject, and finally 4) technologies of the self, which permit 
them to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of 
operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct and ways of being, so 
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as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of freedom, happiness, 
purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (TS 18.)  
 
Embracing all of these aspects of human life, aesthetic style is the form human 
existence takes, as well as the process of actively forming that existence 
(McWhorter 1999, 190). What differentiates this idea from contemporary analysis 
of the so-called “aestheticization process” (meaning, roughly, the process in 
which the individual’s selfhood and life are turned into the raw material of 
aesthetic consumption or surface aesthetics) is that, in his late work, Foucault does 
not focus on the negative aspects of the aestheticization of the self in 
(post)modern societies, as thinkers such as Wolfgang Welsch, Gerhard Schultze, 
Jean Baudrillard Frederic Jameson and Susan Bordo do, for example.  
 
Rather, as I intend to point out, for late Foucault, the aesthetic technologies of the 
self come to serve the ends of the enlightenment process in the sense that he 
introduces them as ways of enforcing an individual’s autonomy and experiences 
of freedom in an ethically and politically acceptable manner. What this also 
means is that his earlier hostility towards the Enlightenment tradition, expressed 
most clearly in The Order of Things (Les mots et les choses 1966), is replaced in 
his late aesthetics by a much more positive account of how Enlightenment 
thinking may provide answers to the main concerns expressed in his late 
aesthetics: What is our own era, and how are we to constitute ourselves as 
subjects in its conditions?  
 
In the last part of this study, I will consider how these ideas of late Foucault 
benefit feminist theorizations of the subject, gender identity and the body. As in 
the earlier parts, I will also put forward some critical viewpoints. My “final” 
suggestion will be that, although there are some limits to feminist collaboration 
with Foucault, his late aesthetics nevertheless offers a set of challenging tools for 
feminist attempts to rethink the subject in ways that enable political subjects to 
transgress the limits of normalizing gender practices.  
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Feminist Theory and Questions of Selves 
 
For the most part, feminist theorists assumed earlier that there exists an identity, 
understood through the universal category of women, which not only initiates 
feminist goals and interests within discourse, but also constitutes the subject for 
whom political representation is pursued (Butler 1990, 1). Grounded in a 
hypothesized model of female consciousness or experience, which is taken to 
unite women across their differences, subject-based or essentialist feminist theory, 
which dominated the field of feminist studies until the late 1980s, stressed 
women’s affinity with nature and the body, their greater need for intimacy and 
interpersonal relations, and their suspicion of abstract instrumental thought (Rich 
1977; Griffin 1984; Gilligan 1982). This sort of women-centered or, alternatively, 
gynocritical thinking has typically operated within the conception of patriarchal 
ideology as a uniformly repressive and homogenous phenomenon that masks 
authentic female subjectivity, rather than as manifesting itself in complex 
formations of beliefs, discourses, structures and representations, which permeate 
and shape the subjective sense of self of both women and men (Felski 1989).  
 
Based on these theoretical premises, the female aesthetics that evolved during the 
early years of the women’s liberation movement in the 1960s and 1970s presented 
a radical response to a tradition in which the assumed goal of women’s literature 
and art had been a smooth passage into a universal and neutral aesthetic realm.18 
The claim was rather that women’s writing expressed a distinct female 
consciousness, that it constituted a coherent literary tradition, and that women 
writers who denied their female identity restricted or even crippled their art. 
French feminist theorists on writing such as Irigaray and Cixous based their ideas 
of female language largely on these ideas. I use the term ‘gynocritics’ to refer to 
the feminist theories that developed alongside female aesthetics in the 1970s. Like 
the female aesthetics, gynocriticism identified women’s writing as a central 
subject of feminist criticism, but rejected the concept of an essential female 
identity and style. The focus moved from authentic female subjectivity to the 
multiple signifying systems of female literary traditions and intertextualities. 
(Showalter 1997, 62-66.)  
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Contrary to these interpretations, which pursue authentic female subjectivity and 
its aesthetic representation, various post-feminist thinkers, such as Judith Butler, 
Susan Bordo, Teresa de Lauretis, bell hooks and Rita Felski, have stressed the 
complex connections between the subject, gender, class, ethnicity, power and 
politics, and the possibilities women have to create disturbance by using 
oppressive or stereotypical discourses (such as ways of talking and acting, and 
visual culture). According to them, it is not enough to ask how women could 
create authentic aesthetics of their selves based on ideas of universal femininity, 
or to consider how they could become more fully represented in art, language and 
politics, as many earlier feminists formulated their questions. Instead, various 
post-feminists have suggested that feminist research ought instead to ask how the 
category of women, the very subject of feminism, is produced and re-produced by 
the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought, and 
accordingly, how this cultural production of women affects their aesthetic 
constitution of their selves. 
 
What this means is that post-feminist intellectuals do not presume the existence of 
a universally valid entity called ‘woman’ behind various aesthetic experiences, 
representations, values and deeds. Rather, they suppose that there exists a diverse 
group of people termed ‘women,’ who deserve to be represented through a 
number of different kinds of cultural practices and discourses, be these expressed 
in the form of philosophy, literature, pictures, performances, everyday aesthetics 
of the self or something else. Therefore, in the post-feminist framework women’s 
aesthetics of the self cannot be expressed in terms of uniform female aesthetics. 
Rather, the aesthetic subject becomes politicized and pluralized as a site of 
conflicting cultural interests and practices that become manifest in the different 
performances and representations of feminine or female self.19  
 
With similar thoughts in mind, a number of post-feminist thinkers have suggested 
that we are not simply born women or men (as many earlier feminists supposed) 
because our selves and bodies cannot be said to have a signifiable existence prior 
to the mark of their socially produced gender (Butler 1990, 7). In other words, 
womanhood and manhood become perceived, first of all, as cultural skills we 
learn to perform – in much the same way as we learn to eat, walk or ride a bicycle 
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(Hein 1997). Due to the fact that the analysis of these skills easily leads to the 
analysis of individual style and aesthetic signs, through which one’s style is 
necessarily expressed, post-feminist theories largely consider the analysis of the 
subject a question of aesthetics, be this discussed in terms of individual stylistics, 
aesthetic performance, or something else. 
 
In this study, this post-feminist constructive aspect of gender functions as the 
basis for my analysis of feminist aesthetics of the self. I have chosen to stress the 
performative and socially constructed nature of gender in order to grasp some 
important ties between the aesthetic subject, the body, discourse and power that 
are, in my view, always present in the constitution of the self, but too often remain 
unarticulated, even in feminist debate. In other words, in my analysis of the 
feminist aesthetics of the self I stress the culturally constructed nature of gender 
because I am primarily interested in finding out how the problem of social and 
political power is related to the aesthetic constitution of the self and the body, and 
in considering what kind of possibilities exist to resist, alter, thwart and effect 
subversions inside this power by aesthetic means. I will therefore mainly ignore 
such vast areas of study as our biological bodies, which is without doubt an 
important object of feminist research, but a detailed analysis of which would 
demand no less than another dissertation. 
 
 
On the Work at Hand 
 
This thesis is divided into three parts. In the first and second parts, the problem of 
the aesthetics of the subject and the body is discussed through an analysis of 
Foucault’s first two theoretical periods, archaeology and genealogy. Both of these, 
although with different emphases, attempt to reveal how the discursive practices 
that affect the constitution of our selves (such as truths about ‘sexuality’ and 
‘man’) are motivated and shaped by power, and how even our scientific 
knowledge is always constituted in and through complex networks of power.  
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I will begin by explicating briefly how the question of the subject is represented in 
Foucault’s archaeology, and continue with a closer examination of his views on 
avant-garde literature, transgression, discourse, ethics, the body, and sexuality. In 
the first chapter, my intention is to open up the main lines of his archaeological 
aesthetic argumentation and to consider why and how his earlier views on the 
issue of the subject are important for feminist debate (as well as for his own later 
thinking). What follows is a short introduction to the main concerns in the work of 
Irigaray and Cixous, who have expressed similar criticism of the Cartesian 
master-subject in relation to the issue of women’s otherness and marginality in 
philosophical and artistic discourses. 
 
In coming to terms with Foucault’s genealogical method in the second part of my 
work, I intend to show how his thinking comes to include a more developed 
notion of power. As I will suggest, this happens largely along the shift in the 
centre of gravity from the language-centred analysis of discourse toward the 
genealogical analysis of the power relations inherent in the constitution of 
knowledge, the subject and the body. An important aspect of Foucault’s 
genealogical analysis as far as feminist research is concerned is his notion of the 
bio-power with which he refers to the tendency of modern power to subject 
human bodies to the docility-utility principle.  
 
Towards the end of the second part, I will consider the usefulness of Foucault’s 
genealogical analysis of power, most notably his concepts of bio-power and 
docility, for feminist accounts by focusing on women’s huge level of 
dissatisfaction with their bodies in the contemporary West. As I will point out, the 
power of normalizing discourses is well evidenced in all of the cases, in which 
women are afraid of becoming socially or sexually rejected for being “too fat” or 
“too old.” Seen through these real historical experiences, the new freedom women 
are often claimed to have over their bodies in the era of body building, plastic 
surgery and personal training programs, seems to be just another historical 
expression of the normalizing power that has not simply increased their freedom, 
but has also tended to make them more docile in new ways.  
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Yet, as I will demonstrate, Foucault’s genealogical notion of docility and, along 
with it, his notion of productive power, have also been criticized by some 
feminists, who find fault with his genealogical method for its negative tone, and 
for not offering tools to consider women’s possibilities to actively change things 
“for the better.” In my presentation of this problem, I will bring out some of these 
critical voices on the one hand, and on the other, I aim to move beyond all 
polarized views by showing that, although there is indeed a clear gender blindness 
in Foucault’s account, his work provides a stepping stone toward the positive 
aspect of women’s power.  
 
As Part Three will illustrate, in the last period of his writing Foucault’s interest 
shifts more clearly to the analysis of the positive aspects of power. Consequently, 
he now begins to consider power to be primarily a liberating force in the 
individualization process. In my view, this shift in his thought is interesting with 
respect to contemporary feminist insights, and there are good reasons to believe 
that it will also become an important object of analysis for feminist intellectuals in 
the near future, in the same way that his genealogy has been for feminism.  
 
The applicability of Foucault’s thinking to feminism will thus be pointed out 
again in the last part of the study. As in the earlier parts, I will also offer some 
critical insights, the main intention of which is to consider in which compartments 
Foucault’s theoretical toolbox might be in need of some replenishment, and to 
point out that some parts of his work might even demand serious re-consideration, 
notably when they are used to support feminist debate on the subject, aesthetics, 
and the body.  
 
By shifting the focus towards the present age and current feminist issues, I attempt 
to put into practice the principle that Foucault calls the “ontology of the present.” 
In other words, my ultimate intention is to use the theoretical tools he offers as a 
means to constitute one theoretical picture of the questions of selves in our own 
era, notably questions concerning the aesthetic construction of the subject and the 
body. At the same time, my connecting of Foucault with feminist theory means 
complementing his work with a problem he did acknowledge but never really 
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examined, namely, the question of the equality of the sexes in the debate on the 
aesthetic constitution of the self.  
 
Seen from another perspective, the study at hand is an attempt to take seriously 
the challenge Foucault offers to his readers when re-reading Kant’s and 
Baudelaire’s conceptions of modernity, and asking: What is our own era? And 
how are we to constitute ourselves as subjects in its conditions? In other words, 
this work is also an attempt to balance the tradition of the Enlightenment and 
critical modernity in the present time by bringing to light topical views on the 
aesthetic creation of the self. 
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I  
ARCHAEOLOGY AND AVANT-GARDE AESTHETICS 
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1. ARCHAEOLOGY AND THE AESTHETIC SUBJECT 
  
As I have already made clear, in this study my investigation of Foucault’s 
thinking centers on two main questions. Firstly, what kind of tools does he offer in 
terms of attempts to rethink the subject in ways that enable political subjects to 
transcend the homogenizing tendencies of power in modern societies? Secondly, 
how do his views on subjectivity relate to actual subject of interest in the politics 
of identity, the body, the politics of representation, ethics and power?  
 
To set this analysis in motion, I begin with a short introduction of Foucault’s 
archaeological views on the subject, aesthetics, ethics and transgression. The final 
goal of my presentation of these issues is to prepare the way for the interpretation 
put forward in the second and third parts of this study, which illuminates 
Foucault’s later elaborations of the notion of the subject. As I will demonstrate, 
the three perspectives of Foucault’s writing – archaeology, genealogy and the 
aesthetics of the self – are not distinct from each other, but rather support and 
enlarge each other, not least in connection with questions concerning the subject 
or the self and on related issues of individual ethics and limit-attitudes.  
 
In addition to this, I point out in the first part of the study some convergences 
between Foucault’s earlier interests in avant-garde aesthetics and views by French 
feminists such as Cixous and Irigaray. These convergences are evidence of a 
common attempt to discuss aesthetic subjectivity in terms that highlight affective 
and embodied dimensions of human experience and preserve radical otherness, 
although with the difference that in Foucault, the exemplary case of this “other” 
was never a woman (as it is in Cixous and Irigaray), but rather a male madman, a 
homosexual and a criminal. 
 
One of the central intentions of Foucault’s archaeological method was to show 
that historical changes in discourses and knowledge affect our views on the 
subject. Moreover, as Foucault emphasized, once you define the “subject,” you 
define what it is capable of being and doing. Consequently, all other possibilities 
are occluded, resulting in a type of death, in an impossibility for human existence. 
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This idea is well expressed in The Order of Things (Les Mots et les choses: une 
archéologie des sciences humaines 1966), in which Foucault analyses the 
impossibility of representing representation – i.e. the limits of capturing all 
possibilities for the self, and therefore the inability to close the circle of the 
subject onto itself. For Foucault, if limits are not given, and there is no essential 
“subject,” then we are obliged to create ourselves, in other words, to continually 
transgress the limits of our knowledge, language, and our selves.  
 
These archaeological notions on the subject and limit-attitudes were closely 
related to Foucault’s critique of Enlightenment humanism, which took a self-
reflective turn to construct man as an object of knowledge. In the context of his 
analysis of modern sciences (The Order of Things), he maintains that all social-
scientific knowledge is based on a particular conception of human reality, namely 
that of man. Modern thought accepted this conception as definitive of human 
reality as such, defining man as that entity for which all representations of objects 
exist. To assert the reality of man in the modern sense is to posit a being that is 
both an object in the world and an experiencing subject through which the world 
is constituted. In Foucault’s view, this has been true at least since Kant, who was 
the first to consider representation as one form of thought, and also the first to 
seek the epistemological conditions that make it possible (OT, 303-343; Gutting 
1995, 11).20  
 
The aim of these archaeological notions was twofold. Firstly, by calling into 
question the notion of man, Foucault hoped to undermine the idea in 
Enlightenment philosophy that scientific and rational thought progressively 
acquires a greater proximity to truth, thereby enhancing humanity. Secondly, he 
wished to deny that the human sciences had a genuine object (man) to talk about. 
As a logical conclusion, Foucault also set in doubt man’s position as a knowing 
subject: he did not consider knowledge to be constituted by the rational and fixed 
human subject, but rather saw it as an effect of a primary linguistic-discursive 
formation, or a set of fundamental rules that define the discursive space in which 
the speaking subject exists. 
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What resulted from his arhaeological line of argumentation was the “death” of 
man, in other words, the transformation of the rational man-subject into a 
linguistic, transgressive and affective structure. One of the most extreme 
conclusions Foucault made on the grounds of this line of argumentation was that 
man was on the way out, and pure discourse was coming in, discourse without the 
knowing subject who utters the words. This idea led him to propose his famous 
thesis of the death of the author. 
 
 
The Death of the Author 
 
In his early essays, written between 1962 and 1969, Foucault applied the problem 
of man-subject and Enlightenment rationality to aesthetics through his treatment 
of late nineteenth-century and twentieth-century avant-garde literature. These 
investigations were all closely related to his philosophical projects, forming an 
inquiry into the thought beyond – or, better, outside – the subject.21 Instead of 
continuing the modern tradition that had, at least since Kant, connected artistic 
creation to the gifts of an individual subject, Foucault argued in his essay “What is 
an Author” (1969) that the author is nothing but a historically constructed rational 
idea: it is just a question of a function of a certain discourse, that is, a discourse 
whose function is to characterize the existence, operation, and circulation of 
certain discourses within a society (WA 124).  
 
Foucault’s argument for the death of the author incorporated key socio-historical 
aspects that set genius- and work-centred aesthetics in doubt. He was interested in 
finding out how the author had been individualized in the West, and how we 
could conceive of the author’s function in the present age.22 With his emphasis on 
the importance of the context of each artwork, Foucault challenged the more 
traditional ideas of the author as intending to represent some specific thoughts or 
personal emotions in his or her work, as well as the (formalist) conception that 
prevails even today that criticism should focus on the structures of the work, 
which is to be studied for its intrinsic and internal relations. The critical question 
Foucault raised was: What is necessary to the work’s composition if a person 
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called “the author” does not write it? This raises another issue. Of what elements 
is the literary work composed? To cite Foucault’s own words: “If an individual is 
not an author, what are we to make of those things he has written or said, left 
among his papers or communicated to others? […] What, for instance, were 
Sade’s papers before he was consecrated as an author? Little more, perhaps, than 
rolls of paper on which he endlessly unravelled his fantasies while in prison.” 
(WA 118.)23 
 
Foucault’s answers were intimately connected to his willingness to replace 
rational Cartesian thinking, which represents the philosopher – as well as the artist 
– as the sovereign and primary form of language by a more fluid notion of the 
subject (PT 42). The imagined disappearance of the subject (man/author) made 
Focault discover a language that showed the essential void at its centre, a void that 
represented the “absence of the subject.” In another early essay entitled “A 
Preface to Transgression” (1963), he described this turning point towards 
transgressive new language in terms of silence, another language, and a void in 
which a multiplicity of speaking subjects are joined and severed, combined and 
excluded.  
 
It should be noted that in his early aesthetic writings, Foucault never recommends 
abandoning the notion of the subject entirely. What he attempts to do instead is to 
grasp its functions, its intervention in discourse, and its structure of dependencies 
(WA 137). Seen in this way, the purpose of killing the author was not to get rid of 
the notion of the subject, but rather to revitalize the idea of the subject by situating 
it as a fluid and affective function, within the space cleared by Foucault’s 
archaeological tools. (WA 137. See also note 22, pp. 125.)  
 
Moreover, because Foucault denies the idea of creative genius and 
correspondence between the intentions of the author and the work, “the essential 
basis of writing is not the exalted emotions related to the act of composition or the 
insertion of a subject into language” (WA 116).24 It is rather primarily concerned 
with “creating an opening where the writing subject endlessly disappears” (WA 
116).25 In this respect, as Foucault concludes, the work could be seen as the 
murderer of the author. At least this is what he sees happening in the texts of 
  
 
 
46
 
avant-gardist writers such as Flaubert, Proust and Kafka, whose texts transgress 
the limits of representational and subjective expression, cancelling out the signs of 
the writer’s particular individuality, and obliterating the self that “does not require 
representation in books because it takes place in the everyday existence of the 
writer” (WA 117, emphasis mine).26 
 
 
The Aesthetic Subject and Transgression  
 
Foucault’s early interest in the aesthetic subject is also intimately linked to his 
attempt to reconsider the foundations of the knowing and speaking subject from 
the affective bodily standpoint. From his reading of Bataille, he suggests that “the 
death of God does not restore us to a limited and positivistic world, but to a world 
exposed by the experience of its limits, made and unmade by that excess which 
transgresses it” (PT 72).27 Interestingly, Foucault sees the death of God as tied to 
the same experience as sexuality, namely the excess of experience, which he also 
terms “transgression.”  
 
In Foucault’s view, transgression as an “excess of experience” both presupposes a 
limit and constitutes it in its attempt to overcome it. Alternatively expressed, 
transgression  
 
[S]erves as a glorification of the nature it excludes: the limit opens violently 
onto the limitless, finds itself suddenly carried away by the content it had 
rejected and fulfilled by this alien plenitude which invades it to the core of 
its being. Transgression carries the limit right to the limit of its being; 
transgression forces the limit to face the fact of its imminent disappearance, 
to find itself in what it excludes (perhaps, to be more exact, to recognize 
itself for the first time), to experience its positive truth in its downward fall. 
(PT 73.)28 
 
Yet, transgression, for Foucault, does not mean overcoming the limits. It is rather 
that transgression and limit depend on each other, for “transgression is an action 
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which involves the limit, that narrow zone of a line where it displays the flash of 
its passage, but perhaps also its entire trajectory, even its origin; it is likely that 
transgression has its entire space in the line it crosses” (PT 73).29 Therefore, as 
Foucault emphasizes, transgressive act it is not connected to the scandalous or the 
subversive, in other words, to anything aroused by mere negative associations, but 
rather affirms in a non-positive way the limitedness of our being.  
 
For Foucault, this non-positive affirmation (transgression) is a movement of 
endless contestation – as opposed to Enlightenment rationality, which privileges a 
stable, fully self-reflexive consciousness at the centre of thought.30 What this 
means, in practice, is that no content can bind transgressive affirmation, since by 
definition, no limit can possibly restrict it (PT 36). This led Foucault to propose 
that non-positive affirmation is perhaps simply the affirmation of division, not as 
a cutting gesture but as a testing of the limits. Therefore, the acts of transgression 
do not bind us to any positive content, for “contestation does not imply a 
generalized negation, but an affirmation that affirms nothing, a radical break of 
transitivity. Rather than being a process of thought for denying existences or 
values, contestation is the act that carries them all to their limits and, from there, 
to the Limit where an ontological decision achieves its end; to contest is to 
proceed until one reaches the empty core where being achieves its limit and where 
the limit defines being.” (PT 36.)31 
 
A fact that is often ignored in the interpretation of Foucault’s early work is that 
one of the central aims of these rather abstract re-considerations of the subject and 
transgression was to create new space for ethical communication. In his essays “A 
Preface to Transgression” (1963) and “What is an Author?” (1969) Foucault links 
the disappearance of the man-subject explicitly with ethics – ethics in which the 
writing aesthetic subject constantly disappears to make room for “other voices.” 
At the same time, there seems to have been something more going on in 
Foucault’s thinking: when the subject is no longer interpreted as the foundation of 
knowledge and art, but is rather seen as something that proceeds constantly 
toward its own limits and even tends to disappear in language, it suggests a 
process of reorientation in which the subject constantly seeks its own limitedness 
and freedom.  
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This reorientation is meant to put in question the more traditional notion of the 
rational Cartesian master-subject, which is largely based on the displacement and 
derogation of its other and the elimination of the unknown, for the benefit of the 
man-subject’s master position. In this sense, it seems to be justified to argue that 
Foucault’s calling into question of the notion of the man-subject includes 
important ethical dimensions in the attempt to create space for difference and 
otherness to emerge. 
 
Yet, due to its non-affirmative character, Foucault’s early work on transgression is 
not an attempt to tell us what is right and what is wrong, nor does it offer any 
normative ethical principles (do not kill etc.).32 The ethical promise of the 
transgression lies instead in its possibilities to discover new ways of existing and 
relating, and as a result of this, in its offering a new art and philosophy that 
“regains its speech and finds itself again only in the marginal region which 
borders its limits” (PT 78).33 As Foucault notes, two crucial questions arise: What 
kind of language can arise from such an absence of the knowing subject? And 
who is the philosopher who will now begin to speak? (PT 78) 
 
In Foucault’s view, giving up the idea of the Cartesian knowing subject and 
replacing it with the transgressive subject who disappears in language gives birth 
to a new philosopher who is aware that “we are not everything,”34 and who learns 
that even the philosopher can never inhabit the whole of his language like a 
“perfectly fluent god.”35 For next to himself, he discovers “the existence of 
another language that also speaks and that he is unable to dominate, one that 
strives, fails, and falls silent and that he cannot manipulate, the language he spoke 
at one time and that has now separated itself from him, now gravitating in a space 
increasingly silent.” (PT 78-79.)36  
 
Foucault also calls this affective linguistic structure “the mad philosopher” who 
does not find his way in language and is not the “mastering subject” of thinking 
and speech. He (or, possibly better, it) rather disappears to make way for 
philosophical language that proceeds as if through a labyrinth, losing and 
overflowing itself, “emptied of itself to the point where it becomes an absolute 
void – an opening, which is communication” (PT 80, emphasis mine).37 Again, 
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this is not “the end of philosophy but, rather, the end of the philosopher as the 
sovereign and primary form of philosophical language.” (PT 79.)38 
 
The language that the mad philosopher speaks is thus not rational but rather 
affective and “overflowing.” Bataille, to whom “The Preface to Transgression” is 
dedicated, has special significance in Foucault’s insights. This applies particularly 
to Bataille’s theory of eroticism as a fundamental cultural experience, which 
embodies an elemental dynamic between continuity and discontinuity. According 
to Bataille, in erotic activity, all boundaries between individuals are partially and 
momentarily dissolved when the self is fleetingly taken over by the demands of 
the body and senses. In the words of Bataille: “Eroticism always entails breaking 
down of established patterns, the patterns […] of the regulated social order basic 
to our discontinuous mode of existence as defined and separated individuals” 
(Bataille 2001, 18).39 
 
Similarly, Foucault suggests (1963) in his analysis of subjectivity and 
transgression that the experience of sexuality, notably when it is absorbed into 
language, takes us to a “dark domain” where we experience the absence of God 
and our own death, but also our limits and their transgression. At the same time, 
this darkness might also serve as a “source of light for those who have liberated 
their thought from all forms of dialectical language” (PT 86).40 If sexuality were 
put into the place of rationality and dialectical thinking, Foucault argues, we 
would enter a “future culture of transgression.”  
 
Yet, paradoxically, according to Foucault’s archaeological insights, modern 
philosophy and aesthetics cannot begin to comprehend the fleeting and singular 
moment of transgression, for this would lead to the solidifying of the contesting 
movement of the subject and knowledge, that is, to a certain (and much more 
serious) death. Therefore, transgression always remains an unspoken potentiality 
of which Foucault nevertheless dreams. In his own words: “Perhaps one day 
[transgression] will seem as decisive for our culture, as much a part of its soil, as 
the experience of contradiction was at an earlier time for dialectical thought. But 
in spite of so many scattered signs, the language in which transgression will find 
its space and the illumination of its being lies almost entirely in the future.” (PT 
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72.)41 This future culture is not mere utopia for Foucault, however: he finds traces 
from it in the work of some avant-garde writers, such as Maurice Blanchot, Pierre 
Klossowski and Georges Bataille. 
 
 
 
 
2. FEMINIST EXPLORATIONS OF THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL TOOLS 
 
What I find valuable in Foucault’s early writings on the subject and transgression 
is that, despite his utopian and overtly linguistic tone, his rethinking of language is 
simultaneously a rethinking of the aesthetic subject from an ethical and affective 
perspective. In his analysis of the avant-garde literature of Bataille, Blanchot and 
others, Foucault turns the knowing subject into the transgressive subject, and 
makes aesthetics the basis of all critical thinking. I see three immediate 
consquences of this. First, the traditional opposition between the knowing subject 
(artist, philosopher) and the work of art (object/text) collapses, putting in doubt 
the ideas of the creative master subject and expression, as well as the division 
between art and (non-artistic) everyday life.  
 
Second, literature is turned, at least ideally, into an existential structure or space in 
which the subject gains experiences not only of his/her possibilities of 
transgressing the limits, but also of his/her bodily finitude, that is, of historical 
engagement and affective limitedness (as distinct from the rational master 
position). Finally, artistic communication is differentiated from the ideas of 
subjective genius, expression and message, and turns into polyphonic space (or, 
possibly better, non-space) or silence, the experience of which inspires further 
study not only of the limitedness of our being, but also of the possibilities of 
communication between the subject and the not-me (“other”).  
 
Foucault’s early work with the subject and transgressive aesthetics is not without 
problems, however. In my view, one of the most severe limitations of his early 
theory of transgressive subjectivity and language lies in its linguistic and artistic 
over-emphasis. In other words, he does not consider the possibility of 
  
 
 
51
 
transgressive subjectivity in the everyday practice of one’s social life, but rather 
analyses the move toward the ethical subject on a very abstract level, despite his 
emphasis on the engaged nature of the subject. He could, therefore be criticized 
for a tendency to aestheticize the idea of transgression which, in his scheme, finds 
its place only in a certain literary canon, typified by writers such as Kafka, 
Bataille, Nietzsche and Klossowski. Even sexuality as a transgressive force is 
analysed by the archaeological Foucault as a mere trait of linguistic expression, 
with no mention of the politics or history of sexuality, of the equality of the sexes, 
or of the ideologically-specific context of the artistic avant-garde (in this respect 
his views change considerably during the later phases of his work, as I will point 
out).42 
 
With similar kinds of critical ideas in mind – although perhaps with a somewhat 
problematic “anti-aesthetic” attitude – Lois McNay comments: 
 
The experience of alterity does not reside exclusively in the elite realm of 
artistic practice; rather it is always implicit in the mundane strategies 
through which domination is maintained. The issue of otherness lies not in 
the aesthetic realm, but at the heart of the process through which the marks 
of difference – sexual, racial, cultural – are routinely turned into signs of 
inferiority and the way in which cultural hegemony is maintained by setting 
the valorized culture over the other. (McNay 1994, 47.)43 
  
One more critical comment on Foucault’s early writings on the subject that I wish 
to make here concerns his utopian stance toward avant-garde art and language. It 
is hard to imagine that his dream of a future language in which the subject is 
replaced by a void and affective energy could ever become a reality in the 
Western philosophical and artistic traditions that are based on the idea of the 
Name and its commercial and symbolic exchange. To arrive at the point at which 
the mastering subject would disappear in the art and in language would, in other 
words, entail the collapse of our whole capitalist system and our ways of thinking, 
and this is not, at least at the moment, something that would seem to be 
happening. In this sense, Foucault’s early radicalisation of the aesthetic subject 
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seems to be overtly academic, elitist and utopian, despite his claims of practical 
engagement.  
 
Finally, Foucault could be criticized for the fact that all the examples he gives of 
transgressive writing derive from male writers and mainly reflect male 
perspectives on questions concerning subjectivity, sexuality, transgression, 
language and art (Klossowski, de Sade, Bataille, for example). In other words, 
there is no explicit consideration of gender issues in Foucault’s early analysis of 
the subject and of transgressive aesthetic language. The transgression of the 
subject is rather idealized as part of the madness of the male philosopher and artist 
– a scheme that is not that new in the history of philosophy or art. 
 
Yet at the same time, the critique implied by Foucault’s early avant-garde dreams 
is an important one, and could be read as a reminder of various feminist critiques 
of the master subject – with the above-mentioned difference that Foucault does 
not criticize the traditional notion for its gendered nature. Many feminist critics 
hold that the notion of the rational, self-reflective subject, which has dominated 
Western thought at least since the Enlightenment, is grounded on the derogation 
and displacement of its other. In other words, the notion of rationality has taken 
precedence over the emotions and the senses, spirituality over the material, the 
objective over the subjective, the mind over the body, and the artificial over the 
natural.  
 
The aim of these dualisms has been to place an abstract, pre-discursive Cartesian 
master-subject at the centre of thought and to derogate the body as the site that is 
opposed to the rational and the spiritual due to its emotional, passionate and 
demanding nature. In Lois McNay’s words: “By prioritising the first term in the 
series of dualisms, classical thought [...] controls the parameters of what 
constitutes knowledge and monitors the extent and kind of discourse that are 
allowed to circulate.” (McNay 1992, 13.) These dualisms have been used to mark 
the original or natural difference between the two sexes, rationality being an 
attribute given to male subjects while ‘women’ have typically represented the 
realm of the body, the senses, and love. 
 
  
 
 
53
 
Developments in the feminist critique such as Luce Irigaray’s idea of parler-
femme and Hélèn Cixous’s writings on the écriture feminine, go some way to 
overcoming these traditional dualisms. Just like Foucault’s mad philosopher, who 
does not master the language he speaks but rather floats endlessly towards his 
own limitedness in and through language, Irigaray’s and Cixous’s presentations of 
the female subject represent a belief in a new experimental avant-garde language, 
which is assumed to overcome the traditional hierarchies and oppositions between 
male/female, rational/sensuous, for example, and to offer in its place new, more 
ethical ways of communicating. Despite the fact that the problems in Irigaray’s 
and Cixous’s accounts have become increasingly apparent during the last ten 
years or so, the main ideas in their theories are worth presenting here in an effort 
to understand why the genealogical perspective is necessary for feminist studies. 
 
 
Irigaray, Cixous and Avant-garde Writing 
 
In this section, I will suggest that Foucault’s early dream of an avant-garde 
language, or a future language that would offer space for transgression and 
affectiveness, parallels in many respects the work of feminist intellectuals such as 
Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous, who also take the critique of traditional 
dualisms as a point of departure in constructing a new version of the subject. 
What they add to Foucault’s insights, in my view, is the question of gender, which 
is totally lacking from his early aesthetics.  
 
My argument is that, in this respect, they could be said to radicalise some aspects 
of Foucault’s thought, or perhaps better, to politicise his thinking towards a better 
understanding of the significance of gender to all intellectual work – including his 
own. This further progress in this respect leads to the consideration of some 
important questions to do with Foucault’s work. How is his idea of the 
disappearing and transgressive subject positioned socially, and can its position be 
equally shared by all? What would the philosophical description of the mad 
philosopher be like if this fluent and affective linguistic structure Foucault terms 
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‘the subject’ were to be connected to the female, not the male, body and 
sexuality? 
 
A rather well-known attempt at this sort of redeployment of descriptions of the 
feminine subject, sexuality and language is Luce Irigaray’s description of the 
‘lips’ that touch upon each other in female sexual pleasure. Taking the position 
that phallo(go)centric discourse (male-centred rationality) has limited women’s 
understanding of sexual pleasure and differentiation, Irigaray tries to find new 
linguistic avenues that could explore women’s unspeakable pleasure, which exists 
but cannot be fully articulated in language. She thus writes of the multiple ways in 
which woman, as a sex which is not one, touches herself all the time, since in any 
case, her genitals are formed of two lips in continuous contact (Irigaray 1985c, 
210). 
 
Female lips, as Irigaray emphasizes, are pressed against one another like strangers 
to dichotomy, lying perpetually half-open. For her, the same openness designates 
female ways of using language in which the subject does not attempt to know the 
object but rather offers silence and space for the other’s becoming. It is thus not a 
question of knowing and mastering, but rather one of keeping oneself open to the 
not-me and otherness, of staying at the borders, of losing one’s hold in a 
movement between me and you. Just as for Foucault, for Irigaray this sort of new 
language is also a promise of new ethics, for the silence that the female subject 
offers is also 
 
 [T]he condition for a possible respect for myself and for the other within 
our respective limits. It also assumes that the already existing world, even in 
its philosophical and religious form, should not be considered complete, 
already revealed or made manifest. If I am to be quiet and listen, listen to 
you, without presupposition, without making hidden demands – on you or 
myself – the world must not be sealed already, it must still be open, the 
future not determined by the past. If I am to really listen to you, all these 
conditions are essential. And moreover, that I do not consider language to 
be immutable. Otherwise, language itself controls, orders, and hinders 
freedom. (Irigaray 1996, 117.)  
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Irigaray also talks about the new female language in terms of parler-femme.44 The 
utopian potential she associates with female language is grounded on her belief 
that the usage of language that expresses respect, indeterminacy and silence leads 
to the collapse of the hierarchical (male) division between sensibility and 
intelligence. In her view, female speech is intelligible exactly because “it remains 
sensible, related to the qualities of sound, rhythm, and meaning in the world of the 
subject(s)” (Irigaray 1996, 126).  
 
This re-writing of the conceptions of the subject and language in terms of the 
female body and sensuousness is an attempt by Irigaray to provide women’s 
writing with a new authority based on their genital and libidinal difference from 
men (Showalter 1997, 63). At the same time, she strives to re-think sexual 
difference in terms of absolute alterity or radical otherness, in other words, as 
something that is not reducible to the knowledge of the mastering subject.  
 
Irigaray thereby joins thinkers such as Foucault, Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-
Paul Sartre in the attempt to break with a venerable tradition, which, since 
Parmenides, has judged it impossible to think of otherness in abstraction from 
sameness (the rational subject who is able to identify his objects of knowledge), or 
to conceive of difference except in relation to the same, and multiplicity as 
anything other than a repetition of the one (reason, cogito etc.). What she calls for 
is a radical reorientation, which requires no less than a disruption of the entire 
order of dominant values, economic, social, moral, and sexual. For her, it is 
women who call into question all existing theory, all thought, all language, 
inasmuch as men and men alone monopolize these. Women, in other words, 
challenge the very foundation of our social and cultural order, whose organization 
has been prescribed by the patriarchal system.  
 
Irigaray’s challenging of the patriarchal system demands elaboration of a 
specifically feminine imagery in which women’s presumptively different relation 
to language (nowadays discussed in terms of écriture feminine), desire, and the 
body is expressed in its own specific ways.45 What this also demands is that the 
concept of the speaking subject be re-defined. When Irigaray says that female 
sexuality is not unifiable and cannot be subsumed under the concept of the 
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subject, this is thus not because she has no interest in retaining – or creating for 
the first time in its own terms – the idea of female subjectivity. It is rather because 
she tries to develop a notion of woman as a subject that does not succumb to the 
metaphysical constraints of masculine subjectivity; one that is not defined in 
terms of the fully present, unitary, mastering subject, and one that does not refer 
back to the one as a repetition of the same. (Irigaray 1996 and 1985a.)46  
 
In other words, Irigaray’s celebration of female subjectivity and indeterminate 
language is, for her, a means of diffusing and decentring a self that is now 
relativized as the product of a patriarchal bourgeois humanism (Felski 1989, 221). 
In this respect, her project is on much the same lines as Foucault’s early writing 
on man and the subject with, of course, the difference that Foucault was not 
interested in the sexual difference or gender specificity of his transgressive avant-
garde subject.  
 
Another well-known French feminist writer on the relations between subject, 
artistic language and sexuality is Hélène Cixous. Just as in Irigaray’s work and in 
Foucault, for Cixous the creation of the new subjectivity means raising the 
question of the possibility of speaking and communicating otherwise, in a more 
ethical manner. She, like Irigaray, sees language as linked to the repressive 
structures of thinking and narration we use to organize our lives. Since women 
have mainly figured within the socio-symbolic system only as the other of man, 
Cixous suggests that the redefinition of women’s sexuality and history could 
recast the prevailing order. For her, writing is the main locus and means of this 
reformation. (Sellers 1993, xxix.)  
 
This idea lead Cixous to seek a new experimental language, concrete examples of 
which she finds in the work of the feminist avant-garde writer Clarise Lispector 
(Cixous 1976; Cixous 1979; Cixous 1981). Like Irigaray, Cixous does not simply 
theorize the possibility of female writing that undermines the dual hierarchized 
structure of oppositions (subject/object etc.). She also attempts to produce the 
kind of writing that ought to express new forms and new narratives for the 
representation of sexual difference. (Shiach 1997, 270.) 
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In Cixous’s view, one of the basic problems that women face in the West is the 
absence of sexual discourse that adequately describes women’s libidinal economy 
and representation. Her advocacy of women’s writing proceeds from her 
investigations of the construction of sexuality in patriarchy as an asymmetrical 
opposition between feminine and masculine, which is a mechanism that maintains 
male privilege. This differential economy affects not only sexual practices, but 
also sexual discourse, which is organized around the systematic absence of a 
discourse of feminine jouissance. In Cixous’s view, this absence extends and 
serves the logic of phallo(go)centric sexuality, because the absence of discursive 
forms capable of representing women’s pleasures in their differences has clear 
benefits for the patriarchal social order.47 Even more useful to existing social 
arrangements are women who do not know what they want, since as long as men 
are the only ones who provide answers to the question of what women want and 
like, the answers will continue to reflect and strengthen male interests and 
privilege.48  
 
Cixous believes that women can disrupt and subvert the existing sexual order by 
writing their bodies in terms that empower women’s specific needs and make 
them public. In the Laugh of the Medusa, in the context of liberating the New 
Woman she formulates her point of view in the following words: 
 
Writing has been run by libidinal and cultural – hence political, typically 
masculine – economy, that this is a locus where the repression of woman 
has been perpetuated, over and over more or less consciously, and in a 
manner that’s frightening since it’s often hidden or adorned with the 
mystifying charms of fiction; that this locus has grossly exaggerated all the 
signs of sexual opposition (and not sexual difference), where woman has 
never her turn to speak – this being all the more serious and unpardonable in 
that writing is precisely the very possibility of change. (Cixous 1976, 879.) 
  
The moment when women start to speak with their own voice is associated by 
Cixous with écriture feminine, feminine writing. She considers such writing 
feminine in two senses. First, Cixous suggests that women are closer to a specific 
feminine economy49 than men, despite the fact that feminine writing is potentially 
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the province of both sexes. As a result, she believes that women’s writing has the 
potential to circumvent and reformulate existing structures of thinking, 
subjectivity and language through the inclusion of other experience (Cixous 1986, 
95-96). Cixous is especially interested in the idea that the inscription of the 
rhythms and articulations of the mother’s body that also influence the adult self 
provides a link to the pre-symbolic union between the self and m/other, and so 
affects the subject’s relation to language, to the other, to him- or herself and to the 
world (ibid. 88, 90-100).50  
 
The second point that Cixous stresses is that a feminine position refuses to 
annihilate or appropriate the other’s difference in order to construct the self in a 
(masculine) position of mastery, and can, therefore, bring alternative forms of 
relation, perception and expression into existence. As Susan Sellers writes, “it is 
in this sense that Cixous believes writing is revolutionary. Not only can writing 
exceed the binary logic that informs our present system and thus create the 
framework for a new “language” and culture, but, she stresses, through its 
transformations, feminine writing will initiate changes in the social and political 
sphere to challenge the very foundation of the patriarchal and capitalist state.” 
(Sellers 1994, xxix.) In Cixous’s own words, feminine writing is: 
 
A place […] which is not economically or politically indebted to all the 
vileness and compromise. That is not obliged to reproduce the system. That 
is writing. If there is somewhere else that can escape the infernal repetition, 
it lies in that direction, where it writes itself, where it dreams, where it 
invents new worlds. (Cixous 1986, 72.)  
 
However, a number of difficulties arise from Irigaray’s and Cixous’s conceptions 
of the feminine and its association with radical signifying practices exemplified in 
avant-garde writing. While most feminists agree that there is a need to revalue not 
only the concepts of the subject and language, but also women’s pleasures and 
physical ways of existing, the solutions offered by the French feminists have been 
much criticized for essentializing and globalizing the female physique, and for 
indirectly reinforcing the traditional notions of the male/female and 
masculine/feminine divide. Because the theoretical difficulties of these 
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approaches have been widely commented on, and because the main interest in this 
work is to consider the question of the aesthetic creation of the self in the 
Foucauldian/feminist framework, I will not go into a detailed analysis of the these 
debates here, but will briefly consider only some points that are crucial for my 
own investigations (for a more detailed discussion, see McNay 1992, 18-19; 
Soper 1997; Delphy 1987; Butler 1990; Showalter 1997, 63-64; Felski 1989).  
 
 
A Critique of Cixous and Irigaray 
 
The work of Cixous exemplifies well some problems inherent in the approaches to 
the female identity, body and sexuality presented above. The problems she takes 
up in her analysis of expressions of pleasure are, in many respects, important 
ones, and she opens up some new perspectives on feminist debates on women’s 
bodily existence and aesthetic self-expression. Yet, the female or woman-centred 
aesthetics of Cixous has some serious weaknesses. There are four main points in 
my critique. 
 
First, Cixous’s way of grounding the dream of the liberation of the new Woman 
primarily on experimental language expresses a rather naive belief in the 
revolutionary potential of avant-garde art, as was the case with early Foucault. In 
my view, her way of connecting feminine and experimental writing begs the 
question of whether avant-garde textuality can, in fact, any longer be interpreted 
simply as subversive. In other words, Cixous’s belief in the utopian potential of 
women’s experimental writing fails to offer any analysis of the institutional 
locations and broader ideological networks framing textual production and 
reception. As Felski correctly notes, it could be argued here that “French 
feminism reveals an overestimation of the radical effects of linguistic 
experimentation which has not come to terms with the contemporary realization 
of the political limitations of modernism (Felski 1989, 222; Huyssen 1984 and 
McBurney 1985).  
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Secondly, problems arise from the fact that the concept of female style, as it is 
conceived by Cixous, describes only the avant-garde mode of women’s writing, 
due to which many feminists have felt excluded by the prescriptive stylistics that 
seems to privilege the non-linear, experimental and surreal expression of a small 
intellectual elite (Showalter 1997, 63). In this respect, Cixous’s theory of 
subversive feminine writing and subjectivity could be criticized for over-
estimating the revolutionary significance of the reading and writing practices of a 
small enlightened minority, and for its dismissal of the more goal-based and 
mundane forms of feminist political activity (Felski 1989, 223). In other words, 
Cixous tends to aestheticize the ideas of femininity and sexual difference by 
reducing the ideas of liberation and the new order to the aesthetic sphere in which 
the subversive and disruptive feminist action should take place, at the same time 
ignoring the social and political problems of different groups of women.  
 
Third, not such a convincing argument has yet been put forward supposing a 
relationship between gender and experimental writing. In the words of Felski,  
 
[W]hen not grounded in a biologism which affirms a spontaneous 
association between a fluid textuality and a polymorphous female body, this 
argument relies on an analogy between the avant-garde and the feminine as 
forms of marginalized dissidence vis-a-vis monolithic and vaguely defined 
“patriarchal bourgeois humanism.” Defining linguistic indeterminacy as 
feminine, however, renders the term so broad as to be meaningless, allowing 
almost any example of experimental writing in the last hundred years to be 
classified as feminine, and this conflantation of modern literary style with 
an ideology of the feminine as quintessentially marginal is of little help in 
theorizing the historically specific locations of women in culture and 
society. (Felski 1989, 221-222.) 
 
Moreover, and finally, Cixous has been criticized of not sufficiently 
problematizing her way of using the term ‘women’, but rather using it as a 
category based quite unproblematically on women’s biological bodies. This way 
of seeing the female body as natural and universal constitutes a dangerous trap for 
feminism, because it ignores the manifold bodily differences between women and 
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seeks the solution from a somewhat utopian idea of the universal Female (Bailey 
1993). Elaine Showalter articulates a rather similar notion, commenting that the 
essentialism of the universal female subject has also been open to charges of 
racism, especially “since black women’s texts were rarely cited as examples.” 
Hence, “as black women and others within the women’s movement protested 
against the inattention to racial and class differences between women, the idea of 
a common women’s culture had to be re-examined.” (Showalter 1997, 63.) 
 
Parts of this critique have been addressed to Luce Irigaray too, whose articulation 
of female sexuality through the notion of the biological non-phallic body has been 
criticized for reducing women to their natural bodies without adequately 
addressing the social oppression of women and associated issues of power, history 
and politics, and without questioning the diversity of women’s experiences of 
their bodies (McNay 1992, 21).  
 
With this critique in mind, Judith Butler comments that Irigaray’s theory risks 
identifying all women with a notion of femininity that is based on an aestheticized 
and non-phallic version of the body. The problem with Irigaray’s analysis of the 
female jouissance is that many women simply do not identify themselves with her 
description of the female body and sexuality, and hence might be easily written 
off from her visions of the new woman as male-identified or unenlightened 
(Butler 1990, 30; Soper 1997, 288). Moreover, Butler shows that the notion of the 
generally shared conception of women is problematic, because it is also based on 
the binary logic (men/women; masculine/feminine) that separates women 
analytically and politically “from the constitution of class, race, ethnicity, and 
other axes of power relations that both constitute ‘identity’ and make the singular 
notion of identity a misnomer” (ibid. 4). 
 
Yet, in considering these critical viewpoints, it is also worth noting that French 
feminist philosophers are often too easily assumed by their English-speaking 
critics to be defending a uniform position, called essentialist, which equates 
biological sex with culturally defined gender.51 In reality, such a generalization is 
rather problematic and simplistic, because their theoretical positions are far from 
uniform, and some of them have changed position drastically during their careers. 
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The political and ethical implications of these variations are also rather complex 
(Kuykendall 1991, 217; Heinämaa 1996, especially15-16, 166-167).  
 
Moreover, as various re-readers of Cixous and Irigaray have shown, their analyses 
of the female body are not necessarily meant to serve the essential claims 
concerning women, but could also be interpreted as a critical strategy that 
becomes understood only in the historical context. The idea of the auto-erotic 
tactility of the female body, for example, as well as the picture of the lips which 
speak with each other, could also be taken as a critical response to Freud’s 
(originally Greek) notion of the female body and sexual pleasure as defective and 
insufficient in itself.  
 
In sum, Irigaray and Cixous could also be understood as trying to redefine the 
female body and sexuality without reference to the active male subject, which was 
taken earlier as the origin of female pleasure. Seen through this historical 
perspective, their essentializing of the female body and pleasure in specifically 
feminine terms is primarily an attempt to turn women’s earlier negative 
definitions (woman as a variation of man, as lack, homme manqué, etc.) into a 
positive new image that emphasizes the specificity and autonomous value of the 
female body, desire and sexuality.52 
 
Another possible solution to the critique of essentialism in the French feminism is 
offered by Diana Fuss, who argues that feminists should not just label some 
feminist texts as essentialist and therefore bad, but should rather ask: if a text is 
essentialist, what motivates its deployment, why and how it is invoked and, most 
importantly, what its political effects are (Fuss 1989, xi. See also Butler 1990, 4-
5). If, for example, Irigaray’s or Cixous’s writings on the female body and 
sexuality could be shown to support the self-understanding of some specific 
political group (white, well-educated, middle- or upper-class women, for 
example) and to ignore the essential problems of some other women, if they 
idealize aesthetics as a sufficient condition for subversive feminist political action, 
or if they exclude from feminist analysis the constitution of central categories of 
identity such as race, class and ethnicity (as Butler argues), they undoubtedly do 
deserve criticism that points out the ideological and political interests and blind 
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spots behind the texts – or at least they need supplementary views that bring to the 
fore the cultural, ideological and discursive dimensions of sexual identity.53 
  
One formulation of this sort of critique comprises post-feminist attempts to find 
out how categories of identity are engendered, immobilized and naturalized in 
various discursive, social and juridical practices. In other words, it is no longer a 
question of whether a specific universal female subject, sexuality or language 
exists, but one of how (and why) sexual identities are constructed and produced in 
the way they are. Another way of putting it is that the idea of anatomically given 
sex has been called into question, and the interest has shifted more towards the 
social construction of gender. So conceived, the task of the “political genealogy of 
gender ontologies,” as Judith Butler terms her studies, will be “to make gender 
trouble, not through the strategies that figure a utopian beyond, but through the 
mobilization, subversive confusion, and proliferation of precisely those 
constitutive categories that seek to keep gender in its place by posturing as the 
foundational illusions of identity” (Butler 1990, 33-34).  
 
The genealogical aspect demands attention not merely to the utopian subversion 
of the patriarchal order through the linguistic revolutions of feminine writing, but 
far more to the cultural and political positions and networks in and through which 
discourses and practices concerning the subject, sex(uality) and gender are 
produced and maintained.  
 
As I will demonstrate in the following second part of my study, this sort of point 
of departure also leads to reconsideration of the potential of feminist subversive 
language and experimental action. The important difference in women-centred 
thinking lies in the fact that post-feminist theorizations of gender no longer base 
their critique on the biologically common essence of woman, but are far more 
concerned with the discursive power practices that not only produce ideas of both 
sexual and gender identity, but can also be used to politicise and undermine them. 
Before moving on to a closer examination of these issues, allow me to go back to 
Foucault for a while and to consider the main points of his genealogical analysis 
of the subject, power, and the body. 
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II  
A GENEALOGICAL CRITIQUE OF THE SUBJECT,  
POWER AND THE BODY 
 
 
  
 
 
 66 
3. GENEALOGY 
 
Foucault’s archaeological project was later continued in a scheme he called 
“genealogy.” Unlike archaeology, which avoids the causal explanation of social 
change by restricting its focus to the historical inquiry into the ordering codes of 
our culture that have arranged the space of knowledge and discoursive practices, 
genealogy (originally Nietzsche’s term for non-eschatological, non-edifying 
historiography) permits social change to be at least contemplated, and it may 
concern gradual, continuous processes of social change too, in carefully analysing 
the complex relations between knowledge and power (Hoy 1999, 7).  
 
The genealogical view, developed and extended especially in Discipline and 
Punish (Surveiller et punir: naissance de la prison, 1975) and in the first volume 
of The History of Sexuality (La Volonté de savoir, 1976), supposes that each 
society has its general politics of truth, which Foucault also calls its “régime of 
truth.” This aspect of politics and the types of discourses accepted and used in it 
are major subjects in his genealogical study. It is a question of finding out the 
mechanisms and instances which enable one to differentiate true and false 
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; of analysing the status of 
those who are charged with saying what counts as true, and the techniques and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth (TP 131).  
 
Foucault’s genealogical analysis of these distinctions opens up the path to 
immanent social criticism, criticism that does not presuppose an independent 
utopian standpoint. As a genealogist, Foucault wanted to diagnose the organizing 
trends of culture, because he believed that we are all (himself included) subjected 
to them. Like Nietzsche, he did not attempt to create an alternative model, but 
rather encouraged us to recognize the problems of the present and the constitution 
of ourselves. (Hoy 1999, 12-13.)54 Hence, the genealogical method is meant to 
show how knowledge and power (which, according to Foucault, are always 
intertwined) effect the constitution of our historically specific selves. 
 
Although a good deal of Foucault’s archaeological method is also present in his 
later genealogy, the linguistic obsession in The Order of Things and in “The Death 
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of the Author” points toward a new emphasis on the inner relation of knowledge 
and power.55 What this means is moving from a rather autonomous theory of 
language towards a more dialectical view in which the discursive and the material 
are linked together in a symbiotic relationship. His best-known formulation of this 
symbiosis is the power/knowledge nexus. Foucault’s idea is that, on the one hand, 
all knowledge is the effect of some specific regime of power, and on the other 
hand, various forms of knowledge constitute the social reality, which they analyse 
and describe. According to Foucault, power and knowledge directly imply one 
another, and there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a 
field of knowledge, nor is there any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
represent at the same time power relations (DP 27). The effects of the 
power/knowledge nexus are relayed through different discourses, for it is in 
discourse that power and knowledge are joined together (HS 100).  
 
The subject’s loss of transcendentality is not compensated for Foucault in the 
genealogical method, as his short depiction of genealogy shows: “One has to [...] 
get rid of the subject itself, that’s to say, to arrive at an analysis which can account 
for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And this is what I 
would call genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the 
constitution of knowledge, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to 
make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field 
of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.” (TP 
117) He is thus not concerned with how subjects form a constitution that 
determines who or what is sovereign, not even in his genealogy. What he wants to 
know instead is how the subjects themselves are constituted, and how this 
constitution is related to the historically varying issues of truth, knowledge, and 
power. 
 
Foucault applies his genealogical problematic to the discursive production of 
sexuality in the first part of the History of Sexuality: “Sexuality must not be 
thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to hold in check, or as an 
obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the name that 
can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, 
but a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification 
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of pleasures, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the 
strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance 
with a few major strategies of knowledge and power.” (HS 105-106.)56 Therefore, 
Foucault concludes, sexuality cannot be thought of as a merely natural 
characteristic of a person. It is rather to be analysed as a historically varying 
construction that has no fixed essence or nature. 
 
As I intend to point out in the sections to come, this sort of deconstruction or, 
perhaps better, disintegration of existing truths and self-certainties has been of use 
in feminist debates on the subject, aesthetics, gender identity, and the body. My 
intention is to illustrate that, on the one hand, Foucault’s genealogical work offers 
a set of challenging tools for analysing the effects of normalizing power on 
subjectivity (and, through that, on individual aesthetic appearances), and on the 
other hand, it also provides feminists with some “disintegrating” strategies for 
escaping the existing regime of sexuality through assertion of the transgressive 
aesthetics of the subject.  
 
My argument in brief, is that in his genealogical work, Foucault considers 
subjectivity from two different angles: firstly, from the viewpoint of modern 
“docility” (which I term his negative aspect of power), and secondly, from the 
viewpoint of active resistance (termed here his positive aspect of power). The 
former aspect of his genealogical analysis is perhaps best presented in the first 
part of The History of Sexuality (1976), while the latter perspective is most 
forcefully explained in his essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971), in 
which Foucault presents parodic and farcical uses of identity as critical strategies 
in the creation of “alternative identities.” 
 
As I will suggest towards the end of this part of my study, the negative aspect of 
Foucault’s analysis of power parallels many feminist notions of women’s cultural 
docility, while his genealogical ideas concerning individual resistance are much in 
line with the post-feminist idea that women can take the active role in creating 
their selves and aesthetic appearances, and thus also have “positive” power over 
their selves. As the third part of this study will demonstrate, in his late aesthetics 
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of the self, Foucault continued to address similar problems, but now in the context 
of ‘modernity’ and the ancient aesthetics of the self. In this context, the positive 
aspect of power came to mean for him an attempt to construct concrete 
expressions of resistance to normalizing power on the one hand, and a sketch for 
practical aesthetics, ethics and politics on the other. 
 
Seen in the wider context, the usefulness of Foucault’s genealogy for the work at 
hand lies in his attempt to develop philosophical tools to study the question of 
how we are constituted as human subjects. His genealogical method takes into 
account the fact that, for the most part, the constitution of the subject is a result of 
subliminal socialization, not something we actively and consciously decide – or 
something we are born with. Like Nietzsche, who attacked the idea of a fixed 
human essence and nature – or like Heidegger, Sartre, and Gadamer, who were all 
interested in the subject’s engagement with a specific historical situation, although 
in very different terms and with very different conclusions – Foucault studies 
aspects of human beings that we generally take to be stable and fixed, but that 
historical analysis shows to be malleable and constituted. This is not only true of 
ideas such as the individual’s self or identity, but also of the human body (as 
experienced), which has been transformed throughout history by various 
technologies such as the capitalist exploitation of the worker’s body, the prison 
system, and the confession of sexual mores.  
 
In Foucault’s view, there is much in our self-understanding that is not voluntary or 
consciously chosen, even though to term it involuntary would miss the extent to 
which we constitute our identities by conforming ourselves to tacitly understood 
practices and generally accepted norms (Hoy 1999, 15). To talk about self-
understanding is therefore to refer – not to the Cartesian knowledge that the self 
may have of itself – but rather to the study of observable manifestations of 
situated and historically limited experiences of the self. Seen in this way, self-
understanding is not a matter of autonomous decision, or of knowing the essential 
nature of one’s self, but a matrix of social and discursive practices that vary 
historically, just as self-understanding does. (Ibid. 17-18.)57  
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It is this productive and social aspect of selfhood and identity that makes 
resistance – also aesthetic resistance – possible for Foucault. For, as he said in an 
interview late in his life, all human artifices can be unmade because they are made 
– assuming we know how they were made (HMD 1989, 252). This idea, as I will 
illustrate, has been extremely influential in some feminist practices that focus on 
the more political and ideological aspects of subjectivity and individual aesthetic 
appearance. Before moving into the analysis of these issues, let me begin my 
presentation of Foucault’s genealogical method by considering his ground-
breaking essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in which he puts forward his 
positive aspect of power in terms of parodic uses of identity – an idea which is 
widely supported nowadays by many postfeminist thinkers. 
 
 
Genealogy and the Dissociation of Identity 
 
Foucault first employs the notion of genealogy in his essay “Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History” (1971), in which he attacks traditional forms of history for 
their reliance on metaphysical concepts and totalising assumptions derived from 
the philosophy of the subject.  
 
First, he argues that traditional or “total” history wrongly describes history in 
terms of linear development, as if there existed some “transcendental teleology” in 
which singular events are placed in universal explanatory schemas and linear 
structures, and thereby given a false unity. At the root of the interpretation that 
shows historical events as supporting a unified totality, he finds the notion of the 
subject who attempts to master history by placing himself (as a knowing subject) 
above everything by avoiding the exceptional and by reducing all things to the 
lowest common denominator. Citing Nietzsche, Foucault calls this form of history 
a supra-historical perspective.  
 
A historian who practices supra-history encourages subjective recognitions and 
understands historical development as the unfolding and affirmation of essential 
human characteristics. As a result, history comes to operate around a logic of 
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identity or sameness, which means that the past is interpreted so as to confirm 
rather than disrupt the beliefs and convictions of the present (NGH 86-87; McNay 
1992, 13-14.) A supra-historian, in short, denies his own singular perspective 
under the cloak of universals to assure his position as a knowing subject. He 
masks his body, passions, and his grounding in a particular time and place to 
secure the sovereignty of his timeless ideas. (NGH 90-91.) 
 
Secondly, Foucault sees traditional history as falsely searching for origins as the 
source of specific historical process or sequence. This search assumes the 
existence of static forms that precede the external world of succession and 
accident (NGH 78). He criticises the search for origins as an epistemologically 
problematic quest for asocial and a-historical essences, which the supra-historian 
interprets as originals prior to the flux, movement, and heterogeneity of history. 
What he considers to be at the historical beginning of things is not the inviolable 
identity of their origin, but disparity and dissension (NGH 79). Thus, if the origin 
of the history of reason is analysed, for example, we find that it is not an innate 
sublime ability that is born with the divinity of man, but, first of all, something 
that is born from the chance and continuous warfare between individuals.58  
 
Against supra-history Foucault posits the notion, derived from Nietzsche, of 
effective history, wirkliche Historie or, alternatively, genealogy. Adopting 
Nietzsche’s conception of the primacy of force over meaning, he opposes the 
endlessly repeated play of domination to the conception of origins and linear 
continuity (NGH 85). A genealogist does not see history as a continuous 
development and working through of an ideal schema, but rather takes it as being 
based on different power blocks, all of which attempt to impose their own system 
of domination. (McNay 1992, 14.)  
 
So conceived, humanity is not seen as proceeding gradually towards universal 
reciprocity, at which point continuous social warfare is replaced by the rule of 
law. It rather installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds 
from domination to domination. (NGH 85.) The critical task of the historian, then, 
is to uncover the contingent and violent emergence of these systems of 
domination, which Foucault also calls “regimes.” Genealogy is meant to disturb 
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what was previously considered immobile, to fragment what was thought to be 
unified, to show the heterogeneity of what was imagined to be consistent with 
itself (NGH 82). This is also true of the human subject and the self, whose identity 
and unity are broken into pieces by the genealogical method: 
 
Where the soul pretends unification or the self fabricates a coherent identity, 
the genealogist sets out to study the beginning – numberless beginnings, 
whose faint traces and hints of colour are readily seen by a historical eye. 
The analysis of descent permits the dissociation of the self, its recognition 
and displacement as an empty synthesis, in liberating a profusion of lost 
events. (NGH 81.)59  
 
As various post-feminist readers of Foucault’s genealogy exemplify, this sort of 
breaking of the subject also leads to the reconsideration of gender categories. For 
if the genealogical eye tends to fragment all coherent identities as empty 
synthesis, it also sets in doubt universalising categories such as women and men, 
showing the heterogeneity and discontinuity inherent in them. (I will return to this 
shortly.) 
 
At the end of his essay on Nietzsche, Foucault differentiates the main tasks of his 
genealogical effective history. First, it must offer to the “confused European” – 
who no longer knows himself because he ignores his mixed ancestries and seeks a 
proper role – the possibility of alternative identities, which are more substantial 
and individualized than his own. For Foucault, it is a question of offering a 
parodic and farcical use of identity, of turning the identification of our weak 
individuality with the solid identities of the past into our unrealization through the 
excessive choice of identities. In this first respect, “genealogy is history in the 
form of an intense carnival.” (NGH 93-94.)60 
 
The second use of effective new history is the systematic dissociation of identity. 
Foucault considers this task necessary because “this rather weak identity, which 
we attempt to support and unify under a mask, is in itself only a parody: it is 
plural, and countless spirits dispute its possession” (NGH 94).61 The genealogical 
method replaces the idea of the unified self and immortal soul with a number of 
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“mortal souls,” in other words, the disintegrated, low and mortal aspect replaces 
the “high” aspect of human existence. This second task of the genealogist leads us 
to discover the roots of our identity, not in terms of synthesis but rather in terms 
of dissipation. If genealogy “gives rise to questions concerning our native land, 
native language, or the laws that govern us,” its intention is “to reveal the 
heterogeneous systems which, masked by the self, inhibit the formation of any 
form of identity.”62 (NGH 95.) 
 
The third use of genealogy is to sacrifice the subject of knowledge that pretends to 
be neutral and masks his passions under commitment solely to truth. The 
genealogist shows that the scientific consciousness of the neutral subject is just 
one manifestation of the “will to knowledge.” The historical analysis of this will 
reveals that all knowledge rests upon injustice (that there is no right, not even in 
the act of knowing, to truth or a foundation for truth), and that the will to 
knowledge is “malicious” (something opposed to the happiness of mankind, as 
Foucault suggests). The will to knowledge does not in itself achieve universal 
truth, nor does it succeed in its attempts to master nature. It is through these 
notions that Foucault formulates the third task of genealogy as follows: “Where 
religion once demanded the sacrifice of bodies, knowledge now calls for 
experimentation on ourselves, calls us to the sacrifice of the subject of 
knowledge.”63 (NGH 96; Nietzsche 1988a, no 501.) 
 
Finally, unlike the supra-historical view, which concentrates on universals, 
origins, linear development and reason, effective history takes the examination of 
the body as its starting point, and through this analyses the effects of power in its 
most specific and concrete form. The replacement of the self-thematizing subject 
as the pivot of history with a notion of the body leads to a change in the 
historian’s methodology. Historical development is no longer interpreted as 
totality fully closed upon itself, but is understood as a conflict between different 
power blocks, i.e. permanent warfare. Being at the very centre of the struggle for 
domination, the body is moulded by the different warring forces (regimes) that act 
upon it. It is constantly “broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; 
it is poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs 
resistances.”64 (NGH 87; Nietzsche 1988b, no 7.)  
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The body is thus conceived of in radically anti-essentialist terms, as being without 
constants: “Nothing in man – not even his body – is sufficiently stable to serve as 
a basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men”65 (NGH 87-88). The 
body manifests “the stigmata of past experience and also gives rise to desires, 
failings, and errors” (NGH 83).66 It is “the inscribed surface of events (traced by 
language and dissolved ideas), the locus of a dissociated self (adopting the illusion 
of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration” (NGH 83).67 
Genealogy, then, is situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its task 
is to “expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s 
destruction of the body” (NGH 83).68 The aim of the genealogist is not, therefore, 
to systematize or produce universals, but to focus on singularities, to fragment and 
disperse the past. Effective history deals with events in terms of their most unique 
characteristics (NGH 88). It introduces discontinuity into our very being, 
multiplies our body and divides our emotions. 
 
The idea that the body and the ways it is worked upon by power constitute a 
proper focus to history is also an underlying principle in Foucault’s two later 
studies, Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality. In these works, he 
replaces the supra-historical view with engaged perspectivism and an examination 
of the ways in which the body is violently and arbitrarily constructed and re-
constructed in history in order to legitimise different regimes of domination 
(McNay 1992, 16).  
 
As his analysis shows, investigations of the body and sexuality are also 
investigations of the modern constitution of the self, because the modern self is 
largely marked by the deployment of sexuality. As Foucault remarks, “It is 
through sex [...] that each individual has to pass in order to have access to his own 
intelligibility, [...] to the whole of his body, [...] to his identity.” For “We have 
arrived at the point where we expect our intelligibility to come from what was for 
many centuries thought of as madness; the plenitude of our body from what was 
long considered its stigma and likened to a wound; our identity from what was 
perceived as an obscure and nameless urge.” (HS 155-156.)69 Sex, in short, has 
become constitutive of one’s construction of the personal identity and the self. 
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Foucault’s suggestion is that the analysis of sexuality must be grounded on the 
analysis of discursive practices, because the whole discursive notion of sex is an 
artificial and historically changing construction. It has made it possible to group 
together anatomical elements, biological functions, conducts, sensations and 
pleasures, enabling individuals “to make use of this fictitious unity as a causal 
principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere” (HS 
154).70 Sex, so conceived, is not an autonomous agency, which “secondarily 
produces manifold effects on sexuality over the entire length of its surface of 
contact with power” (HS 155).71 It is rather “the most speculative, most ideal, and 
most internal element in a deployment of sexuality organized by power in its grip 
on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and pleasures” 
(HS 155).72 
 
The philosophical study of these mechanisms is thus crucial, not only for our 
understanding of sex and sexuality but also for our understanding of the modern 
individual, for as Foucault suggests, these two concepts cannot be separated from 
each other. 
 
 
The Modern Production of the Individual 
 
Behind Foucault’s genealogical emphasis lurks his willingness to create a new 
conception of the subject on the one hand, and the wish to rewrite the relations 
between the subject, the body, truth, power and knowledge on the other. He gives 
prior warning of neither, and in fact no one even knows what they are. This is due 
to the fact that knowledge (as savoir) does not consist of a collection of solid 
propositions and items (as connaissance does), but is rather like a frame within 
which various hypotheses gather their sense. It is, in other words, a matter of 
knowledge, which is more like a postulated set of rules that determine what kinds 
of sentences count as true or false in some domain. (Hacking 1999, 30.) 
 
When applied to phenomena such as sex or sexuality, for example, this means that 
the same concept denotes different kinds of objects in different discourses, and 
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also occurs in different sorts of sentences. What this means in practice is that our 
supposed knowledge of what we call sex (or sexuality) is linked to a large circle 
of ideas, representations, consciousnesses, bodies, and systems of power, all of 
which aim at producing and sustaining the constituted knowledge of sex. What 
Foucault finds behind our knowledge and truth about sex, is a question of what 
governs our scientific statements about sex, and the way in which these statements 
govern each other to constitute a set of scientifically acceptable propositions, 
capable of being verified and falsified by scientific procedures (TP 112). Hence, 
as he concludes in the first part of the History of Sexuality, when we talk about 
sex, it is not only through preoccupation with it, but it also impinges on political 
technologies of life, because all such talk in the modern Western world is used as 
a means of access to the life of the individual and of the species.  
 
Seen in this light, the whole notion of our sexual “nature” becomes a product of 
the specific modes of knowledge designed to make us objects of control. 
Although this knowledge is formulated and defended by a particular historical 
society, thus having no universal value, it is, first of all, our own acceptance that 
we have some certain nature that makes us an object of control, for this 
acceptance demands that we find it, confess it, and set our lives to rights by it 
(Taylor 1999, 78). It is, in other words, in the process of subjection 
(asujettisement) that we come to accept our being as an object of control, as 
something that can be measured, defined and normalized. 
 
In Foucault’s view, this is true even in cases in which we may think that we gain 
more freedom when we get rid of, say, sexual prohibitions concerning the more 
traditional modes of love relations (as in Western cultures after the 1960s). For 
despite the fact that there may be more opportunities in the contemporary Western 
world to engage in sexual acts, and to express one’s sexual desires, we are 
nevertheless dominated by certain controlling images of what it is to be a fulfilled 
and healthy sexual being (Taylor 1999, 79). In Foucault’s words: “Responding 
precisely to the revolt of the body, we find a new mode of investment which 
presents itself no longer in the form of control by repression but that of control by 
stimulation. ‘Get undressed – but be slim, be good-looking, tanned’.” (BP 57.) He 
also calls this control of the body by stimulation the exploitation of eroticisation, 
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referring critically to the aestheticization of the body that does not liberate 
individuals, but rather controls their self-expression by aestheticized means.  
 
One aspect of Foucault’s genealogical analysis of subjection (asujettisement) that 
carries significance for feminism is that it shows how various forms of 
knowledge, as well as the truths we operate with, also serve the need to control 
and normalize, because knowledge can be used as a means to measure, classify, 
examine and categorize people and their personal choices and lifestyles. In 
Foucault’s view, this is specifically true in the domain of sexuality.  
 
Yet, it is important to realize that he does not attempt to explain the rise of 
technologies of control in terms of the modern identity of man as an individual. 
What interests him is the modern notion of individuality as one of its products. 
His suggestion is, in other words, that modern technologies of control bring about 
the modern individual as an object of control, and the being who is thus examined 
and made the target of policies of normalization is the one whom we have come to 
define as the modern individual. (Taylor 1999, 75.)73 As I have already made 
clear, I call this aspect of Foucault’s genealogical analysis his “negative aspect of 
power.” 
 
The contemporary success of plastic surgery could be used as a concrete example 
of what Foucault means. As Susan Bordo observes, we live in a culture in which 
“self-starvation, addictive bingeing and purging, exercise compulsions, and a 
multi-million dollar industry in corrective surgery are flourishing” (Bordo 1994, 
239). Moreover, it is also a culture, which “inclines us away from systemic and 
historical understanding of these practices and the forms of normalization they 
serve. Instead, exercise, diet and plastic surgery are continually mystified in 
commercial constructions of body alteration as self-determination and creative 
self-fashioning” (ibid.). In other words, there is a huge business in the 
contemporary West in the process of subjection and individualism, but this 
process is easily commercialized and aestheticized, and it does not lead to true 
individuality but rather to the active self-normalization of the individual, which 
Foucault also describes as docility.  
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Docile Bodies 
 
In the following three sections, I aim to exemplify what practical conclusions 
Foucault draws between the negative aspect of power and the bodily existence of 
modern subjects – an issue that is extremely relevant to current feminism(s) and 
critical aesthetic analysis of the forms of subjection that engender the “feminine” 
body, as I intend to point out a little further on. 
 
Foucault uses the expression “docile bodies” to describe some central aspects of 
the control that modern bio-power has over the individual’s body and self-
constitution. In Discipline and Punish he traces the roots of modern docility back 
to the seventeenth century, referring to La Mettrie’s L’Homme-machine, which is 
a materialistic reduction of the soul and, at the same time, a theory of training 
(dressage). Docility, for Foucault, joins the analysable body to the manipulable 
body. A body is docile that “may be subjected, used, transformed, and improved” 
(DP 136).74  
 
This very docility, according to Foucault, is the reason why Frederick II, the 
“meticulous king of small machines” and “well-trained regiments and long 
exercises” 75 was obsessed with celebrated automata: they also functioned as 
political puppets, small-scale models of power (DP 136). Despite the fact that 
body has always been an object of imperious and pressing investment, something 
new appeared in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries along with 
the development of modern society: a whole new scale of control over bodily 
operations was now used to subject bodies to the docility-utility principle, which 
Foucault also terms ‘disciplines.’  
 
In the modern era, these disciplines became general formulations of domination, 
but this power was not merely repressive. It also gave rise to a new art of the 
human body, which was directed “not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the 
intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the 
mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and 
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conversely.” (DP 137-138.)76 Why, then, did this new form of power over the 
body emerge? What ends did Foucault’s analysis serve? 
 
Foucault argues that, through the modern principle of docility, the human body 
entered some machinery of power, which explored it, broke it down and 
rearranged it. In his view, this rearranging was without question an “indispensable 
element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible 
without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and 
the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes” (HS 140-
141).77  
 
Modern mechanics of power defined how one could have a hold over other 
people’s bodies so that they might operate as one wishes, not only do as one 
wishes, with the techniques and speed of working, and the efficiency, that one 
determines. Examples of this docility are most easily found among workers. The 
birth of the capitalist society and of industry forced many factory workers to work 
as long as 15 hours a day, regardless of whether they were men or women, adult 
or children. Thus the disciplines that modern society directed to the bodies 
produced subjected and practiced beings (“factory workers” or, alternatively, 
“bourgeois people” with their bourgeois bodily manners, for example), which 
Foucault terms docile bodies (DP 138).  
 
The modern discipline directed at bodies has also given way to new ideas of the 
sexual and medical body. According to Foucault, this can be seen, for example, in 
the hysterization of women’s bodies, the pedagogization of children’s sex, and the 
socialization of procreative behavior. All part of a new deployment of the body, 
they give evidence of the fact that sexuality and the body, in the modern era, are 
to be understood – not as some kind of natural givens which power tries to hold in 
check – but far more as historical constructs. It is a question of production and the 
tactics practiced on bodies and sexuality, not one of their biological nature or 
inner essences. This notion lead Foucault to focus his attention not so much on 
models based on laws, but rather on the strategic models, that are to be analysed 
as forms of power relations that constitute a certain order of political bio-power. 
(HS 102-105.)  
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Bio-power 
 
Foucault also describes modern forms of control of the body in terms of ‘bio-
politics’ and ‘bio-power.’ He uses these terms to refer to certain positive 
knowledge that has been used to count and classify people in the modern era by 
compiling statistical data on births, deaths, sickness, suicide rates, fertility, and so 
on (Hacking 1999, 34). According to Foucault, this kind of power over life has 
been evolving since the 17th century, and it could also be seen as an indispensable 
element in the development of capitalism – which would not have been possible if 
the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production had not been 
effected, and if the adjustment of the population to economic processes had not 
happened. Bio-power also served the needs of social hierarchization, as Foucault 
noted in the following: 
 
If the development of the great instruments of the state, as institutions of 
power, ensured the maintenance of production relations, the rudiments of 
anatomo- and bio-politics, created in the eighteenth-century as techniques 
of power present at every level of the social body and utilized by very 
diverse institutions (the family, the army, schools and the police, 
individual medicine and the administration of collective bodies), operated 
in the sphere of economic processes, their development, and the forces 
sustaining them. They also acted as factors of social hierarchization, 
exerting their influence on the respective forces of both these 
movements, guaranteeing relations of domination and effects of 
hegemony. (HS 141.)78 
 
What Foucault means by this is that the adjustment of the accumulation of people 
to that of capital, as well as the joining of the growth of human groups to the 
expansion of productive forces and profit, were made possible in part by the 
exercise of bio-power in its many forms (ibid.). Moreover, it was only through 
this kind of bio-power that Western people gradually learned what it meant to 
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have a body, conditions of existence, individual and collective welfare and so on, 
in other words, forces that could be modified and a space in which they could be 
handled in an optimal manner (UP 142). What followed, was that:  
 
[F]or the first time in history [...] biological existence was reflected in 
political existence; the fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate 
that only emerged from time to time, amid the randomness of death and its 
fatality; part of it passed into knowledge’s field of control and power’s 
sphere of intervention. Power would no longer be dealing simply with legal 
subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living 
beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them would have 
to be applied at the level of life itself. (HS 142-143.)79  
 
What is at stake here is also a question of tactics of battle in which the biological 
existence of the population is taken as the defining strategy of states. In other 
words, power has been situated and exercised on the levels of life, the species, the 
race, the sex, and the large-scale phenomena of population. Foucault’s analysis of 
bio-power is not restricted to the history, however, for it is diagnosed as a modern 
form of knowledge-power specific to our present time as well: he seems to believe 
that when one understands how bio-power works, one has a sense of intelligibility 
for understanding what sort of people we are today. This is not to say that bio-
power is the only thing going on in our lives. Foucault rather makes the 
interpretive claim that if things are considered in this way, a lot seems to fall into 
place. As Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow suggest, bio-power could be 
defined as the way our current practices work to bring about an order in which 
Western people are healthy, secure, and productive (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1999, 
116).  
 
Foucault’s way of painting a picture of a totally normalized society is meant to 
make it problematic. The implicit hope within his analysis seems to lie in the 
supposition that we have not been completely normalized yet. This would not be 
possible in the Foucauldian view either, since he denies the possibility of a 
theoretical standpoint from which this kind of claim could be asserted. Thus the 
optimism, or, perhaps better, the “hyper-militant pessimism,”80 inherent in his 
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thinking lies in his belief that resistance to social developments can only come 
about from within the society, and from the areas that have not been fully 
normalized. (Hoy 1999 13-14; Gutting 1995, 10.)  
 
For Foucault, the paradox of the modern constitution of the subject is that, 
although modern power produces and protects individuals and their rights, it also 
suppresses the individualization process by terming exceptions from the norm 
negatively and by punishing individuals for acting as individuals. For example, 
people whose sexual desires, outlook and activities do not fit the picture of normal 
sexuality are not appreciated in modern society for their individuality, but are 
rather criminalized or regarded as psychologically perverse.  
 
In Foucault’s view, it is crucial to be aware that modern definitions of perversity 
are also instrumental and connected to power, and that discursive definitions tend 
to produce stereotypes of sexuality rather than repress sexual desires. For “the 
implantation of perversions is an instrument-effect: it is through the isolation, 
intensification, and consolidation of peripheral sexualities that the relations of 
power to sex and pleasure branched and multiplied, measured the body, and 
penetrated modes of conduct. And accompanying this encroachment of powers, 
scattered sexualities rigidified, became stuck to an age, a place, a type of 
practice.” (HS 48.)81 Moreover, as Foucault notes, from the nineteenth century 
onwards the discursive production of perversities has served countless economic 
interests, which “with the help of medicine, psychiatry, prostitution, and 
pornography, have tapped into both this analytical multiplication of pleasures and 
this optimisation of power that controls it” (HS 48).82 
 
The important point here for my own investigation is that in Foucault’s 
genealogical analysis of the subject the body is seen as giving meaning within 
discourse only in the context of power relations. Sex and sexuality, so conceived, 
are no longer taken as mere biological or natural facts, but become politicised. In 
other words, they are presented not as an innate essence we are born with, but 
rather as manipulable cultural constructions and historically specific organizations 
of discourse, power, bodies and affectivity. (Butler 1990, 92.) At this point, it is 
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crucial to ask what Foucault means by power, which is such a central conception 
in his genealogical analysis of the subject, the body and sexuality. 
 
 
Power 
 
In contrast to views that consider power in terms of ideology, superstructure, 
repression, law, and rights, Foucault’s thesis is that while we have not ceased to 
think of power in terms of these models (laws, prohibitions, duties), we actually 
live in relations of power, which are quite different and cannot thus be described 
properly in their terms. What is wielded through the modern technologies of 
control is something that is concerned, first of all, with normalization and bringing 
about a certain result, whether defined as health or good function, and all 
deviations from these are treated as cases to be brought back to what is considered 
to be normal. (Taylor 1999, 75.) 
 
This feature of modern power goes along with two others. First, modern power is 
not concerned with prohibitions and instructions that directly restrict our behavior, 
as has been the case with the more traditional forms of power, but it must be seen 
as productive. Consequently, it also constitutes new kinds of subjects and new 
kinds of desires and behavior. It is, in other words, out to form us as modern 
individuals. Second, the usage of modern power cannot be reduced back only to 
the subject, and it cannot be satisfactorily depicted in terms of ideology or 
superstructures.83  
 
It is inherent in the old models that power presupposes a certain who, in other 
words, some identifiable party who is organizing the lives of other people (or, as a 
result, prevents us from doing certain things) (Hacking 1999, 34). Foucault denies 
this more traditional hierarchical model of power as opposition between rulers and 
the ruled. For him, “power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a 
certain strength we are endowed with” (HS 93).84 Rather, it is “the name that one 
attributes to a complex strategic situation in a particular society” (HS 93).85 In the 
first part of the History of Sexuality, he presents a brief crystallization of his way 
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of using the term power, which explains some central features of his 
interpretations of sexuality and the self. There are five points in his account. 
 
1) Power is not something one holds on to or allows to slip away, because it is 
exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of non-egalitarian and mobile 
relations. 
 
2) Relations of power are immanent in other types of relations (economic, 
processes, knowledge, and sexuality), not in a position of exteriority with respect 
to them. Relations of power are not manifested in super-structural positions (as 
prohibitions and accompaniment), but have a directly productive role, whatever 
they come to play. 
 
3) Power comes from below. In other words, it is not binary and all-encompassing 
opposition between rulers and the ruled, or the oppressors and the oppressed. We 
must rather suppose that the manifold relations of force that come into play in the 
machinery of production, in limited groups, families and institutions, are the basis 
of the wide-ranging effects of cleavage running through the whole of society. 
These relations of force form a general line of force that traverses local 
oppositions and links them together. They also bring about redistributions, 
realignments, homogenizations, convergences and serial arrangements of force 
relations. Major dominations are, moreover, the hegemonic effects that are 
sustained by all of these confrontations.86  
 
4) Power relations are both intentional and non-subjective. If they are intelligible, 
this is not because they are the causal effect of some other instance that explains 
them, but rather because they are imbued with calculation, for power is always 
exercised with series of aims and objectives. This is not to say that it results from 
the decision or choice of an individual, however. Its rationality is characterized by 
tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level at which they are 
inscribed (local cynicism of power). These tactics become connected to one 
another, propagating and attracting one another, but finding their base of support 
and their condition elsewhere. They end up by forming comprehensive systems: 
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their logic is clear, the aims decipherable, and yet usually no one is there to have 
invented them, and only a few can be said to have formulated them. 
 
5) Where there is power, there is resistance. This resistance is never in a position 
of exteriority in relation to power. The existence of power relations cannot be 
thematicized in terms of their being an inside power, however, nor can it be 
regarded as an essential feature of the ruse-like nature of history (if history is the 
ruse of reason, power is the ruse of history, always emerging as the winner). It is 
rather to be understood as depending on a multiplicity of various points of 
resistance, which are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no 
single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, no source of all rebellion, and no 
pure law of the revolutionary. Instead, there is a plurality of resistances, and each 
of them is a special case: resistances that are possible, necessary, improbable, 
spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant, violent. By definition, they can 
only exist in the strategic field of power relations. Resistances are spread over 
time and space at varying densities and in irregular fashion, sometimes mobilizing 
groups of individuals in a definitive way, inflaming certain moments in life, 
certain points of the body, and certain types of behavior. (HS 94-96.) 
  
Thus, Foucault concludes, power is everywhere, not because it embraces 
everything, but because it comes from everywhere (HS 93). It is, in other words, 
in the moving substrate of force relations where states of power are engendered. 
This is also true of discourses, which are to be seen not simply as the surface or 
projection of power mechanisms, but as something in which power and 
knowledge are joined together. For this reason, discourse must be conceived of 
“as a series of discontinuous segments whose tactical function is neither uniform 
nor stable” (HS 100).87 For discourses, just like silences, are not simply 
subservient to power or raised up against it. When we analyse them, “we must 
make allowance for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be 
both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy” (HS 100-
101).88 
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In Foucault’s genealogical scheme, discourse thus produces and transmits power 
by reinforcing it, but it also undermines and exposes power, and even makes it 
possible to thwart it. In other words, discourse functions as a mediator of power 
and at the same time offers possibilities to resist it. Forms of resistance are not 
universal, but strategic and empirical. They are responses to specific types of 
power, whose mechanisms they attempt to unveil. Resistance is to be seen not as 
functioning outside of power, however, but rather as a position within power, as a 
reaction to it, or as a production of new expressions of power that remain 
necessarily inside its networks. 
 
As an example of the discourse that offers the means for its own undermining, 
Foucault refers to the discursive production of homosexuality, showing how the 
appearance of nineteenth-century psychiatry, jurisprudence and literature 
produced a whole set of discourses on the species and subspecies of 
homosexuality, perversions, inversion, and “psychic hermaphrodism.” By so 
doing, it made possible the formation of a reverse discourse in which 
homosexuality began to speak on its own behalf, demanding that its legitimacy or 
naturalness be acknowledged, often in the very same vocabulary, using even the 
same categories by which it was medically dismissed. (HS 101.)  
 
What Foucault argues is that there is not a discourse of power on one side, and 
opposite to it another discourse that runs counter to it. Discourses are rather to be 
seen as tactical elements or blocks that operate in the field of force relations. It 
should also be borne in mind that counter-discourses are also plural in nature. In 
other words, different and even contradictory discourses may exist within the 
same strategy, or they may circulate without changing their form from one 
strategy to another, opposing one. Thus, there is no point in expecting discourses 
on sex and sexuality to tell us what strategy they derive from, what kind of 
ideology (dominant or dominated) they represent, or what kind of moral divisions 
they accompany. As Foucault suggests, it is much more important to question 
discourses on the two levels of their tactical productivity (what reciprocal effects 
of power and knowledge they ensure) and their strategic integration (what force 
relation and what conjunction make their utilization necessary in a given episode 
of the various confrontations that occur). (HS 102.) 
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4. GENEALOGY AND FEMINISM 
 
Despite the fact that Foucault himself mainly ignores the question of the equality 
of the sexes, or, better, makes only some rather superficial references to the issue, 
his genealogical suggestion that sexuality is not a natural or innate quality of the 
body, but rather the effect of historically specific power relations, embodied in the 
individual’s process of subjection, has provided feminists with a fresh analytical 
framework through which to explain how women’s subjectivity and existence are 
controlled and impoverished within certain culturally-determined stereotypes of 
female sexuality.  
 
What is relevant to feminist theory is also Foucault’s genealogical claim that 
power is always productive and not only oppressive, because it affects the 
constitution of our selves through various forms of knowledge, norms, ideals, 
stereotypes, laws, habits and discursive practices. Applied to the feminist 
terminology, this means that our being or becoming women (and men) is defined 
from birth to death by a complex network of limiting practices and discourses, 
which we cannot ignore even if we would like to.  
 
Seen in this way, individual gender identity is not grounded on any natural or 
innate self, but becomes constantly produced in and through different strategic 
cultural models and discursive practices that vary historically. For Foucault, these 
practices and strategies represent power relations, which are intimately connected 
to political power. At the same time, however, it is exactly these models and 
practices that may be used to disturb the existing limits and norms imposed on 
individuals, assuming that they are used creatively and in unexpected ways. 
 
With these notions in mind, I will explore in the following sections the usefulness 
of Foucault’s genealogical tools for feminism. As I will illustrate, Foucault’s work 
has inspired a large number of feminists to rethink their conceptions of the 
subject, as well as their views of power, resistance, and the body. Yet, at the same 
time, feminist debate has brought to the light some problems in Foucault’s 
thinking. In discussing this, I intend to show how Foucault offers a set of adequate 
tools for re-constructing feminist views on the subject and the self, on the one 
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hand, and how, on the other hand, his work requires critique and reformulation 
when brought together with feminist insights. 
 
 
The Advantages of Foucault’s Genealogical Method for Feminism 
 
As I will demonstrate in this section, many contemporary post-feminist theorists 
are motivated by the same four tasks that Foucault set for his genealogical 
method. For the first, a large number of feminists have been interested in offering 
perspectives on alternative identities. This has often led feminist thinkers to 
consider identity in terms of parody, masquerade or farce rather than as something 
authentic or essential.  
 
As I will point out later, there is also a strong tendency in post-feminist theory to 
consider identity not as something fixed and stable that we are born with, but 
rather as cultural practice or process, which can be turned into a parody and 
counter-discourse. In this respect, both post-feminism and contemporary 
subversive art offer concrete examples of discourses that not only produce and use 
power by suggesting meanings to things, but also work as stumbling-blocks for 
hegemonic discourses and as a source of meaningful resistance. 
 
In many cases, the central aim of feminist resistance is to offer alternative ways of 
idealizing women and to resist stereotypical heterosexual normality. According to 
Judith Butler, gender is a strategy for survival within compulsory systems (such as 
heterosexuality), a strategy that has clearly punitive consequences. For “discrete 
genders are part of what ‘humanizes’ individuals within contemporary culture; 
indeed we regularly punish those who fail to do their gender right.” (Butler 1990, 
139-140.)  
In this respect, Butler’s idea of gender can also be read as one form of the 
controlling bio-power that Foucault talks about. In her book Gender Trouble 
(1990), Butler uses the expression “heterosexual matrix” to describe the strategies 
of power that attempt to naturalize bodies, desires and genders. For Butler, the 
heterosexual matrix is a hegemonic epistemic/discursive model of gender 
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intelligibility, which assumes that “for bodies to cohere and make sense there 
must be a stable sex expressed through a stable gender (masculine expresses male, 
feminine expresses female) that is oppositionally and hierarchically defined 
through the compulsory practice of heterosexuality.” (Butler 1990, 151, note 6.)89  
 
The heterosexual matrix is grounded on three main suppositions of the 
characteristics of normal woman and man, which could be depicted as follows: 
 
 
WOMAN MAN 
Women’s body Man’s body 
Desire for men Desire for women 
Women’s social role Men’s social role 
 
 
By defining the normal individual through this sort of normative model, the 
heterosexual matrix functions as one form of productive and organizing power: it 
aims to produce two genders, heterosexual men and heterosexual women. In other 
words, the discourse that supports the heterosexualizing power produces a specific 
body culture and a sexual culture, and represents this culture as a norm, defining 
at once the limits of normality. When confronted with marginal or alternative 
sexualities and identities, the heterosexual matrix does not allow them to be 
represented as culturally-accepted sites of identity, although it might allow them 
to exist. Instead, alternative identities and ways of living are criminalized, 
medicalized and ignored, or at least turned into objects of jokes. (Balsamo 1999, 
55.) 
 
Feminist productions of counter-discourses to the normative heterosexualizing 
power bring an element of disorder to discussions on sexuality and identity. An 
individual aesthetic deed can function as such a source of disturbing discourse. In 
this context, as I will show, individual identity is not to be taken as a mere site of 
alternative aesthetic deeds. The construction of identity is, in fact, also a political 
category in that it might function as a site of cultural otherness. This is so, I 
  
 
 
 90 
suggest, because alternative aesthetic appearances have the power to show by 
their very existence that the hegemonic practices of sexuality and identity 
represent, not the truth, but merely one possible order, which can be also changed 
or even replaced by other orders (as history also shows).  
 
With similar ideas in mind, Kaja Silverman suggests that we need alternative 
visual texts (that she also terms “textual interventions”), which activate in us the 
capacity “to idealize bodies which diverge as widely as possible both from 
ourselves and from the cultural norm” (Silverman 1996, 37). In her view, this is 
important because without this sort of counter-action we easily end up idealizing 
women in a way that “not only restricts ideality to certain subjects, while 
rendering others unworthy of love, but also naturalizes the former as essentially 
ideal.” Thus, we should learn how to idealize women in oppositional and 
provisional ways that create more space for their aesthetics of the self and 
alternative styles of living. At the same time, we should make sure that these new 
representations do not turn into ones that “work to naturalize the end result of that 
psychic activity in a way that might be ultimately productive of simply new, 
reified ideas.” (Ibid.)  
 
Secondly, the systematic dissociation of identity, or alternatively, its pluralization, 
which is the second task of Foucault’s genealogy, is important for all feminists 
who aim to replace the older (essentialist, universalist) notions of woman by a 
plural term ‘women,’ and who attempt to show that this category does not 
represent a synthesis between different women, but rather includes dissipation and 
discontinuity. As Judith Butler says, “if one ’is’ a woman, that is surely not all one 
is: the term fails to be exhaustive, not because a pre-gendered ’person’ transcends 
the specific paraphernalia of its gender, but because gender is not always 
constituted coherently or consistently in different historical contexts, and because 
gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, and regional modalities of discursively 
constituted identities. As a result, it becomes impossible to separate out gender 
from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and 
maintained.” (Butler 1990, 3.) 
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As Silverman, in turn, suggests, a middle-class white woman, for instance, is 
culturally encouraged to see herself and to represent herself as the bodily ideal in 
relation to which both black women and homeless men are largely perceived as 
insufficient or inferior (Silverman 1996, 36). There are also women who identify 
themselves with the cultural images of masculinity, in other words, women who 
seek to embody the man who represents their individual ideal. The problem with 
which post-feminists are concerned is that in cases such as this, the imaginary 
accession to masculinity is often described as a travesty or perversion of the “real 
thing,” and so fails to lead to the desired identification with her ideality. (Ibid.; 
Halberstam 1999, 127.)  
 
By creating textual interventions in the hegemonic images of masculinity/ 
femininity, feminists such as Judith Butler, Jana Sawicki, Kaja Silverman, bell 
hooks, Judith Halberstam, Teresa de Lauretis and various others seek to create 
more space for alternative styles of living and alternative aesthetics of the self, 
while paying specific attention to the differences among women. Using Foucault 
in this respect means acknowledging the multiplicity of difference among women, 
and claiming the end of woman as a universal category (Ramazanoglu 1993, 9; de 
Lauretis 1997, 34-35; Sawicki 1991). Moreover, it also means asking what kind of 
category woman constitutes: whether she represents a culturally produced gender 
or a natural/biological sex, and what the precise nature of the distinction between 
these two aspects of her existence is (Elam 1994, 42).  
 
As part of this critique, many contemporary post-feminist theorists have argued 
that we should give up the idea of a stable notion of gender as a foundational 
premise of feminist politics, because the construction of the categories of women 
and men as coherent and stable subjects seems to lead to the regulation and 
reification of gender relations. Moreover, the stability of the gender categories can 
be shown to achieve coherence only in the context of the heterosexual matrix, 
which many feminists attempt to overcome, for good reasons. (Butler 1990, 5.)  
Instead of speaking of specific feminine sexuality – a discourse through which 
thinkers such as Irigaray and Cixous try to effect changes in power relations – 
post-feminists offer a plurality of pleasures that often transgress the supposition in 
the heterosexual matrix that female desire is grounded on the biological woman’s 
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desire for the opposite sex (man), and vice versa. In the words of Judith 
Halberstam:  
 
[P]leasure might be sex with a woman who looks like a boy; pleasure might 
be a woman going in disguise as a man to a gay bar in order to pick up a gay 
man. Pleasure might be two naked women; pleasure might be masturbation 
watched by a stranger; pleasure might be a man and a woman; but pleasure 
seems to be precise […] Wanting a man with a vagina or wanting to be a 
woman transformed into a man having sex with other men are fairly precise 
and readable desires – precise and yet not at all represented by the 
categories for sexual identity we have settled for. (Halberstam 1999, 127.) 
 
Third, Foucault’s insistence that genealogical study should have the examination 
of the body as its starting point, even replacing the notion of the self-thematizing 
subject, has attracted the interest of some post-feminists. As the second point 
above implies, post-feminists do not take the stable notion of gender as a 
foundational premise of feminist politics. Therefore, in the bodily context, they do 
not assume that there is some universally valid experience of the female body and 
sexuality on which feminist politics and aesthetics could be based. For them the 
body is rather the site of permanent struggle, a site in which various power blocks 
impose their effects, and on which the most serious wars over signification are 
enacted.  
 
In short, the body is taken by post-feminists not as something essential in itself 
(the female body, the male body, the heterosexual body) but rather as a locus of 
dissociated self and volume in perpetual discontinuity. The focus is thus paid on 
the openness of bodily identity, not on its fixed character, on singularities, not on 
universals. Thus the task is to fragment and disperse female and male bodies (on 
the levels of experience and representation) rather than to present them as 
coherent or essential. With these ideas in mind, Butler shows how this sort of 
notion of the body easily leads to consideration of the question of the aesthetics of 
the self, or as she terms it, “styles of the flesh.” She writes: 
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If the body is not a ’being’ but a variable boundary, a surface whose 
permeability is politically regulated, a signifying practice within a cultural 
field of gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality, then what 
language is left for understanding this corporeal enactment, gender, that 
constitutes its ’interior’ signification on its surface? Sartre would perhaps 
have called this act ’a style of being’, Foucault ’a stylistics of existence’ [...] 
I suggest that gendered bodies are so many ’styles of the flesh’. These styles 
are never fully self-styled, for styles have a history, and those histories 
condition and limit the possibilities. Consider gender, for instance, as a 
corporeal style, an ’act’, as it were, which is both intentional and 
performative, where ’performative’ suggests a dramatic and contingent 
construction of meaning. (Ibid. 139.) 
 
Finally, with respect to the fourth aspect of Foucault’s genealogical method, 
intellectuals termed post-feminists in this work are also willing to get rid of the 
traditional idea of the neutral, universal or disinterested subject of knowledge. 
What interests them is the possibility of replacing the idea of the neutral knowing 
subject with the more politically-aware notion of the subject who is produced in a 
complex network of history and power, and who also necessarily uses power.  
 
Seen in this light, women are not taken as mere victims of a patriarchal society, 
but are interpreted as using power themselves too, not least in their relation to 
their selves and to other women. In other words, the “experimentation on 
ourselves” that Foucault demands every genealogist to practice parallels the post-
feminist idea that women may take the role of active subjects in the formation of 
their selves and styles of living. Neither Foucault nor post-feminists consider 
these positions neutral however, and both acknowledge that they express very 
different sorts of interests, needs and problems within the disintegrated and 
historically changing category of women.  
 
Within this framework, feminist ideas of emancipation and resistance also become 
understood in new ways that are no longer grounded on the idea of universal 
emancipation or universal liberty and equality (like the utopian state of affairs). In 
the post-feminist scheme, resistance is explained as something that is not only 
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heterogeneous and plural, but also constantly changing in the moving substrate of 
force relations and discourses. This means that there is not one unified discourse 
or counter-strategy called feminism, but rather different and sometimes even 
contradictory counter-discourses that might function within the same critical 
feminist strategy.  
 
 
Reconsidering Women’s Power: Beyond the Oppressor/Oppressed 
 
As I will illustrate in this section, Foucault’s genealogical scheme also implies 
that feminist analysis of power should not be based on the traditional model 
according to which men are simply oppressors and women are mere victims of 
patriarchal power. For if it is true that power comes from everywhere, and if 
resistance is always found where there is power, women also produce and use 
power, despite the fact that they are in many ways also oppressed by the political 
structures, habits and value beliefs of the patriarchy. This notion has led many 
feminists to elaborate the old distinction between oppressors and oppressed, and 
to reconsider women’s relation to power. 
 
Seen in a larger perspective, the question of power is as central to feminist theory 
as the question of the subject, because all feminism demands some tracing of the 
connections between the persistence of male power and women’s experiences of 
sexual subordination. These connections have an effect not only on feminist 
political strategies, but also on how women’s possibilities for empowerment and 
active agency are understood (Ramazanoglu 1993, 17).  
 
There is no space here to go into detail about the historical debates on power and 
women’s oppression (on this issue, see Bordo 1994; Bartky 1988; McNay 1992, 
notably pp. 36-37; and hooks 1984). Rather, maintaining the topic of the 
constitution of the subject and the body, I will emphasize only the traits that have 
a bearing on the uses of Foucault’s insight for the contemporary generation of 
feminist theories. For it is exactly on this point that Foucault’s views show their 
attraction in the contemporary analysis of female subordination and male 
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domination – much of which, as Susan Bordo correctly notes, is reproduced 
voluntarily through self-normalization to the stereotypical everyday habits of 
femininity and masculinity (Bordo 1994, 233).  
 
This is surely not to claim that all gender subordination could be explained in 
terms of voluntary choices: women are also subordinated both emotionally and 
physically, and financially trapped in degrading jobs and violent relationships 
(ibid.). Foucault’s usefulness for feminism has been rather more apparent in his 
analysis of productive power and the politics of appearance. Allow me to point 
out here, following Susan Bordo’s analysis, three crucial points in Foucault’s 
analysis of power that have inspired contemporary feminists’ views on women’s 
constitution of their selves in this respect. 
 
First, within the Foucauldian/contemporary feminist framework, it does not make 
much sense to regard men merely as the enemy or the oppressor, because power is 
not simply possessed by men. In other words, power is not something that people 
have, but it is rather a non-centralized struggle of forces, which constitutes a 
dynamic network into which power comes from everywhere, including from 
below.  
 
Therefore, the prevailing forms of selfhood and subjectivity that sustain 
dominance and inequality are not constructed and enforced by design, control and 
punishment from above (as sovereign power is exercised), but rather effected 
through multiple processes that have no unique origin or location. Seen through 
Foucauldian eyes, the subordination and regulation of women does not proceed 
only through physical restraint and coercion, despite the fact that social relations 
contain such elements. Rather, women could also be seen as participating in 
reproducing sexist culture through individual self-surveillance and self-correction 
to norms and stereotypes (Bordo 1994, 233 and Bordo 1993, 28). I will analyse 
this phenomenon more concretely a little later in terms of women’s docility. 
My second point is connected to Foucault’s idea that power forces are not based 
on chance, nor are they random, but configure instead to assume certain particular 
historical forms, within which certain groups do have dominance over others. In 
other words, although power is not held by any one, it does not mean that it is 
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equally held by all. Power produces different kinds of strategies, the general 
design or institutional crystallization of which is embodied in the state apparatus, 
in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies, manners of 
representation and interpreting, for example.  
 
Patriarchy is one example of such a strategy, or hegemony. In my view, awareness 
of this fact is as crucial for feminist studies on power as awareness of the 
particularity of each local struggle inside the patriarchal society, for to ignore it 
would mean ignoring the idea that there are also some forms of major domination 
(as Foucault pointed out in his analysis of power) despite the fact that power is not 
held by any one. (Bordo 1994, 232.) 
 
Third, and finally, if power also includes its own resistance, or rather, multiple 
points of resistance – which mobilize groups of individuals in a definitive way, 
inflaming certain moments in life, certain points of the body, and certain types of 
behavior, as Foucault suggests (HS 96) – women should be seen as being capable 
of resisting and undermining power strategies that effect their daily lives and self-
understanding. From this perspective (that Bordo terms postmodern), both the 
earlier feminist emphasis on women’s social conditioning and the later move to 
normalization seem to ignore the unstable nature of subjectivity and, along with it, 
the creative potential of individuals. (Bordo 1994, 233-243.) 
 
Put in another way, when it comes to the everyday politics of the self and bodily 
(aesthetic) appearance, contemporary post-feminism has focused more on actively 
resisting and disturbing the normative and normalizing practices of our culture 
than on describing women as passive, powerless victims of patriarchy. As I intend 
to point out, in coming to terms with the contemporary feminist aesthetics of the 
self, opportunities for resistance are often sought from the oppressive and 
stereotypical discourses themselves, not from outside the oppressive logic of the 
patriarchal society. In other words, contemporary critique tends to turn strategic 
power discourses against themselves by repeating and imitating them in ways that 
undermine, disturb and thwart their chain of meanings in the way that Foucault 
suggests resisting discourses operate. Just as for the genealogical Foucault, for 
genealogically-oriented post-feminists the central site of this resistance is the 
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body, which is not just an object of docility but can also be used as means of 
undermining its stereotypical or oppressive representations. 
 
 
Genealogy of the Sexualized Body 
 
In this section, I will show more precisely how Foucault’s genealogical notion of 
the body as the locus in which power relations are manifest in a very concrete 
form has made a contribution to feminist thinking on the body. As I will suggest, 
what is of special significance is his insistence on the body as a historical and 
culturally-specific entity. Moreover, his way of demystifying the body from all 
sorts of original or natural essences, as well as his stressing of historicism and 
perspectivism, has offered feminists a theoretical framework in which the body 
can be analysed as a concrete phenomenon without eliding its materiality with a 
fixed biological or pre-discursive essence (McNay 1992, 17). 
 
Feminists have long been preoccupied with the question of how to conceptualise 
the sexualised body without positing an original sexual difference that would 
precede our becoming male or female. Lois McNay explains the importance of 
this task in the following terms: 
 
On a fundamental level, a notion of the body is central to the feminist 
analysis of the oppression of women because it is upon the biological 
difference between the male and female bodies that the edifice of gender 
equality is built and legitimised. The idea that women are inferior to men is 
naturalized and, thus, legitimised by reference to biology. This is achieved 
through a twofold movement in which, firstly, women’s bodies are marked 
as inferior by being compared with men’s bodies, according to male 
standards (homme manqué) and, secondly, biological functions are conflated 
with social characteristics. In many respects, masculine characteristics can 
be seen to be related to dominant perceptions of the male body, i.e. 
firmness, aggression, strength. However, man, unlike woman, is understood 
as being able to transcend being defined in terms of his biological capacities 
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via the use of his rational faculties. In contrast, women, as de Beauvoir 
notes, are entirely defined in terms of their physical capacities. (McNay 
1992, 17.) 
 
The devaluing and derogation of the female body and sexuality through 
comparison with the male body, and the definition of the female through 
“original” biological categories, has lead to different strategic systems of 
oppression: to the underestimation of women’s mental and bodily capacities, to 
the representation of women as mere objects of the heterosexual male’s desire, to 
the subjection of women in confinement to medical power, to the construction of 
female sexuality as deficiency or frigidity and, along with it, the denial of female 
sexuality as a locus of autonomous experience and jouissance (Kintz 1989, 64; 
McNay 1992, 18).  
 
Some feminists, notably the radical feminists and the so called new French 
feminists, have reacted to the traditional underestimation of the female body and 
sexuality by emphasizing the importance of creating practices that attempt to 
disturb and subvert earlier ways of reducing it back to the male ideal model. This 
has often led to the stressing of the stability and centrality of sexual difference as 
a constitutive principle, and, along with it, to the constitution of what has been 
called female aesthetics. 
 
It is via the female, or “woman-centred” aesthetics that some feminists have 
striven to inscribe a female idiom in critical discourse and to define feminist 
critical stylistics based on women’s gender-specific experience. In much the same 
spirit, in an article entitled “Toward a Feminist Aesthetic” (1978), Julia P. Stanley 
and Susan J. Wolfe put forward the compelling hypothesis of the need to create a 
coherent female style or aesthetics, because “the unique perceptions and 
interpretations of women require a literary style that reflects, captures, and 
embodies the quality of our thought.” This style, in their view, must be a 
“discursive conjunctive style instead of the complex, subordinating, linear style of 
classification and distinction” (Stanley and Wolfe 1978, 59, 67). 
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Sharing the same belief, Adrianne Rich proposed in 1975 that feminism needs the 
idea of a common female culture. As she notes, “Divided from each other through 
our dependencies on men – domestically, tribally, and in the world of patronage 
and institutions – our first need has been to recognize and reject these divisions, 
the second to begin exploring all that we share in common as women on this 
planet.” (Rich 1975, xvii.)  
 
As I pointed out in my assessment of Irigaray and Cixous, French feminist writing 
of the same period produced the concepts of écriture féminine and parler femme, 
which followed rather similar lines of argumentation. These ideas and terms were 
meant to represent women’s style as a textual rupture and subversion in avant-
garde literature, available to both women and men, but more intimately connected 
and even analogous to female sexual morphology (Showalter 1997, 63).  
 
In much the same spirit, thinkers such as Annie Leclerc and Julia Kristeva have 
also attempted to create new ways of valuing the female body by recovering a 
positive image of women’s biological selves and specific sexual pleasure 
(jouissance feminine) through the analysis of their style of speaking and writing.90 
While the French critique of phallo(go)centrism takes very different paths in the 
work of Irigaray, Cixous, Leclerc and Kristeva, it all explores the possibility of a 
concentric feminine discourse. This discourse, as Elaine Showalter explains, is 
critical at its very root, for “whether clitoral, vulval, vaginal, or uterine; whether 
centered on semiotic pulsions, childbearing, or jouissance, the feminist 
theorization of female sexuality/textuality, and its funky audacity in violating 
patriarchal taboos by unveiling the Medusa, is an exhilarating challenge to phallic 
discourse” (Showalter 1997, 63). 
 
Yet, at the same time, there are some serious problems in these feminist accounts. 
Most of their theoretical and political limitations stem from their fetishizing of 
sexual difference, feminine subjectivity and marginalization, which has lead many 
theorists to equate oppression with fixed meanings and to conclude that the 
feminist subversion of identity constitutes the most radical form of cultural 
activity. The appeal of such a theoretical position is easy to understand: by 
remaining within the themes of feminine marginality, artistic experimentation and 
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“original” sexual difference, it is relatively easy to retain the oppositional purity 
of feminism (or feminine), and to keep one’s “hands clean.” The ideological 
positioning of feminism or the feminist avant-garde is not so easily transcended, 
however. As Felski notes, the fetishizing of strategies of experimental writing 
represents just one more dead-end in its inability to offer any serious defence of or 
justification for women’s struggles for social, economic and political change. 
(Felski 1989, 223.) 
 
What many post-feminist intellectuals propose instead is that, while feminist 
politics and theory must include the question of women’s pleasure, since the 
history of women’s oppression is so closely tied up with the regulation of female 
sexuality, feminism cannot be reduced to the mere play of desire and in particular 
not to the jouissance liberated by the experimental text. For the subversion of the 
unified master-subject and fixed meanings does not seem to imply in itself 
anything other than some sort of utopian anarchism, which could just as easily 
serve the interests of all sorts of political extremes as feminist political goals. 
(Ibid.) 
 
The alternative interpretation, offered by post-feminist gender theorists, 
emphasizes that gender, just like ethnicity or class, is a fundamental or organic 
social variable in human existence, not something that is original, universal or 
natural. Therefore, within post-feminist theorization, the object of feminist 
criticism undergoes a remarkable transformation. Unlike the theories that 
emphasize women’s writing or specific female sexual pleasure (jouissance 
feminine), post-feminist problematizations explore ideological description and the 
social production of gender. 
 
Against this background it seems justifiable to suggest that all those feminist 
analysts who have attempted to overcome the earlier limitations of feminist theory 
by paying attention to the genealogical issues Foucault talks about, represent an 
important shift in the historical development of feminism. Unlike the views that 
base ideas of the gendered self and body on the notion of original and essential 
sexual difference, recent post-feminist gender theories concentrate more on the 
discursive practices through which gendered identity and our bodily experiences 
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are produced and reproduced. Just as for Foucault, for the feminists who support 
these views, sexual identity and gender are not something original we are born 
with, but they are rather the most speculative elements in the deployment of 
sexuality organized by power (HS 155).91 Paying heed to this genealogical point 
of view means politicizing and challenging the essential claims of some earlier 
feminisms. 
 
 
Gender as a Performance 
 
As I will illustrate in this section, one of the most challenging formulations of 
these post-feminist claims is that of Judith Butler, whose Gender Trouble (1990) 
is one of the most cited books among contemporary feminists. Butler draws on 
Foucault’s genealogical work to produce a new analysis of how we construct 
categories in order to understand sex, gender and desire. The point of departure of 
her research is the study of the historical present, and the task is, briefly, “to 
formulate within this constituted frame a critique of the categories of identity that 
contemporary juridical structures engender, naturalize, and immobilize” (Butler 
1990, 5).  
 
What this means is that her genealogical perspective still focuses on the question 
of gendered identity but not on the grounds of gender stability that would prove 
the foundational premise of feminist politics. Rather, what has come to replace 
older notions of sexual identity is a new sort of feminist politics and identity, “one 
that will take the variable construction of identity as both a methodological and 
normative prerequisite, if not a political goal.” (Ibid.) So conceived, the task of 
the feminist genealogy of the category of women is to outline the political 
operations that produce and hide what qualifies as the juridical subject of 
feminism. According to Butler, feminist genealogical critique 
 
refuses to search for the origins of gender, the inner truth of female desire, a 
genuine or authentic sexual identity that repression has kept from view; 
rather, genealogy investigates the political stakes in designating as an origin 
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and cause those identity categories that are in fact the effects of institutions, 
practices, discourses with multiple points of origin. The task of this inquiry 
is to center on – and decenter – such defining institutions: phallogocentrism 
and compulsory heterosexualism. (Butler 1990, viii-ix.) 
 
One of Butler’s principal aims in Gender Trouble is to explore how traditional 
binary logic has trapped critical understandings of sex and gender. In her view, 
even if the sexes appear to be binary in their constititution and morphology, there 
is no reason to assume that genders should also remain as two.  
 
As Butler writes, the supposition of a binary gender system implicitly maintains 
the belief in the mimetic relation of gender to sex, whereby gender is seen as 
mirroring sex or as being otherwise restricted by it. Therefore, when the 
constructed status of gender is theorized as radically independent of sex (as in 
Butler’s own post-feminist account), gender itself becomes “a free-floating 
artifice, with the consequence that man and masculine might just as easily signify 
a female body as a male one, and woman and feminine a male body as easily as a 
female one.” (Butler 1990, 6.)  
 
Butler’s project, then, is to explain why there can be subversive separations 
between the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender.’ If, as Butler suggests, gender is a cultural 
meaning that the sexed body assumes and practices, it cannot be simply derived 
from the natural body. It would appear to be more relevant to ask: “Does being 
female constitute a ‘natural fact’ or cultural performance, or is ‘naturalness’ 
constituted through discursively constrained performative acts that produce the 
body through and within the category of sex?” (Butler 1990, viii. See also McNay 
1992, 21-22; Bordo 1993, 165.)  
 
In Butler’s view, gender is primarily a cultural performative that demands 
repetition (acts, habits, ways of talking, and looking, for example) rather than 
something coherent, original or innate. Identity needs coherence, but this 
coherence should be sought from the level of the “surface politics of the body,” 
not from the ideas of original essences or selves. This is so, she argues, because 
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“acts, gestures, and desire produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but 
produce this on the surface of the body, through the play of signifying absences 
that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity as a cause” 
(Butler 1990, 136). Moreover, such acts, enactments and gestures are always 
performative in a sense that “the essence or identity they otherwise purport to 
express are fabrications manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and 
other discursive means. That the gendered body is performative suggests that it 
has no ontological status apart from the various acts which constitute its reality.” 
(Ibid.) 
 
As various concrete examples of female masculinity or feminine manhood 
suggest, we need to think more subtly about the broad repertoire of gendered 
styles that women and men may adopt. Therefore, Butler urges us to reconsider 
how and why gender should be understood as a pluralizing concept that 
appreciates many different masculinities and femininities instead of universally 
valid womanhood or manhood. At the same time, she casts suspicion on the idea 
that sex is grounded on pre-discursive nature because, in her view, it is culture, 
after all, that has played a crucial part in explaining and naming sex. In other 
words, it is culture that has established sex as a marker, which creates some sort 
of natural distinction when in fact it is an arbitrary sign of difference. Sex, 
therefore, should be reconsidered as just as much a cultural construction as gender 
is presumed to be (Bristow 1997, 212).  
 
Butler even goes so far as to claim that gender as a discursive element actually 
gives rise to a belief in inner or pre-discursive sex. What this means is that sex is 
retrospectively a product of gender so that, in a sense, gender can be shown to 
come before sex. This is not to say that gender is simply the “real thing” for 
contemporary feminists. Butler rather calls it drag or performance, a particular 
kind of imitation. So conceived, gender is understood as an ideal that is its own 
projection and does not exist anywhere else.  
 
As a logical conclusion to this line of argumentation, Butler writes that genders 
can “be neither true nor false, but are only produced as the truth effects of a 
discourse of primary and stable identity” (Butler 1990, 136). To some degree, the 
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same seems to be true of anyone, for no-one living in the contemporary West can 
escape being shaped, re-shaped, named and categorized in the same grip of gender 
ideals. Hence Butler’s claim: we are all nothing but drags.  
 
 
Docile Female Bodies 
 
As I have suggested above, post-feminist gender theory is in many respects a 
close relative of Foucault’s genealogical analysis, which denies all coherent 
original, pre-discursive and natural structures of the subject, and attempts to find 
out ways in which the subject and the body are conceptualised and articulated 
within different cultural discourses and historically specific knowledge/power 
networks (Balsamo 1999, 3).  
 
Another important aspect of Foucault’s genealogy for these feminist analyses is 
his interpretation of modern selfhood and the body as being shaped by the 
subject’s docility to the normalizing power. In a piece of writing entitled “The 
Eye of Power” (1977), Foucault notes: “There is no need for arms, physical 
violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze which each 
individual under its weight will end by interiorising to the point that he is his own 
overseer, each individual thus exercising this surveillance over, and against, 
himself.” (EP 155)  
 
As I will illustrate in this section, this notion has been very useful, for example, in 
attempts to understand contemporary phenomena such as eating disorders, plastic 
surgery and body building, all of which seem to incorporate women’s need to 
show their selves in culturally accepted and appreciated forms. The problem with 
this inspecting gaze for women is that, in a patriarchal culture, women learn to 
look at themselves through the heterosexual male perspective, as Laura Mulvey 
pointed out in her now classic analysis of the “male gaze” (Mulvey 1975).  
Women’s constructions of a discrete gender are, in other words, often not 
grounded on their individual desires, or experiences of their bodies and selves, but 
are rather based on their experiences of the heterosexual matrix and the male gaze. 
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Advertisements, movies, pornography, and existing beauty myths influence the 
desired appearances of woman in each culture, and on how women should behave 
to be desired or appreciated as feminine. In Mulvey’s view, the point in the case 
in which women themselves find these representations desirable is some sort of 
cross-identification or transsexual identification, in which women adopt the male 
gaze.92  
 
Seen in a wider context, it seems that the importance of performing one’s body 
image (and, along with it, gender) has grown in the contemporary West to such an 
extent that it directly influences the individual’s self esteem, behavior and psyche. 
What this means is that the body image no longer refers to mere physical 
existence or to stereotypical gender roles, but also includes the mental picture a 
person has of her/his body, as well as the individual’s thoughts, feelings, 
judgements, sensations, awareness and behavior. It is not merely a question of 
new ways of creating one’s self, however. Rather, as Bordo correctly notes, there 
seems to have been a remarkable shift in what constitutes the aesthetics of the 
body: for the first time in history, fat rather than appetite or desire has become the 
declared enemy, and people have begun to measure their bodily achievements by 
numbers on a scale rather than by their mastery of excess and impulsive desires 
(Bordo 1994, 185).  
 
In Bordo’s view, most eating disorders arise out of and reproduce normative 
gender practices of our culture; practices that are meant to train the female body in 
obedience and docility to cultural demands, while at the same time being 
experienced and explained in terms of personal power and control (Bordo 1994; 
Bordo 1995; Bordo 1990b). The ideal of slenderness, for example, as well as the 
diet and exercise that have become inseparable from it, offer the illusion of 
meeting the contradictory demands of the contemporary ideology of femininity 
through the body.93  
 
The old interest in shaping the body through fasting, ascetics and visual 
appearance (clothes, make-up, jewelry, patches) is thus nowadays directed 
directly at the physical body, which has come to designate the whole 
characteristic of a person (Sykora 1993). The effects of this new body culture – 
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or, alternatively, the change in the aesthetic “regime” concerning the body – are 
not always liberating, however, and may be rather tragic: women’s dissatisfaction 
with their body image is so prevalent in our society that it is almost considered 
normal. To cite the words of Bordo: “Preoccupation with fat, diet, and slenderness 
[...] can function as one of the most powerful normalizing mechanisms of our 
century, insuring the production of self-monitoring and self-disciplining “docile 
bodies” sensitive to any departure from social norms and habituated to self-
improvement and self-transformation in the service of these norms” (Bordo 1993, 
186). 
 
In most cases, normalizing bio-power also regulates the aesthetic ideals and 
standards of women’s bodybuilding through the stereotypical ideals of femininity 
and masculinity. As Anne Balsamo points out in her Technologies of Gender 
(1999), female bodybuilders are culturally reconstructed according to dominant 
codes of femininity and racial identity, despite the fact that the female athletes 
also violate traditional codes of feminine identity and bodily concepts (Balsamo 
1999, 41).  
 
The transgressive element in women’s bodybuilding can be linked to two 
phenomena. First, women who use bodybuilding technology to sculpt their bodies 
might be seen as culturally transgressive because they attempt at reconstruction 
against the “natural” identity of the female body. Second, when female athletes 
use technology to achieve more muscularity (a male body prerogative), they also 
transgress the “natural” order of gender identity. Thus, what we discover through 
an analysis of media images of female athletes is that “representations of their 
bodies often highlight their transgressive nature.” (Ibid. 43.)  
 
Yet, as Balsamo points out, women have not simply gained more freedom through 
the practices of bodybuilding, weight training and power lifting. For through these 
technologies, many female bodies are technologically transformed into new kinds 
of material embodiments of cultural ideals of “natural” femininity and erotic 
beauty. (Ibid. 47.) Therefore, it seems justified to argue that female bodybuilding 
is not merely transgressive. It may also apply some rather traditional aesthetic 
  
 
 
 107
ideals of femininity to female bodies, and use them as criteria in their aesthetic 
valuation.  
 
A good example of this is given in The Hardcore Bodybuilder’s Source Book, in 
which judges are given the following instructions about judging female 
competitors: 
 
First and foremost, the judges must bear in mind that he or she is judging a 
woman’s bodybuilding competition and is looking for an ideal feminine 
physique. Therefore, the most important aspect is shape, a feminine shape. 
Other aspects are similar to those described for assessing men, but in regard 
to muscular development, it must not be carried to excess where it 
resembles the massive muscularity of the male physique. (Kennedy and 
Mason 1984, 181.) 
 
What this citation clearly shows, in my view, is that, although female 
bodybuilders transgress aesthetic gender boundaries, they are not reconstructed or 
even redefined according to an “opposite” gender identity, nor do they necessarily 
create space for new ideals of femininity. They reveal, instead, how culture tends 
to place bodies in their place, that is, subjected to its “other,” no matter whether 
they attempt to be transgressive or not. For white women, this other is typically 
the idealized strong male body; for black women it is the white female body. In 
Balsamo’s words: “A closer study of the popular culture of female bodybuilding 
reveals the artificiality of attributes of “natural” gender identity and the 
malleability of cultural ideals of gender identity, yet it also announces quite loudly 
the persistence with which gender and race hierarchies structure technological 
practices, thereby limiting the disruptive possibilities of technological 
transgressions.” (Balsamo 1999, 55.) 
 
As these few practical examples suggest, there seems to be a vast network of 
discourses that produce and re-produce our conceptions and experiences of the 
aesthetics of the gendered body in Western cultures: discourses that encourage 
individuals to imagine the possibilities of the body and to close their eyes to their 
limits and consequences (Bordo 1994, 39). The homogenizing representations of 
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the female body are one crucial example of such discourses, be they manifest 
through advertising, pornography, art or philosophical aesthetics.94 Stereotypical 
aesthetic images function as models against which individuals continually judge, 
measure, discipline and correct themselves. Their function is, in a nutshell, to 
normalize the body, to make it fulfil the norms and stereotypes addressed to it 
through cultural discourses. (Ibid. 25.)  
 
Historically changing gender stereotypes and normalizing culture are thus 
manifest not only on the level of texts and beliefs, but primarily, as Foucault’s 
genealogical analysis suggests, as the practical and direct controlling of the 
body.95 Female bodies become docile bodies through the ever-changing, 
stereotypical, elusive ideal of femininity. In other words, women’s living bodies 
are normalized into bodies whose forces and energies are habituated to external 
regulation, subjection, and “improvement.” They are turned into bodies that might 
feel autonomous, transgressive and free while being regulated into normality, 
usefulness and docility (Bordo 1993, 166, 174). 
 
Yet, on the subject of controlling the female body appearance through the 
maintenance of stereotypical feminine ideals, it would be too simplistic to regard 
the problem of women’s subordination in this respect in terms of the traditional 
oppressor/oppressed model. Rather, as Bordo suggests, we must abandon the idea 
that power is something possessed by one group and levelled against another, and 
think instead of “the network of practices, institutions, and technologies that 
sustain positions of dominance and subordination in a particular domain” (Bordo 
1993, 167). What this means is that each case of domination has to be studied as a 
unique phenomenon, which needs specific forms of counter-action to be subverted 
and disturbed.  
 
Seen in this way, it is useless to see men as the mere enemy of women. Rather, it 
seems to be apparent that both sexes suffer from the same sexism and 
heterosexism, despite the fact that men often have a higher stake in maintaining 
institutions within which they occupy dominant positions (in pornography, for 
example). The suffering of men from the (hetero)sexist culture comes not only 
from inequalities in their racial, class, and sexual situations, but also from the fact 
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that most men, just like women, find themselves implicated and embedded in 
sexist practices and institutions that they have not created as individuals, and that 
they also might feel tyrannized by. (Bordo 1994, 234.)  
 
A point of relevance in Foucault’s genealogical views on power to these feminist 
considerations is apparent in his attempt to criticize and reconstruct the 
(hetero)sexualizing power: his genealogical method shows that supposed truths of 
the body, the subject, sexual identity and sex are produced and reproduced in the 
material world in which power is brought to bear on all the forms they take. As I 
have shown, this idea not only illuminates individual docility, but also implicitly 
deconstructs the idea of monolithic patriarchy as a source of power, and suggests 
that women also partake actively in making their bodies conform to historically 
specific ideas of femininity. From this perspective, women’s bodies are not mere 
victims or oppressed flesh of male domination and commodification, but become 
understood rather as variable sites of power/knowledge relations in which women 
themselves also actively take part. (Ramazanoglu 1993, 15.) 
 
The notion of women’s active role in power relations is crucial for the work at 
hand for two reasons. First, it suggests that, even in the case of docility, women 
are also acting as doers, not merely as those who are done to. This means that 
women are not mere victims, but also responsible for the creation of their 
subjectivities. Secondly, if women, like all subjects, partake actively in power 
relations, as Foucault’s insights imply, they are also apparently granted the 
possibility to change these power relations through their actions. 
 
This more positive aspect of Foucauldian power analysis will be linked with 
feminist insights in the third part of this study, which focuses on the issue of the 
aesthetics of the self. My argument will be that, although Foucault never 
thoroughly analyses the positive aspects of women’s power – and although his 
theorizations also include some problems when seen through feminist lenses – his 
work nevertheless offers a good tool-kit for elaborating views on women as active 
agents who have the power to create their unique aesthetics of the self and to 
transgress some of the limits imposed on their gender.  
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Before going into this discussion, it is important to consider some evident 
shortcomings in Foucault’s genealogical account. I will therefore continue with a 
feminist critique of his genealogical method and attempt to encapsulate both its 
limitations and value for feminist debate. 
 
  
A Feminist Critique of Foucault’s Genealogy 
 
As I have pointed out, Foucault’s genealogical work on the subject, the body and 
power has been useful for feminist theorizations of the same issues. Moreover, his 
theoretical apparatus has also highlighted some inadequacies in the feminist 
debate, and has been functional in reconstructing it. During the past ten years or 
so, however, some feminists have called the feminist alliance with Foucault into 
question, arguing that his analyses of subjectivity, power and resistance threaten 
to undermine the emancipatory project of feminism (Sawicki 1991, 96). In 
conclusion, therefore, I will illustrate both the limitations and value of Foucault’s 
genealogical account by bringing it to bear on recent discussions of women’s 
specific history and bodily existence, as well as on the debate on their potential 
for active self-determination and resistance. 
 
One major line of feminist criticism that has been levelled at Foucault’s work is 
that he ignores the gendered nature of modern disciplinary techniques for the 
body, and that this has resulted in certain gender blindness in his theory. With this 
in mind, some feminists have criticized him for failing to analyse gender itself as 
an institutionalized and organized system of differences, which constitute the 
individual body and render it meaningful. Anne Balsamo, for example, comments 
that “in a way that contradicts his analytical intentions to consider the system of 
differentiations that make the body meaningful, gender often functions for him as 
a natural given” (Balsamo 1999, 21).  
 
In much the same spirit, Francis Bartkowski argues: “What Foucault has done is 
to reproduce and produce as history the patriarchal history of sexuality” 
(Bartkowski 1988, 47). Given these critical comments, Balsamo takes the work of 
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current feminists to be articulating what Foucault could not (or did not) articulate, 
namely, a history of sexuality from a site of resistance by addressing the 
construction of the feminine, femininity, and Woman to describe how gender is, 
to put it in Foucauldian terms, “a primary apparatus of scientific bio-power that 
constructs the body as an intelligible object” (Balsamo 1999, 22). 
 
Another serious challenge to Foucault’s genealogy is that his treatment of the 
body is inadequate because he does not explain how men and women have related 
differently to the institutions of modern life (Bartky 1988; McNay, 32-38; 
O’Brien 1982). In other words, some feminist analysts argue that, as an object of 
bio-power and docility, the female body, for him, does not seem to possess any 
specificity apart from the male norm. Rather, both male and female bodies are 
regarded in his genealogy as passive objects of the same disciplinary power.  
 
With this critique in mind, Sandra Lee Bartky puts a forceful case against 
Foucault’s analysis of docility, while at the same time recognizing the 
considerable achievements of his inquiries into the cultural exercise of power. 
   
Foucault’s account [...] of the disciplinary practices that produce the ’docile 
bodies’ of modernity is a genuine tour de force, incorporating a rich 
theoretical account of the ways in which instrumental reason takes hold of 
the body with a mass of historical detail. But Foucault treats the body 
throughout as if it were one, as if the bodily experiences of men and women 
did not differ, and as if men and women bore the same relationship to the 
characteristic institutions of modern life. Where is the account of the 
disciplinary practices that engender the docile bodies of women, bodies 
more docile than the bodies of men? Women, like men, are subject to many 
of the same disciplinary practices Foucault describes. But he is blind to 
those disciplines that produce a modality of embodiment that is particularly 
feminine. To overlook the forms of subjection that engender the feminine 
body is to perpetuate the silence and powerlessness of those upon whom the 
disciplines have been imposed. Hence, even though a liberatory note is 
sounded in Foucault’s critique of power, his analysis as a whole reproduces 
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that sexism which is endemic throughout Western political theory. (Bartky 
1988, 63-4.) 
 
Foucault’s gender blindness has been shown to be evident in cases such as his 
analysis of the docility of the prisoner’s body. In Discipline and Punish, for 
example, he does not pay any attention to questions such as how the treatment of 
female and male prisoners has differed in the history of the modern prison 
institution and how these differences have been related to the dominant 
constructions of masculinity and femininity.  
 
Focusing on this issue, Patricia O’Brien points out that, in fact, there are 
remarkable differences between the treatment of male and female prisoners in the 
modern prison institution (the term ‘modern’ refers here to the historical period 
that begun in the 17th and 18th centuries). While male criminals are typically 
perceived in terms of social deviance, female criminals are perceived in terms of 
inherently regressive, biologically limited female sexuality. The argument at its 
most extreme has been that “all menstruating, lactating, ovulating, pregnant, 
newly delivered, newly sexually initiated and menopausal women were prone to 
crime” (O’Brien 1982, 68). Therefore, most women could be seen as criminally 
deviant during any period of their adult life. As O’Brien testifies, female criminals 
have also been perceived as less receptive to rehabilitation than their male 
colleagues, whose problems have been defined as mainly “social” (ibid.; McNay 
1992, 34).  
 
Furthermore, Foucault’s analysis of bio-power and docility has been criticized for 
denying the subject’s potential for active self-determination and resistance. As 
various feminists have shown, in coming to terms with modern bio-power and the 
body, Foucault ignores his own idea that where there is power, there is also 
resistance, and explains modern bio-power instead as merely a normalizing 
force.96 Lois McNay crystallizes the central problems of Foucault’s account in this 
respect as follows: 
 
Although, during the nineteenth century, there was undoubtedly an 
intensified feminization of the female body, the implication of Foucault’s 
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monolithic conception of power and passive account of the body is that the 
experiences of women were completely circumscribed by this notion of a 
pathological and hysterical feminine sexuality. What Foucault’s account of 
power does not explain is how, even within the intensified process of the 
hysterization of female bodies, women did not slip easily and passively into 
socially prescribed feminine roles. (McNay 1992, 41.) 
 
What McNay wishes to point out here is that Foucault’s genealogical way of 
describing individuals as docile bodies offers an inadequate account of many 
women’s experiences and leads to the underestimation of the significance of the 
freedoms that women have gained in modern society. By positing bio-power as 
the fundamental constitutive principle of the social realm, law and knowledge, in 
McNay’s view, he reduces all social institutions to the simple effects of an all-
pervasive bio-power, and he could therefore be accused of overestimating the 
normalizing effects of disciplinary power in industrial societies (McNay 1992, 46; 
Rose 1984).  
 
In the light of these accusations, McNay criticises Foucault for failing to 
recognize that new social phenomena such as women’s right to vote, to have their 
own money, and to decide whether to marry, divorce and to have children or not, 
their possibilities to have legal abortions (in some countries), to engage in sexual 
relationships, to participate in feminist organizations and politics, and so on, are 
also products of modern bio-power. In other words, McNay stresses the fact that 
women have not simply adjusted to the roles addressed to them in modern society, 
as in her view, Foucault claims. They have also produced counterfactuals in an 
attempt to cancel or to resist the power imposed on their lives and their aesthetics 
of the self. With this in mind, she concludes that modern power has not only 
disciplined women’s bodies in a negative sense, but has also given them 
significantly more freedom of control over their lives (McNay 1992, 45).  
 
My own reaction to these criticisms is twofold. On the one hand, I agree with 
feminists who disapprove of Foucault for ignoring the question of practical gender 
differences in his “histories” and aesthetics – as I agree with many of the critical 
voices that suggest that the idea of women’s potential to actively resist the effects 
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of normalizing power is never properly taken up by him. Furthermore, in 
questions of subjectivity, the body and transgressive aesthetics, which are among 
the main themes of this study, it is also somewhat problematic that all of the 
concrete examples Foucault gives of resistance derive from male agents, be they 
linked to art, madness or aesthetics of the self (the subject of his texts is also 
always il, he). What Foucault ignores, in other words, is that what is culturally 
transgressive for male agents is not necessarily transgressive at all for female 
agents, and vice versa, due to the fact that the cultural (as well as the bodily) 
positions and experiences of women and men differ, sometimes radically.  
 
In this respect, Foucault’s genealogical work seems to be in need of some further 
interpretation, which would show better awareness of gender inequalities and 
develop further his views on subjectivity, resistance, power and the body. 
Identifying this problem is not, of course, radical in itself: this sort of 
supplementary work on Foucault’s writings has been undertaken since the late 80s 
by a vast number of feminist intellectuals, and it seems to get better all the time. 
 
Yet, when trying to map my own position in the feminist debate on Foucault’s 
genealogical work, I also wish to emphasize that, despite his gender blindness, it 
is also the genealogical Foucault who has provided many feminists with the tools 
for radical criticism, political struggle and change. Moreover, in the face of 
McNay’s argument that Foucault’s genealogical analysis of the body is limited to 
the mere emphasizing of docility, I wish to point out that his genealogical analysis 
is not merely an analysis of modern docility or an overestimation of the 
normalizing effects of disciplinary power in industrial societies, as McNay argues. 
It also includes an aspect of positive power, in other words, power to effect 
changes, although this view might be somewhat underdeveloped in his 
genealogical writings.  
 
As I have suggested, this positive aspect of Foucault’s genealogical power 
analysis is most forcefully put forward in his essay on  “Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History” (1971), in which he offers some challenging insights into the possibilities 
of turning subjectivity, identity and the body into a source of endless parody and 
carnival, suggesting that despite modern modes of docility, there is always a 
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possibility to engage in new ways of living and performing oneself, and thus to 
transgress the limits of this very docility.  
 
Given its importance for all feminist debate, the presentation of Foucault’s late 
elaboration of this positive aspect of power will be the starting point for the 
following part of this thesis, in which I attempt to grasp the shift in the centre of 
his thinking towards a view on the power he terms “the aesthetics of the self.” As 
I will show, this relatively little-considered late phase of his work has important 
implications for actual feminist debate, notably on questions concerning women’s 
aesthetic construction of their selves and on related issues of self-government, 
individual ethics and politics.  
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III  
THE AESTHETICS OF THE SELF 
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5. FOUCAULT’S LATE AESTHETICS 
 
As I suggested in the previous part of this work, Foucault’s analysis of 
knowledge/power and the genealogical diagnosis of the development of what he 
calls bio-power challenges us to reconsider our views on the relation between the 
subject, the body, and individual freedom in the Western world. Despite the fact 
that he terms his inquiries histories, his work deals with our contemporary reality 
in many different ways.  
 
In Foucault’s view, the normalizing society (in which we all undoubtedly live) is 
the historical outcome of technologies of power that are centred on life. Hence, 
we should not let the idealistic formulations of various constitutions and codes 
(claims on freedom, fraternity and equality, for example) deceive us, nor should 
we believe that the laws – which operate more and more as norms that rule our 
lives – simply protect us, because it is exactly these juridical forms that have 
made an essentially normalizing bio-power acceptable. (UP 144.) Foucault’s 
judgement of modern bio-power is, in a sense, negative: he believes that we have 
entered a phase of juridical regression in comparison with some earlier societies 
(notably those preceding the 17th-century) we know of. 
 
In the context of contemporary reality, Foucault’s scepticism seems to be well-
founded. Despite the fact that one would think that women have gained more 
freedom of control over their lives and bodies, modern bio-power manifests itself 
in many cases in which women’s juridical rights over their own bodies are still a 
painful subject of political struggle, be this struggle linked to abortion, 
prostitution, sexual abuse, violence or non-heterosexual motherhood. On another 
level, it seems that very many of us turn our selves into docile bodies, which 
manifest obedience to the normalizing power, even at the cost of getting seriously 
ill or dying. In modern Western cultures, individual docility often appears to be 
manifested through aestheticized practices of the self, in other words, through 
aesthetic practices of appearance that are meant to shape the individual’s body to 
better meet stereotypical gender ideals, as I suggested in my discussion on docile 
female bodies.  
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New modes of female docility are apparently often linked to the illusion in the 
form of commodities and advertisements that provide people with aesthetic sign 
language through which to interpret their “unique” existence in the world. In 
many cases, this aspect also covers individual manifestations of sexuality: many 
people make use of the possibility to express their sexual urges, advertising 
themselves with the help of commodity aesthetics as individual sexual beings. It 
is, however, highly questionable, whether this sort of aesthetic creation of one’s 
subjectivity and body is anything other than an expression of cultural docility – or 
at least quite often this seems to be the case.  
 
In this last part of my thesis I will show how, in his late writings, Foucault 
attempted to develop a critical alternative for this sort of “aestheticization” of the 
subject by looking more intensively at possible forms of active resistance that 
could strengthen individual autonomy and also effect changes in social conditions. 
What he offers, I suggest, is in some respects a more positive account of the 
subject, who might also transgress the limits of bio-power through the search for 
alternatives to modern self-subjugation (Bernauer 1990, 9).  
 
In his late thinking, Foucault also seems to believe that philosophers like him are 
particularly useful to various excluded and oppressed groups that have not thus far 
been able to speak in their own voice, such as homosexuals, madmen and 
criminals. This is already true of Foucault’s earlier works, in which there was a 
certain cry, as Michel Serres pointed out as early as 1961 when reading Foucault’s 
Folie et déraison: a cry in favour of all those who were disgraced, quarantined, or 
oppressed and kept in a state of ostracism and excommunication. In studying the 
histories of these excluded and oppressed groups of people, Foucault was 
attempting to re-write history from the viewpoint of the Other (OT xxiv). At the 
same time, his concern for the disenfranchised – the poor, the mad, the sexually 
deviant, prisoners, factory workers, and children attending the rigorous schools of 
the nineteenth century – seemed to exhaust itself in allowing the voices of these 
groups to become heard. In other words, he invited his readers to react with 
revulsion to the living conditions of these people and their oppression, but had 
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nothing to say about eliminating or reducing their problems. (Nehamas 1998, 
175.)  
 
For this reason, various interpreters of Foucault’s work have accused him of 
nihilism and negative theology, for example.97 However, what these 
commentators have largely missed, in my view, is that his late turning to the 
problematic of the aesthetic practices of the self was meant to overcome exactly 
this weakness in his thinking, and to construct a view on the individual’s 
possibilities to change things “for better.”  
 
Alternatively expressed, the aesthetic practices of the self represent a positive 
program that seeks opportunities to enforce alternative forms of identity and 
living, and points to the fact that multiple local possibilities for resistance already 
exist in our construction of our selves. So conceived, the subject is not seen as a 
mere passive body in the grip of disciplinary power. It is represented instead as a 
site of critical contestation and as being able to use power him/herself too, not 
least with respect to one’s own self. 
 
 
From the Docile Body to the Active Self 
 
The move toward a more active notion of the self came in the second and third 
volumes of the History of Sexuality (L’usage des plaisirs, 1984 and Le souci de 
soi, 1984), and in Foucault’s interviews and articles from the beginning of the 
1980s.98 In this last third of his writing period (he died in 1984), Foucault’s focus 
shifts towards the forms and modalities of one’s relation to oneself by which the 
individual is constituted and recognizes himself as the subject. He writes about 
this constitution of the self in terms of practices of the self (practiques de soi) and 
the aesthetics of existence (esthétique de l’éxistence).  
 
Foucault’s focusing on these practices is not merely a question of aesthetic 
stylization or aestheticization of life. It is rather that, by studying the aesthetic 
practices of the self, he attempts to ground his theorization of the active self on the 
  
 
 
 
 
121
ethical and political premises he believes could better serve individual freedom, 
and even society as a whole. As I intend to point out, he seeks support for this sort 
of theoretical construction from ancient Greco-Roman thinking on the one hand, 
and from the critical modernity of Immanuel Kant and Charles Baudelaire on the 
other. 
 
Despite the fact that the focus slightly changes in Foucault’s late work, I maintain 
that he is not giving up his earlier methodologies of archaeology and genealogy, 
as some other commentators have suggested.99 As he declares, the problematic of 
aesthetic practices of the self is to be seen as situated at the point where 
archaeology of problematizations and a genealogy of practices of the self intersect 
(UP 11-12). In my opinion, Foucault’s late theorization of the aesthetics of the 
self could also be seen as a continuation of his archaeological analysis of aesthetic 
limit-attitudes and transgression (Part I) – as well as it can be interpreted as a 
continuation of his genealogical analysis of the positive aspect of power, 
presented most powerfully in his essay on “Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History” 
(Part II).  
 
Yet, the task Foucault now sets himself is slightly different: he attempts to show 
how, in classical antiquity, sexual pleasures and sexual activity were 
problematized through aesth/ethical practices of the self, bringing into play the 
criteria of an aesthetics of existence (UP 12). Although it is a question of one 
more history, Foucault’s interest is not restricted to the past. Rather, his analysis 
opens up the question of the limitations of sex, sexuality and personal freedom in 
the present too, inviting those disadvantaged by it to develop strategies to effect 
changes in their existential condition. (Poster 1999, 210.) This critical inquiry, as I 
will point out, parallels in many respects the current feminist debate on gender, 
sexuality, self, the body and freedom. 
 
With a shift in emphasis from the docile body to the active self, Foucault attempts 
to attribute a certain degree of independence and autonomy to the ways in which 
individuals act, especially in the ordering of their everyday existence (McNay 
1992, 61). As I have stressed, this is not to say that the idea of the individual’s 
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ability to resist is new in itself in Foucault’s thought. On the contrary, it is much 
more reasonable to read his aesthetics of the self as an elaboration of the idea that 
he came up with in his genealogical analysis of discourses: “Discourses are not 
once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than 
silences are. We must make allowance for the complex and unstable process 
whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a 
hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and starting point for an 
opposing strategy.” (HS 101.)100 If this notion is considered in the context of 
aesthetic practices of the self in Foucault’s late work, the emphasis is no longer on 
the terms ‘docility,’ ’discourse,’ ’knowledge,’ and ’power,’ but shifts to the idea 
of active self-government and the aesthetic practicing of one’s self, which might, 
just like discourse, transmit and produce power, but also undermine it and expose 
it.  
 
Alternatively expressed, in his theorization of the aesthetics of the self, the subject 
is still seen as a product of certain practices of knowledge-power, as already 
suggested in his genealogical method, but the idea of governmentality has come to 
include new aspects. As I have demonstrated, in his earlier genealogical works 
Foucault related the idea of governmentality primarily to bio-power, arguing, that 
the modern state was made up of a network of institutions and practices, which 
employ manifold techniques of power to order individuals, processes of 
subjection and social relations. In his genealogical analysis of these techniques, he 
attempted to describe the processes by which the subject is disciplined and 
regulated, and subjected to processes of normalization and individualization.  
 
Additionally, the subject was shown to be tied to its own identity through 
conscience or self-knowledge: searching endlessly its own truth, the subject binds 
itself still further to regimes of knowledge/power (Fraser 1997, 28). With these 
notions Foucault wanted to prove that normalizing state power was not grounded 
on the repression of desires, but rather on the strategies of bio-power that 
individuals incorporated as the essence of their selves, as the meaning of their 
souls, and as the law or truth of their consciousness and desires (homosexual self, 
hysteric self, mad self, for example). Seen from this perspective, governmentality 
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is not the imposition of laws, but rather the regulation of the population through 
various controlling and normalizing techniques, such as statistical data on births, 
deaths, suicides, madness, sexuality, normality and fertility. Like disciplinary 
power, this sort of governmentality targets each individual as a means with which 
to maintain social control, which gives it negative character (McNay 1992, 67-68; 
Butler 1990, 135; Sawicki 1991, 39). 
 
What is new to some extent in Foucault’s late writings is that it is also through 
techniques of self-government that individuals can come to resist the modern 
state’s government of individualisation. In other words, following the lines of 
argumentation he had developed in his genealogical method, he still emphasizes 
the fact that each subject constitutes itself actively through the process of 
subjection (assujettissement), but now he comes to term this constitution practices 
of freedom (pratiques de libération), or aesthetic practices of the self (EE 733).  
 
This is not to say, however, that Foucault turned toward some sort of simple 
individualism, or that he grounded his theory of the subject on the idea of a totally 
autonomous, sovereign subject who could be taken as the origin of all social 
action. Rather, in his late aesthetics, he explicates from a new perspective why the 
notion of subjectivity and individual autonomy should be used in such a way as to 
avoid all suggestions that individual freedom takes the form of the recovery of the 
natural, authentic self (Dews 1989, 38).101 
 
 
Aesthetics, Ethics and Politics 
 
As I will demonstrate, Foucault’s turning to the issue of the aesthetic practices of 
the self also represents a new angle on the question of ethics. The primary locus of 
his late thinking on ethics is no longer embedded in avant-garde language or in the 
disappearance of the author into the textual void, however, but is far more focused 
on the power individuals exercise over themselves through their creating of 
individual aesthetics of existence.  
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Ethics, so conceived, is not exhausted by our relations to others, in other words, 
by norms and codes of moral behavior that govern the interaction between various 
individuals and groups. It rather has its roots, first of all, in the ways in which 
individuals regulate themselves and relate to themselves. Therefore, Foucault 
maintains, when coming to terms with ethics we should study the ways in which 
we practice self-government and at the same time constitute ourselves as the 
moral subjects of our actions and desires. Ethics, so conceived, is the care of the 
self. 
 
This idea is not new, of course, as Foucault himself demonstrates as he guides his 
readers back to the practices of the self in Greco-Roman Antiquity. Yet, when 
coming to terms with his own era, Foucault does not regard his contemporaries to 
be very liberated and, on the level of freedom and personal existence, not even 
very advanced. Foucault justifies this viewpoint by showing that unlike 
Christianity, which presents life after death as the best part of the individual’s 
existence, Greco-Roman Antiquity did not require one to wait until life after 
death. Rather, free men acted so as to give their lives certain values (bring the 
maximum possible brilliance to their lives, reproduce certain examples), and this 
acting was meant to turn their lives into “an object for a sort of knowledge, a 
tekhnē, that is, for an art” (GE 245).102  
 
In Foucault’s view, there was a similar culture in the Renaissance era, which 
revitalized the ancient idea of the aesthetics of existence, although in a slightly 
academic form (GE 251). Moreover, in a piece called “What is Enlightenment,” 
he connects the philosophical inheritance of the aesthetics of the self to Immanuel 
Kant’s modern philosophy, and interprets his own late aesthetics as part of the 
critical tradition of Kantian Enlightenment. In the context of modernity, 
Foucault’s admiration is directed not only to Kant’s “high” rational ideals, 
however, but also to the “low modernity” of the French poet and aesthetician 
Charles Baudelaire. Like Kant, who claims that we must engage in a constant 
critique of the world around us and of ourselves if we are to reach a more mature 
stage of existence and individual autonomy, the Baudelairean aesthetics demands, 
in Foucault’s view, that individuals start to reflect critically on their own era and 
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their individual selves (WE 38-39). As I will demonstrate, it is largely on the 
grounds of these modern ideas that Foucault creates his own critical theorizations 
of the “ontology of the present” and the “ontology of ourselves.” 
 
In some of his late articles and interviews Foucault comes to apply his critical 
insights on the aesthetics of the self to the homosexual movement and homosexual 
identity. By emphasizing the idea that sexual minorities should not merely attempt 
to defend their rights in the battle for autonomy and equal rights, but should also 
actively create and affirm their unique aesthetics of their selves, he shows his 
regard for some contemporary subcultures as one possible site of a more 
enlightened/mature life and autonomous self-creation. 
 
When I examine these more contemporary issues in the context of Foucault’s 
thought, I will suggest that he considers the issue of aesthetic practices of the self 
not only as a matter of the aesthetic re-creation of some groups of individuals, or 
the creation of new “advanced” subcultures. I rather propose that the critical 
attitude inherent in the Foucauldian aesthetic practices of the self, be they 
practices connected to homosexuality or to something else, involve the political 
task of changing the dominant culture as well.  
 
I will therefore connect Foucault’s late views on aesthetics of the self not only to 
ethics, but also to critical politics. Furthermore, it is primarily through this link 
between aesthetics and politics that I will seek from his late work material for 
constructing a feminist view on his aesthetics of the self. As I will suggest, 
Foucault’s ideas on transgressive subjectivity, the body, and sexuality are 
extremely relevant to current feminist debate, because they offer useful tools for 
the critical analysis of the current problems of women, and even give some 
practical suggestions that might help in the re-creation of our ideas concerning 
female selves. (McWhorter 1999, 191.)  
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6. AESTHETIC PRACTICES OF THE SELF 
 
In the two last parts of the History of Sexuality Foucault provides a concrete 
illustration of what he means by practices of the self by examining ancient Greek 
and Roman behavior. This shift in focus from modern attitudes to sexuality and 
the body in the first volume to the study of classical mores might seem surprising 
at first, but he explains both the theoretical and historical significance in the 
introduction to the second part of the history of the sexuality (The Use of 
Pleasures 1984). 
 
Foucault’s earlier intention had been to write a history that would show how the 
notion of sexuality had been established since the beginning of the nineteenth 
century in connection with other phenomena. These included the establishment of 
rules and norms, partly old, partly new, which found support in juridical, 
pedagogical, religious and medical institutions, and changes in the way 
individuals were led to assign value and meaning to their duties, their pleasures 
and conducts, their dreams, feelings and sensations. He noticed in his genealogical 
studies that he could not analyse the formation and development of the experience 
of sexuality without studying the genealogy of desire and the desiring subject at 
the same time. He therefore expressed his intention to analyse 
 
 [T]he practices by which individuals were led to focus their attention on 
themselves […] as subjects of desire, bringing into play […] a certain 
relationship that allows them to discover, in desire, the truth of their being, 
be it natural or fallen. In short, with this genealogy the idea was to 
investigate how individuals were led to practice, on themselves and on 
others, a hermeneutics of desire, a hermeneutics of which their sexual 
behavior was doubtless the occasion, but certainly not the exclusive domain. 
Thus, in order to understand how the modern individual could experience 
himself as a subject of ‘sexuality,’ it was essential first to determine how, 
for centuries, Western man had been brought to recognize himself as a 
subject of desire. (UP 5-6.)103 
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The study of the subject of desire led Foucault to ask in the voice of a genealogist: 
“What were the games of truth by which human beings came to see themselves as 
desiring individuals?” (UP 7.)104 A related question that started to interest him in 
the two last parts of The History of Sexuality concerned the question why sexual 
activities and pleasures were an object of moral solicitude: “Why this ethical 
concern – which, at certain times, in certain societies and groups, appears more 
important than the moral attention that is focused on other, likewise essential, 
areas of individual or collective life, such as alimentary behavior or the fulfilment 
of civic duties?” (UP 10.)105 
 
In raising these questions in the context of Greek and Greco-Roman culture 
Foucault notes that the problematization of sexuality and ethics was linked to a 
group of practices that might be called the “arts of existence,” or “techniques of 
the self.” What he means by these phrases, are those voluntary and intentional 
actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also attempt to 
transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make 
their life into an artistic oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets 
certain stylistic criteria. (UP 10-11.)  
 
In Foucault’s reading of the ancient texts, the Greek master class developed a 
specific aesthetic way of living (manière de vivre), which he also describes in 
terms of the Greek tekhnē tou biou and the economics of pleasure (GE 235). One 
of the key findings of philosophers such as Socrates, Seneca and Pliny was, 
according to Foucault, centred around the question: Which tekhnē should I use in 
order to live as well as I ought to live? (GE 235.) He points out how, with the help 
of this question, the Greeks interpreted the age-old problem of tekhnē tou biou as 
a question of an aesth/ethical technique of the self (tekhnē de soi).  
 
As the usage of the term tekhnē already implies, one’s aesthetic stylisation of the 
self was not a rest cure, but rather a long process of active exercising, pratical 
tasks, and various activities. As Foucault demonstrates, there was the care of the 
body to consider, physical exercises without overexertion, health regimens, the 
carefully measured satisfaction of needs, meditations, the reading of and 
  
 
 
 
 
128
conversations on books, and the recollection of “truths” that one might know 
already but that must be more fully adapted to one’s own life. (CS 51.)  
 
Although similar ideas of the arts of existence or techniques of the self also 
feature in later phases of Western culture, in Foucault’s view they lost much of 
their importance when they were assimilated into the exercise of priestly power in 
early Christianity, and later into medical, educative, and psychological types of 
practices in modern societies. In order to clarify the difference between these two 
cultures, notably in their different attitudes to the ethical subject, Foucault 
differentiates two aspects of morality. The first refers to moralities that stress the 
importance of the code (its richness, its systematicity, and its capacity to adjust to 
every possible case and to embrace every area of behavior), and the second to 
those in which the strong and dynamic element can be found in the forms of 
subjection and the practices of the self. (UP 30.)  
 
In the former case, as Foucault demonstrates, the important thing is “to focus on 
the instances of authority that enforce the code, that require it to be learned and 
observed, that penalize infractions” (UP 30).106 In such cases, the subjection 
occurs mainly in a quasi-juridical form, where the ethical subject refers his 
conduct to a law, or set of laws, to which he must submit (UP 30).  
 
When it comes instead to the second type, to the moralities that stress the 
importance of subjection, the system of rules and moral codes may be quite 
rudimentary, and their exact observance is often relatively unimportant – at least 
compared with what is demanded of the individual in his relationship to himself, 
in his actions, thoughts and feelings as he aims at forming himself as an ethical 
subject. Here, the emphasis is on the forms of relations with the self, on the 
techniques and methods by which the individual works them out, on the exercises 
by which he makes of himself an object to be known, and on the practices that 
enable him to transform his own mode of being (UP 30).107 
  
Foucault himself was much more keen on this second model of ethics. This is 
typified in his view of Greco-Roman culture, which does not aim to offer a basis 
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for a universally valid moral theory, but rather conceives of ethics as a tekhnē, or 
alternatively as “a savoir-faire that by taking general principles into account 
would guide action in its time, according to its context, and in view of its ends” 
(UP 62).108  
 
Although the necessity of respecting the law and the customs – the nomoi – was 
often underscored in Greek and Greco-Roman antiquity, more important than the 
laws was the attitude that caused people to respect them. The accent was thus 
placed on the relationship with the self, on the methods and techniques by which a 
man belonging to the master class worked them out, on the exercises by which he 
made himself an aesthetic object (or an example) to others, and on the practices 
that enabled him to transform his individual mode of being. (UP 31.) With this in 
mind, Foucault suggests that ethics is a way of existing, a style of existing, a way 
of relating oneself to oneself and others, and not a universalizing principle that 
guides everyone’s actions (UP 62; PE 587). It therefore demands constant creation 
and certain know-how, just as the making of an artwork does. He also talks about 
this work in terms of ‘care.’ 
 
 
Care 
 
What runs through the whole cycle concerning Socrates’ death is  
the establishment, the foundation, in its specifically non-political nature,  
of a form of discourse which is primarily occupied with,  
which cares for, care – whose care is the care of the self.  
 
Foucault, Lecture at the Collège de France 
 
 
In his last lectures at the Collège de France (1984), which focused on Socrates and 
the Cynics, Foucault pointed out that in antiquity, reflection on liberty and 
practices of individual freedom were closely related to the notion of care.109 In his 
view, this no longer holds true in our own time, because in the contemporary 
West, one’s (philosophically grounded) caring of oneself is often regarded as 
suspicious. By way of explanation, he took his listeners back to Socratic views on 
life and philosophy, stressing the idea that the cure is reached through the process 
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of taking care of oneself, and that this caring also constitutes the main task of 
philosophy. Despite the fact that this is the central theme of Plato’s early works, 
and is given a radical expansion in the Phaedo, Foucault concentrates in his 
lectures on the Apology and the Laches, showing how Socrates’ individual 
mission could be seen as creating a new understanding of the old conception of 
parrhēsia (literally “saying everything,” but also “telling-the-truth”), and how this 
new understanding could function as a basis for philosophically understood 
aesthetics of the self.  
 
What is important in the Socratean parrhēsia, in Foucault’s view, is that, with its 
help, Socrates aimed to show to his fellow citizens that what was important was 
not reputation or money, but care of oneself. In other words, what is most 
important in life is not concern for the world, but concern for wisdom, truth, and 
one’s own soul. Foucault interprets the Socratean aim of making people care for 
themselves as the use of one’s reason in order to find out who one is and how one 
can best be. (Nehamas 1998, 165-166.) This caring is closely connected to 
philosophising, for as Foucault concludes in the Socratean spirit, “If I attend to 
you, it is not in order to transmit to you the knowledge you lack, but so that, 
having realized that you know nothing, you will learn thereby to care for 
yourselves” (cit. in Nehamas 1998, 166).110  
 
In The Use of Pleasure, Foucault studies four aspects of ethics conceived of as 
care of the self. First, he focuses on the aspects of the self or the individual that 
are relevant to ethical reflection (“determination of the ethical substance”), 
aspects that constitute the individual as a moral or ethical entity. For example, 
one’s sexuality or fidelity might be part of one’s “ethical substance,” while one’s 
athletic ability or “surface beauty” may not (although the imperatives of working 
for “one’s health” or “body” are nowdays almost considered ethical imperatives).  
 
Second, Foucault gives attention to the ways in which people recognize their 
moral obligations to themselves. These modes of subjection (mode 
d’assujettissement) are grounded on the way in which one establishes an 
individual relation to the rule and recognizes oneself as obliged to put it into 
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practice (fidelity, for example). Third, he considers the aspects of morality that are 
connected to forms of elaboration, of ethical work (travail éthique) that one 
performs on oneself, not only in order to harmonize one’s personal conduct with a 
given rule, but to try to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s own 
behavior. For example, one’s sexual behavior can be practiced and measured in 
relation to the rules one tries to apply (fidelity, austerity, respect for the other).  
 
Fourth, and finally, Foucault considers the telos of the ethical subject, in other 
words, the idea that an action is not only moral in its singularity, it is also moral in 
its circumstantial integration and by virtue of the place it occupies in each pattern 
of conduct. This aspect of morality stresses one’s attempts to become some sort of 
person through ethical behavior. (UP 26-28.) The telos of the ethical subject, as 
well as the ways in which moral actions contribute to it, are, of course, themselves 
historically variable.111 In Foucault’s view, this is also true of the aesthetic 
practices of the self that were used in Antiquity to train the above-mentioned 
ethical skills, be these practices linked to the regulation of sexual desires, 
behavior, ways of acting and relating to others, or something else.  
 
Despite the fact that care for oneself is centred on the individual’s life and on its 
aesthetic and ethical formation, both Socrates and Foucault argue that it also 
precedes, or perhaps even constitutes, care for the other. With this in mind, 
Foucault refers to Socrates’ usefulness to his city, that is, to his importance to his 
fellow citizens and to his benefits to his friends, and points out that Socratic 
parrhēsia is good not only for the individual, or for those involved in 
communication and telling-the-truth to each other, but for the city as a whole. 
Mixing his voice again with that of Socrates, he says: “In urging you to care for 
yourselves, I am being useful to the whole city. And if I try to protect my life, it is 
precisely in the city’s interest to protect true discourse, the courageous truth-
telling which urges the citizens to care for themselves.” (Nehamas 1998, 168. See 
also ECP 7)  
 
So conceived, caring for oneself did not mean that one could do whatever felt 
good. On the contrary, aesthetic practices of the self were primarily practices of 
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ascesis and self-restraint, and they were typically manifested through what 
Foucault calls “the diet of pleasures.” The controlling of one’s sexual appetite, for 
example, was considered morally important by the Greeks because without such 
self-restraint, those who were masters of their own life (rich white males) could 
have just as easily turned into tyrants as into bon souveraines (good governors). In 
this respect, controlling oneself meant controlling one’s relations with others, or 
trying to avoid misusing one’s power and, at the same time, avoiding becoming a 
slave to one’s own appetite (and thus not-free). (ECP 8.)  
 
In my view, the normative thrust inherent in Foucault’s late insights is hidden in 
his belief that if one manages to stylizise one’s way of living through practices 
such as “the diet of pleasures,” the respect of others will naturally follow. In 
Foucault’s words: “Care for the self is ethical in itself, but it implies complex 
relations with others, in the measure that this ethos of freedom is also a way of 
caring for others” (ECP 7)112. And again: “Ethos implies also a relation with 
others to the extent that care for self renders one competent to occupy a place in 
the city, in the community or in interindividual relationships which are proper – 
whether it be to exercise a magistracy or to have friendly relationships” (ECP 
7).113  
 
According to Foucault, a tyrant is a person who does not choose himself, unlike a 
good sovereign does, because “the risk of dominating others and exercising over 
them a tyrannical power only comes from the fact that one did not care for one’s 
self and that one has become a slave to his desires” (ECP 8).114 In the history of 
philosophy, the creating of one’s aesthetics of the self has been an important task 
for all those who wish to become good governors. Foucault supports this idea by 
once more citing Socrates, who says provocatively to young men: “Hey, you, you 
want to become a political person, you want to govern the city, you therefore want 
to take care of others but you did not take care for yourself, and if you do not take 
care for yourself, you will be a bad leader” (ECP 13).115 
 
It was with these classical thoughts in mind that Foucault attempted to show that 
contemporary philosophers could also take their work as a form of caring for 
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oneself and as an art of existing – given, that this caring is understood as a process 
of discovery, not of who she/he originally or essentially is, but far more of 
inventing and improvising who one could possibly be. Philosophising in this sense 
(as well as the philosophical subject/the self) is a form of critical inquiry and at 
the same time, a creation of art, which is in a constant state of becoming. Like all 
creativity, it is necessarily situated in history, because not everything is possible at 
all times. Nevertheless, just like all creativity, it also involves changing the 
knower him/herself. So conceived, philosophical writing becomes understood as 
one possible form given to creative life.116  
 
As Foucault develops this line of argumentation, he comes to speak more and 
more often of his own work in relation to ways of living, creative ethical 
undertakings, practices of freedom, and life itself as a work of art. The idea that 
individual life and even philosophical thinking could also be considered critical 
artistic practices leads him to criticize the tradition of art and aesthetics that 
associates art primarily with specific art objects and specialists called ‘artists.’ 
Hence his cry:  
 
What strikes me is that fact that in our society, art has become something 
which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is 
something which is specialized or which is done by experts who are artists. 
But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or 
the house be an art object, but not our life? (GE 236.)117 
 
In my view, this citation bears some interesting resemblances to Foucault’s earlier 
archaeological thought in which he draws on avant-garde aesthetics for its 
transgressive force. What has changed on the path from the analysis of avant-
garde writing to aesthetic practices of the self, I suggest, is that he came to 
consider the aesthetics of the self as a form of this transgression. In other words, it 
is no longer writing, the context, or the importance of the empty space left by the 
disappearance of the author/subject that is at the core of his critical research, but 
rather the concrete limits of the self – limits that one’s personal aesthetics of 
existence is meant to examine and transgress. What is relevant in this 
  
 
 
 
 
134
transgression is not any particular subject or identity, as Jon Simons suggests, but 
the process of subjection as art (Simons 1995, 76).  
 
Yet, it should not go unnoticed that, despite its resonance of autonomy, there is 
also some irony in this self-fashioning. For Foucault is well aware of the fact that 
everyone’s personal aesthetics of the self necessarily includes being moulded by 
various outside forces and attempting to fashion others. Thus, despite one’s efforts 
to create an individual aesthetics of the self, one remains tied to control 
mechanisms and outside forces.  
 
In Foucault’s view, this should not make us passive, however, for to abandon self-
creating is to abandon the craving for freedom, and to let go of the hold upon 
one’s self, even if it is a self based on fiction, is to die. (Simons 1995, 76; 
Greenblatt 1980, 257.) There is thus a need for techniques of aesthetic self-
empowerment, which Foucault also discusses in terms of practices of the askeesis, 
because they support individual freedom and might help individuals to become 
freer from domination by the other (ECP 2-3; UP 72-7). Because of their critical 
function, aesthetic practices of the self are not confined to aesthetics and ethics, 
but are also essentially part of one’s personal politics and freedom.  
 
 
Practical Politics of the Self 
 
In his late thinking, Foucault considers the political force of philosophy mainly to 
lie in the philosopher’s ability to deal with questions of domination, be these 
questions analysed on the level of knowledge, sexuality, the body, aesthetic 
appearance, economy, human relations or institutions. As he stresses, this critical 
function of philosophy derives, at least partly, from the Socratic imperative 
presented above: “Be concerned with yourself, i.e., ground yourself in liberty, 
through the mastery of self” (ECP 20).118 Politics, so conceived, is primarily 
understood as concrete praxis and aesthetic stylisation of the subject/the self, 
which Foucault also presents in his late work as the “praxis of freedom.”119 
 
  
 
 
 
 
135
Aesthetic practices of the self are, in Foucault’s view, intrinsically connected to 
politics already due to the fact that they seek individual freedom. This is also true 
of attempts to philosophise practices of the self, for freedom, as he suggests, is in 
itself political (ECP 6).120 Moreover, the question of freedom is political “in the 
measure where being free means not being a slave to one’s self and to one’s 
appetites, which supposes that one establishes over one’s self a certain relation of 
domination, of mastery, which was called arche – power, authority” (ECP 6).121 
 
In the light of the above, it seems justified to propose that Foucault’s ideas 
concerning freedom are not merely descriptive, but also incorporate a significant 
political aspect. I suggest that we read the Foucauldian practices of the self as 
political on two levels.  
 
The first is the individual level, on which he sees freeing oneself of the 
domination of others as a political task. In this respect, Foucault’s practices of the 
self are also part of one’s personal politics (or micro-level politics), because they 
are expressions of the power one has over oneself as a socially-positioned being. 
So conceived, aesthetic practices of the self are meant to transform individuals 
into politically active subjects who do not resign themselves to normalizing and 
controlling powers, but try to effect changes through critical practices of the self. 
These practices need not be unique, and in fact, they rarely are. In most cases, 
they are instead schemes that already exist in some form in one’s culture, or that 
are suggested to the subject by her/his culture, society, or social group. Without 
the subject’s decision to choose, nothing happens however, because people decide 
for themselves whether or not to care for themselves, as Foucault denotes (ECP 
11). (I’ll return to this Kantian idea a little later.) 
 
Secondly, Foucault’s analysis of practices of the self in terms of freedom are 
explicitly connected to the aim of producing critical effects on social reality at 
large in that direction (Oksala 2002, 246). When applied to Foucault himself, who 
came to see his own writing as part of the philosophy understood as the critical art 
of living, this implies that he believed that philosophers like him were directly 
useful to the public and society because of their attempts to create new 
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alternatives for living. To become a critical philosopher in the Foucauldian sense 
is to become original and unified in the Nietzschean sense of the term (“we want 
to be the poets of our lives,” [”wir wollen die Dichter unseren Lebens sein”], 
Nietzsche 1988b, no. 299). In other words, it is to require individuals to produce 
nothing less than a new model for living, a new art of living, extending our 
understanding of what a subject can be, in much the same spirit as artists might 
enlarge our sense of what art can accomplish (Nehamas 1998, 179).  
 
What then, we should ask, does Foucault mean by the expression ‘freedom’ in his 
late work? Why does he call the self and the subject free, if it is always 
constituted in and through some limited historical situation? And why, even more 
oddly, does he term the subject autonomous if it has no independent life apart 
from its social reality?  
 
 
Freedom 
 
In response to the questions raised above, I propose the division of Foucault’s 
usage of the term ‘freedom’ in his late work into three different strands. Firstly, as 
I have already demonstrated, it has a strong political emphasis. Secondly, I 
propose that it can be linked to his ontological insights into the subject – which 
seem to be, interestingly, closely related to Jean-Paul Sartre’s thinking. Finally, I 
will suggest that Foucault’s notion of freedom is connected to the Enlightenment 
thought from which he derives, at least partly, his late interest in the subject’s 
autonomy and freedom.122 I will explicate the second (ontological) aspect in this 
section, and turn to the third aspect concerning the Enlightenment tradition in the 
sections to come. 
 
My thoughts on the Foucauldian subject’s ontological freedom are based on the 
notion that for Foucault the self is always in a state of becoming, and cannot 
therefore be apprehended as a real existent. In other words, for Foucault, there is 
no founding inner self with a fixed identity, but rather a self that is a relation of 
oneself to oneself, mediated in and through the social and material world. Thus 
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the subject can never, strictly speaking, coincide with the self, for this would 
cause the self to disappear (for the relation to the self would disappear if the self 
became a fixed identity). In this sense, I maintain – against Foucault’s own 
statements – that his late notion of the self is a close reminder of the Sartrean 
subject, who also “escapes identity while positing it as unity” (Sartre 1995, 77). 
Let me explain briefly what I mean by this argument. 
 
In his essay on the genealogy of ethics, Foucault argues that his viewpoint on the 
freedom of the subject and the creation of one’s self differs radically from Sartre’s 
thinking because Sartre refers to the self in terms of authenticity and 
inauthenticity, and thereby “turns back to the idea that we have to be ourselves – 
to be truly our true self,” as Foucault writes (GE 237).123 His assertion that Sartre 
links the term ‘authenticity’ with the self certainly holds true. What Foucault fails 
to recognize is that, for Sartre, the term ‘authenticity’ presents exactly the kind of 
relation of oneself to oneself that takes this self to be inconsistent with itself. In 
other words, I insist that Sartre’s notion of authenticity of the self does not refer to 
some innate or fixed entity, as Foucault claims, but on the contrary, it indicates 
the understanding of the self as an open and aesthetic process. In this respect, 
Sartre’s position is indeed very close to Foucault’s late aesthetics.124  
 
A few short extracts from Sartre’s Being and Nothingness (L’Être et le néant 
1943) immediately prove the falsity of Foucault’s interpretation of the Sartrean 
subject – as well as the similarities between his late views and those of Sartre. 
Note, for example, the following paragraph from Sartre: 
 
In fact the self cannot be apprehended as a real existent: the subject can not 
be self, for coincidence with self […] causes the self to disappear. But 
neither can it not be itself since the self is an indication of the subject 
himself. The self therefore represents an ideal distance within the 
immanence of the subject in relation to himself, a way of not being his own 
coincidence, of escaping identity while positing it as unity – in short, of 
being in a perpetually unstable equilibrium between identity as absolute 
cohesion without a trace of diversity and unity as a synthesis of a 
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multiplicity. This is what we shall call presence to itself. (Sartre 1995, 76-
77.)125 
 
In Being and Nothingness, as well as in his posthumously published Notebooks 
for an Ethics (Cahiers pour un morale 1947-48, published in 1983), Sartre 
explains the same idea in terms of authenticity. In the latter book, he notes, for 
example: “Man creates the World […] above himself or rather […] he surpasses 
himself through this creation and he is this very surpassing, he is nothing other 
than this absolute nihilating of himself so that the world may exist. He has the joy 
of being consciousness of being and, at the same time, of not being his creation. 
[…] The world is me in the dimension of the Not-me.” (Sartre 1992, 498.)126 This 
negativity cannot, in Sartre’s view, be overcome, because “it is me but always in 
another dimension of Being, always other than myself” (ibid.)127 Therefore, he 
concludes, “originally, authenticity consists in refusing any quest for being, 
because I am always nothing” (ibid. 475, emphasis mine).128 We thereby 
rediscover in our self “the characteristics of the work of art since in this too there 
must be some ‘matter to shape’ that lends its Being (otherwise it would remain 
subjective and a dream)” (ibid. 498).129  
 
It should be pointed out that neither Foucault nor Sartre suggest, in the romantic 
vein, that freedom is an expression of the subject’s inborn autonomy. Instead, the 
ontological freedom of the subject is taken by both of them to be an endless task 
of producing oneself as a coherent entity (self). In other words, neither presents 
the subject’s ontological status as a fixed, free position in the world, that is, as an 
autonomous and fixed site of being. Rather, the ontological freedom of the subject 
is explained by Sartre as the task of creating oneself and as a judging oneself free, 
and by Foucault as the endless task of producing oneself.130 Both thinkers also 
associate this work with artistic creation.131 Seen in this way, I suggest that 
freedom is not only a critical task but can also be seen as an original responsibility 
that is grounded in the subject’s ontological inconsistency with itself.  
 
Alternatively expressed, freedom is not, for Foucault or Sartre, some sort of happy 
condition that would ease individual life. It is rather the difficult task of producing 
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oneself in a complex modern world in which one’s constitution of oneself is not 
only a privilege, but also a big risk. Like Sartre, Foucault does not attempt to tell 
individuals how they should act or how they should create themselves. For both, 
too, there seem to be wrong or at least ineffective ways of creating oneself, 
namely, ways that ignore or deny the fact that the subject is ontologically free to 
make alternative constructions of itself and free to reflect and transgress its limits 
– not absolutely free, but free in the context of some limited historical situation 
and in the context of each self. Therefore, I suggest that both Foucault and Sartre 
clearly imply that an individual who denies or ignores his/her ontological 
inconsistency with her/himself – and thus, denies his/her freedom – lives in a state 
of “bad faith” (mauvaise foi).  
 
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre describes this bad faith as an attempt to hide 
from oneself the truth of oneself. What he means by this is that an individual who 
lives in bad faith pretends to know the truth of her/his self, that is, she/he pretends 
to be some sort of fixed “thing in-itself.” Sartre’s famous example is the waiter in 
the café who is playing at being a waiter in a café (Sartre 1995, 59). This playing 
is, in his view, strongly motivated by social pressures, for it is, first of all, society 
that demands that he limit his existence while at work to the role of the waiter, or, 
in another context, to that of a grocer, a soldier, or a lover. Sartre also analyses the 
idea of being a homosexual as an expression of bad faith, since in this case, too, 
an individual – as well as those who talk of someone’s existence in terms of being 
a homosexual – denies his ontological freedom and inconsistency within himself 
(thus, also in the domain of sexuality), and tries to constitute himself as a fixed 
thing (ibid. 65). In his Notebooks for an Ethics, Sartre comments that therefore 
“authenticity lies in unveiling being through the mode of non-being” (Sartre 1992, 
474).132 
 
I suggest that Foucault’s equivalent of the famous Sartrean phrase bad faith is the 
expression “California cult of the self,” which he uses to designate a relation to 
the self that ignores the subject’s ontological freedom. The “good faith” 
individuals may manifest in their action is grounded on the recognition that the 
self is not a fixed thing, but an open process and an artificial construct, which is 
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inconsistent with itself. In Foucault’s words: “We have to dig deeply to show how 
things have been historically contingent, for such and such reason intelligible but 
not necessary. We must make the intelligible appear against a background of 
emptiness and deny its necessity. We must think what exists is far from filling all 
possible spaces.” (FWL 139-40.)133  
 
With the California cult of the self, Foucault refers to an aesthetic cult of oneself, 
which does not include the same philosophical and moral motivation as the 
aesthetic practices of the self in which he was interested. Instead, the cult 
members typically believe that “One is supposed to discover one’s true self, to 
separate it from that which might obscure or alienate it, to decipher its truth 
thanks to psychological or psychoanalytic science, which is supposed to be able to 
tell you what your true self is” (GE 245).134 Thus, for Foucault, the California cult 
of the self represents a denial of the creative processes and of one’s freedom 
rather than their realization (McWhorter 1999 196). In his view, it is even in 
opposition to aesthetic practices of the self, for, “not only do I not identify this 
ancient culture of the self with […] the California cult of the self. I think they are 
diametrically opposed” (GE 245).135 
 
In other words, what is at stake in the creation of the self as a “praxis of freedom” 
is not only the surface stylization of one’s appearance or of “anything-goes” 
morality. If this were the case, Foucault would not term these practices aesthetics 
of the self, but would rather talk about the California cult of the self. This 
differentiation is crucial, I assert, not only because it shows that Foucault’s notion 
of freedom has an ontological basis, but also because it separates his philosophical 
aesthetics of the self from the commercialized aestheticization of the self, which 
tends to transform individual existence into aesthetic consumption without even 
trying to cope critically with questions such as domination, society, subjection, 
freedom and ethics. 
 
On the ontological level, Foucault’s late notion of freedom does not merely refer 
to the subject’s inconsistency with itself, however. I suggest that it is also 
intimately linked to his ideas concerning the ontological contingency of the 
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present time, and to the opening up of the possibilities of this very present (ibid.; 
Rajchman 1985b, 46). On this level, the ontological analysis of individual 
freedom and transgressive politics overlap. 
 
In the following section, I will show how Foucault applies the above mentioned 
two aspects of freedom of the subject (political and ontological) to the present 
time in his analysis of homosexual identity and “gay” styles of living. As I will 
illustrate, homosexuality does not, in Foucault’s view, have much to do with fixed 
and stable identities. Instead, he suggests that, just like all identities, the 
homosexual self should be interpreted as a site of critical practices of freedom, 
which are brought to life through a certain style of existence, or art of living, 
which might be called ‘gay’ (SC 292).  
 
 
Homosexuality and Identity 
 
As I have suggested, one of the central political goals of Foucault’s philosophical 
aesthetics of the self is to support and strengthen the existential possibilities of 
various excluded groups to sound out on their own. In this respect, his aesthetic 
theorizations have an explicitly political character: they work to re-define identity 
as a site for cultural resistance and individual autonomy that might pave the way 
for alternative styles of living and identification. My argument so far has been that 
Foucault’s way of defining the subject as an ontologically free being supports this 
task: the self that is interpreted as not being fully present in itself cannot 
legitimate its own being as the truth of itself. Instead, each construction of the self 
is taken to be a result of active subjection, a historical process that could have 
been otherwise as well.  
 
As we have seen, this kind of view of the self has not only political but also 
ethical consequences in Foucault’s thinking. This does not mean, however, that it 
leads to the offering of some normative standards for moral action. Rather, his late 
aesth/ethics of the self encourages individuals to accept each self as an open 
process and as critical work done on freedom. Alternatively, his theorizations 
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attempt to aid those of us who are looking for a way out or beyond existing sexual 
regimes. 
 
In a late interview, “Sex, Power, and the Politics of Identity” (1984), Foucault 
explicates the importance of the aesthetic practices of the self for various sexual 
minorities by referring to the homosexual movement, which was, in his view, at 
that time much more in need of the art of existence than of scientific knowledge 
of sexuality. 
 
[W]hat the gay movement needs now is much more the art of life than a 
science or scientific knowledge (or pseudoscientific knowledge) of what 
sexuality is. […] Sexuality is something that we ourselves create – it is our 
creation, and much more than the discovery of a secret side of our desire. 
We have to understand that with our desires, go new forms of relationships, 
new forms of love, new forms of creation. Sex is not a fatality: it’s a 
possibility for creative life. (SPPI 163.)136 
 
As this citation clearly shows, for Foucault, practices of the self are also an 
important part of homosexual politics of the self, because they work to free 
sexuality and pleasure from the chains and restrictions that society and its juridical 
forms impose on the individual’s constitution of their selves and of sex (ECP 3). 
In his view, the liberation of pleasure concerns not only homosexuals, but also 
heterosexuals, who are not, in practice, much more free in the realization of their 
individual sexual desires.  
 
By defining sexuality in terms of the possibility to live a creative life, Foucault 
once more associates one’s sexual practices of the self with creating an artwork. 
He suggests that the creative work on one’s sexual self should be part of 
individual basic rights. In his view, the rights everyone has in choosing her/his 
sexuality are not respected enough in the West, even if the situation improved 
after the 1960s (the changes in the medical and juridical definitions of 
homosexuality, for example). What still remains to be done is to affirm actively 
  
 
 
 
 
143
different sexual choices and forces through creative practices of the self, which 
are not created in the mere defence of homosexuals’ right to exist.  
 
According to Foucault, concentration on the creative action of each individual is 
even much more important than the emphasizing of one’s fixed (homosexual, or 
any other) identity (SPPI 164-165). This is due to the fact that practices of the self 
are creative strategies that can create a new culture, but this culture cannot be 
based on the idea of fixed identity – notably if we, along with Foucault, accept the 
claim that there is no essential identity, but only a moving grip of power relations 
in and through which individuals continually constitute themselves.137 Seen in this 
way, acts of affirming alternative identities are significant because they are forms 
of expression of our critical work on the limits imposed on individuals/us. In other 
words, they enforce individual style in terms of freedom rather than fixed 
identities, and thus advocate also social change in the direction of freedom. 
 
Alternative practices of the self, such as homosexuality, thus represent one form 
of active resistance. In his late work, Foucault interprets this sort of resistance as 
even prior to domination. As he notes, the moment one ceases to do what one is 
expected to do, or transgresses the definitions and limits addressed to one, one 
starts to utilize power relations. So conceived, resistance comes first and remains 
superior to all other forces inherent in the struggle for power, for it is resistance 
that forces power relations to change. (EE 740-741.)  Seen in this way, the 
aesthetic practical politics of the self are, again, inseparable.  
 
 
Transgression, Pleasure and Identity 
 
To see what kind of new stages of (politicised) aisthesis Foucault is after in his 
discussion of the homosexual identity, I will go back to issues of transgression 
and pleasure for a while to see how they are related to the notion of subject in his 
late aesthetics. 
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By linking sexual pleasure (désir) with creative life, Foucault opposes the view, 
characteristic of much earlier medical and naturalistic discussion, which suggests 
that pleasure can be used as a calibration in terms of normality (“Tell me what 
your desire is and I will tell you who you are, whether you are normal or not, and 
then I can validate or invalidate your desire”). Against this sort of understanding 
of pleasure, Foucault states that there is no “pathology” of pleasure, or 
“abnormal” pleasure. Instead, pleasure is an event outside the subject, or at the 
limit of the subject, taking place in that something, which is neither of the body or 
the soul, which is neither inside nor outside – in short, a notion neither assigned 
nor assignable. (Foucault in Halperin 1995, 93-94.)138  
 
So conceived, pleasure can be understood as a critical moment of transgression, 
which contests the limit between intelligible and unintelligible experience, as well 
as that between a normal and an abnormal way of existing. As I pointed out in 
Part I of this study, Foucault already wanted to liberate the living subject of desire 
in his archaeological critique of rational subjectivity. The notion of transgression 
was meant to convey the idea that subjectivity is constantly on the move towards 
its own limits. Yet, as Foucault stressed in the “Preface to Transgression” (1963), 
transgression does not entail overcoming the limits, but it is rather a form of their 
non-positive affirmation. This non-positive affirmation turns the subject into a site 
of endless contestation (in contrast to Enlightenment rationality, at the core of 
which is stable, fully self-reflective consciousness). In Foucault’s words, which I 
quoted earlier when considering his early insights into avant-garde writing: “To 
contest is to process until one reaches the empty core where being achieves its 
limit and where the limits define being” (PT 36). 
 
The archaeological Foucault saw the ethical promise of transgression as lying 
mainly in its possibilities to open up new ways of existing in language (creating 
space for multiplicity, disruption, affectiveness and otherness), and new ways of 
philosophising. In his own terms, the transgressive usage of language paved the 
way for the mad philosopher who no longer attempted to master the objects of his 
knowledge, but rather lost himself to (eroticized) language. In this process, the 
  
 
 
 
 
145
knowing subject was replaced by multiple speaking subjects, which were joined 
and severed, combined and excluded.  
 
At the same time, as I proposed, transgression was intimately linked with 
Foucault’s willingness to liberate the affective and sexual forces of the subject – 
forces of aisthesis that the rational notion of the subject forcefully ignored and 
even denied. With this in mind, he argued that, in the rationalized modern world, 
it is specifically in the realm of sexuality that the possibility of the experience of 
transgression remains. In other words, according to early Foucault, modern 
sexuality was de-naturalized into an object of discursive analysis, and only 
pushing it to its limits could undermine this position. In terms of his archaeology, 
the priviledged site for this pushing was avant-garde aesthetics and, most notably, 
avant-garde literature.  
 
In my view, Foucault’s late aesthetics of the self is in much the same sense a limit 
experience and an attempt to seek new stages of transgressive aisthesis. For him, 
the individual’s freedom from normalizing forms of individuality consists, in 
brief, in the aesthetic exploration of the limits of one’s subjectivity, body and 
sexual pleasure. By questioning the necessary or given limits of identity/self, the 
possibility of transgressing them is critically established and, as a result, the 
possibility of creating new kinds of subjective experiences and new kinds of 
pleasures is opened up.  
 
Yet, when we compare Foucault’s earlier ideas on artistic transgression with his 
late aesthetics, we soon come to realize that, although the main line of his 
argumentation is partly the same, the emphasis has shifted away from the analysis 
of avant-garde language as a site of transgressive action toward the notion of the 
self as a practical site of endless contestation and limit-attitudes. This shift in 
interest also leads him to consider the experimental and aesthetically shaped body 
as a site of transgressive action and identity. Allow me to make some comments 
on this in the following section before moving on to consider the third aspect of 
Foucault’s notion of freedom, which is linked to his analysis of the 
Enlightenment.
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Experimental Bodies 
 
When Foucault’s late views on the self, identity and transgression are applied to 
issues to do with the body and sex(uality), we can interpret them in two ways 
(Oksala 2002, 178-180). Firstly, with respect to the notion of intelligibility, 
Foucault’s ideas concerning sexual pleasure suggest that, despite the fact that the 
body is always a discursive site in the sense that it is used as an object of various 
disciplinary technologies and scientific discourses, it is also capable of distorting, 
overflowing and multiplying its discursive classifications through experiences of 
pleasure.  
 
There are, in other words, experiences of pleasure that clearly fall outside of the 
discourses that our culture imposes on bodies and desires (such as lesbian 
pleasure, bi-sexual pleasure, transgendered pleasure and autistic pleasure, to name 
just a few), and such experiences might be rendered mute and unintelligible 
because of their “strange” character. In this respect, the experiencing body that 
feels pleasure can take normal/normalizing language to the point at which it 
breaks down and loses its power of definition, even of expression.  
 
Yet, as Johanna Oksala observes, this breaking down of definitive language does 
not mean the return to a pre-discursive body. It is rather, as she explains by citing 
the words of Foucault, that the body as a contestation exists on the limits of 
discursive language, in those moments “when language, arriving at its confines, 
overleaps itself, explodes and radically challenges itself in laughter, tears, the 
overturned eyes of ecstasy” (Oksala 2002, 181-182; PT 48-51.) Hence, the 
experience of the limit can be realised in language, but this might happen only at 
the moment “where it says what cannot be said” (ibid.). 
 
Secondly, the experiencing affective body might transgress the limit between the 
normal and the abnormal. In other words, in Foucault’s view, the notion of 
pleasure can also be used to describe an event ‘outside the subject,’ or at the limit 
of the subject, taking place in that something, which is strictly speaking neither of 
the body nor the soul, and which is neither inside nor outside (Oksala 2002, 180; 
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Halperin 1995, 93-94).139 So conceived, the body that experiences pleasure may 
transgress the definitions concerning our “true” or “normal” self – definitions that 
modern bio-power attaches to individuals through various normalizing discourses 
and practices. In her reading of Foucault’s notion of the body and transgression, 
Oksala aptly crystallizes this transgressive force of bodily pleasure. 
 
Sexual experiences transgress and also constitute the limit between the norm 
and what falls outside it. The experiential body is not outside the norms but 
neither is it fully within them. It cannot be reduced to either one of these 
alternatives. The very process of normalization sets the limits for normal 
experiences, but these limits open up possibilities of transgression which 
affirm the potential limitlessness of the body. The Foucauldian body is 
capable of generating resistance, of presenting not malleability but excess 
and transgression as pleasure. This resistance is not a return to a wild and 
natural body, however, but it is resistance made possible by the normalizing 
power. (Oksala 2002, 180.) 
 
As I have suggested, for Foucault, philosophical criticism and the critical view of 
our freedom consist largely of reflecting upon the limits imposed on ourselves and 
considering our possibilities of transgressing them. In this respect, and in the 
context of Foucault’s aesthetics of the self, all critical action is clearly a reflexive 
and conscious endeavour that implies some degree of subjective autonomy. 
Therefore, it is not totally surprising that, in his late aesthetics, he comes to 
connect his analysis of individual freedom and self-stylisation to Kantian 
Enlightenment.  
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7. THE AESTHETICS OF THE SELF AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
 
When will you begin to live virtuously, Plato asked an old man who was 
telling him that he was attending a series of lectures on virtue. One must 
not just speculate forever; one must one day also think about actual 
practice. But today we think that those who live as they teach are 
dreamers. (Immanuel Kant, The Philosophical Encyclopaedia) 
 
For me intellectual work is related to what you could call aestheticism, 
meaning transforming yourself (MS 14).140 
 
This transformation of one’s self by one’s own knowledge is [...] something 
rather close to the aesthetic experience. Why should a painter work if he is not 
transformed by his own painting? (MS 14.)141 
 
 
An aspect that is often ignored in discussions of Foucault’s aesthetics of the self is 
that he does not base his insights only on ancient writings. His thoughts are also 
influenced by modern philosophy and aesthetics, notably Kant’s essay on the 
Enlightenment.  
 
When coming to terms with Kant and Enlightenment thought, Foucault uses the 
concept of Enlightenment as one way of thematizing and crystallizing the aims of 
his critical theorizations of the subject and the aesthetic practices of freedom. It is 
not, in other words, the only possible context and in Foucault’s view there may be 
even better ways to express the same ideas (another context to which he refers, 
again, is avant-garde aesthetics). Yet, there are certain strengths in Kant’s 
account. As I will illustrate in the following sections, the benefits of Kant’s theory 
of enlightenment for Foucault derive mainly from the fact that it offers 
intellectually challenging views on the ways in which the individual’s freedom 
and social responsibility could be brought together.  
 
When Foucault’s theorizations of the subject and the aesthetics of the self are 
considered in the context of Enlightenment thought and Kant’s philosophy, a set 
of counter-arguments immediately arises. Was it not exactly the unpleasant 
underside of Kantian Enlightenment that Foucault was dedicated to exposing in 
his early archaeological work, notably in his critique of Cartesian rationality and 
its exclusion of the ‘other’ from the history of the rational ‘same’?  What about 
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the subject who was described earlier by genealogical Foucault as primarily a 
product of discourse and knowledge-power relations, and who was not supposed 
to reach any autonomous or authentic stage, and not even to talk about the process 
of enlightenment? How can the same subject suddenly start to test the limits of 
himself, and even the world around him? Does this not require that he be able to 
step outside the network of power/language/knowledge that shapes his 
subjectivity?  
 
There are good reasons to pose these critical questions. For it is true that Foucault 
had fought with Kantian Enlightenment and humanist views on man since The 
Order of Things (1966), criticizing not only the credibility of rationality and 
progress, but also the very idea of the autonomous and true subject who was to 
free her/himself from the domination of others and become mature (Norris 1995, 
166; Nehamas 1998, 174). There was, however, at least one significant reason for 
him to turn towards the tradition of the Enlightenment in his late aesthetics. I 
suggest that this reason was linked to his attempt to construct a more developed 
view on the individual’s possibilities to effect changes in his/her self as well as in 
his/her historical situation – a view for which the heritage of the Enlightenment 
offers many useful tools. 
 
Despite his interest in Kant’s work, Foucault does not merely repeat Kantian 
ideals, however, but rather submits Enlightenment rationality to critical re-
appropriation. What results is not the Kantian question of the necessary 
limitations of knowledge, but a more positive form of the questions: what 
possibilities of concrete historical critique can we find in our time, and how are 
we to transgress the limits imposed on our subjectivities, thoughts and languages? 
 
As my analysis will point out, Foucault also finds support for his re-interpretation 
of Enlightenment thinking in the “low modernity” of Charles Baudelaire, notably 
in his writings on dandyism and modernity. At the same time, Foucault’s position 
on this network of ideas is rather unique. This is due partly to the explicitly 
politicised nature of his project, and partly to his ways of legitimating the process 
of enlightenment, not so much on the basis of universal common reason, but far 
  
 
 
 
 
150
more in terms of multiple reasons, experimental lifestyle, transgressive 
subjectivity, sexuality and the body.  
 
What remains of the project of enlightenment in Foucault’s late aesthetics is a 
critical “ontology of ourselves,” which has to be considered not as a theory, a 
doctrine, or a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating, but far more as 
an ethos and an attitude – a philosophical life in which “the critique of what we 
are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are 
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them,” as 
Foucault suggests (WE 50). So conceived, the reconsideration of the subject in the 
context of Enlightenment thought also provides some interesting tools for feminist 
attempts to rethink the subject in terms of autonomous self-government, 
multiplicity and active resistance, as I will point out a little further. 
 
 
The Birth of the Modern Subject 
 
In a piece entitled “What is Enlightenment?” which took its cue and its title from 
an essay of Kant’s published in November 1784 by the liberal Berliner 
Monatschrift, Foucault imagines that Kant’s famous question What is 
Enlightenment? (Was ist Aufklärung?) is posed to him two centuries later. In his 
interpretation of Kant’s text, Foucault gives special attention to Kant’s way of 
defining enlightenment by the term Ausgang, a way out, or an exit, which 
Foucault sees as presenting the birth of the modern subject. For Kant, the modern 
enlightened man exists in his own historicity, freed from the continuities of 
religion and tradition, having made “his way out.” He is looking for a difference, 
asking: “What difference is today introducing with respect to yesterday?” (WE 
33-38; Siivonen 1996, 79.)  
 
Kant indicates that the way out characteristic of enlightenment is a process that 
releases us from a state of tutelage or immaturity (Unmündigkeit). By tutelage he 
means a state of mind that makes us accept someone else’s authority. According 
to Kant, individuals (especially women) usually remain in tutelage because they 
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are idle and suffer from a lack of courage. It is not, in other words, necessarily due 
to the capacity for reason, but primarily because of laziness and ill will, that most 
people never become adult and autonomous and do not begin to use their reason 
in public. This makes them follow the rules and canons of others, and keeps them 
in chains. Unlike the autonomous enlightened man whose attitudes are free and 
who is the master of his own life and reasoning, those who live in an immature 
state obey and let others decide for them.142 With these critical notions in mind, 
Kant formulates his famous definition of Enlightenment: 
 
Enlightenment is man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is 
man’s inability to make use of his reason without direction from another. 
Self-incurred is this tutelage when its cause lies not in lack of reason but in 
lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. 
Sapere aude! “Have courage to use your own reason!” – that is the motto of 
enlightenment (Kant 1996, 7. Translation has been altered.)143  
 
By making this transcendental turn toward individual reasoning, the modern 
(Kantian) individual is assumed to be able to live heroically. In other words, 
he/she should be able to give up the dependence on religion and metaphysics as a 
basis for justifying and valuing some specific practices of the epoch, and should 
turn instead towards the public usage of his/her own reason. (Kant 1996, 13; 
Dreyfus and Rabinow 1999, 111.) The process of enlightenment is even some sort 
of task and an obligation in Kant, because he takes each individual to be 
responsible for himself/herself and his/her immature status. Therefore, his 
instruction “have courage to use your own reason!” (Aude sapere!) forms the 
heart of the process of enlightenment in which men participate both collectively 
and individually in the process of becoming adult and free (WE 35).  
 
Like many other analysers of the Enlightenment tradition (such as Theodor W. 
Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Jürgen Habermas), Foucault wished to retain this 
tradition of rationality, and regarded it as a useful tool in the more contemporary 
expression of critical thought – because individual autonomy and the creation of 
“new subjectivities” also requires rational work on our limits. What he 
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emphasized, however, was that the criticism inherent in this work is no longer to 
be used in the search for formal (Kantian) structures with a universal value. 
Instead, Foucault considered the task of Enlightenment thinking to be to make an 
historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and 
to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are thinking, doing and saying. This 
viewpoint led him to pluralize the notion of reason.  
 
 
The Pluralization of Reason 
 
As I suggested above, for Kant, it is only through the legitimate use of reason that 
the individual’s autonomy can be assured. In this sense, as Foucault claims, the 
Enlightenment is the age of the critique (WE 38). With this idea in mind, in his 
late writings Foucault retains from Enlightenment thinking exactly the notion of 
the subject’s rational autonomy and places it at the heart of his theory of the 
aesthetics of the self. Just like Kant, he considers this notion essential to the 
individual’s ability to exercise critical judgement, free from dominant beliefs, 
norms and desires.144  
 
Yet, Foucault’s position also differs in some important respects from that of Kant. 
Firstly, unlike Kant, who sees the Enlightenment as the exit of man’s self-
incurrent tutelage, Foucault stresses that we must acknowledge that the process of 
enlightenment is (and always was) just one more discursive paradigm, or one of 
those shifting orders of language or representation that make up the structural 
genealogy of Western reason (Norris 1995, 168). Therefore, his own work does 
not orient the process of analysis toward “the essential kernel of rationality” that 
is assumed to be found during the process of enlightenment. On the contrary, 
critical thinking, in Foucault’s view, must be directed toward the “contemporary 
limits of the necessary,” that is, toward what is not or is no longer indispensable 
for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous subjects (WE 43).  
 
Secondly, Foucault argues that there are no universally applicable transcendental 
principles and standards, such as universal reason, that could be applied to human 
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nature and life. In opposition to Kant’s universalising account, therefore, he 
proclaims that the quest for a morality to which everyone should submit would be 
“catastrophic” (FI 12). Furthermore, as he suggests elsewhere, we should not 
forget that “it was on the basis of the flamboyant rationality of social Darwinism 
that racism was formulated, becoming one of the most enduring and powerful 
ingredients of Nazism. This was, of course, an irrationality, but an irrationality 
that was at the same time […] a certain form of rationality.” (SKP 249.)145  
 
Although Foucault recognized the necessity of rationality for all critical thought, 
he thus also wanted to analyse its limits, historical effects and dangers. In his 
version of enlightenment, the individual subject’s rational autonomy is thus not 
bound up with the idea of the unified rational subject. Far from it, for, as he saw 
it, there exists multiple and historically specific forms of rationality, due to which 
reason can never discover its essence or founding act, but only “different 
modifications in which rationalities engender one another, oppose and pursue one 
another” (SPS 443).146  
 
This plurality of reasons does not necessarily mean that individuals may not use 
their reason to criticize other rational practices in public. In other words, by 
pluralizing reason Foucault is not arguing that “anything goes.” It is my 
contention that, for him, the pluralization of critique is rather a necessary moment 
in the formation of individual autonomy, but such critique cannot be grounded on 
universal common reason because this would ignore individual differences as well 
as the elements of rational disintegration within the subject itself and within 
reason.  
 
By denying the idea that the process of enlightenment is grounded on the usage of 
universally valid reason, Foucault also rejects the strong universalist premises that 
hold such values to be more than just a product of our own cultural attachment to 
the philosophic discourse of modernity (Norris 1995, 169). With the help of these 
limitations, Foucault manages to avoid legitimating the “story of enlightenment” 
as the truth of our condition and our future possibilities.147 In that sense, the 
criticism engendered by Foucault’s enlightenment is not transcendental, and its 
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goal is not that of making metaphysics possible. Rather “it is genealogical in its 
design and archaeological in its method.” (WE 46.) He also describes the task as 
“patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty” (WE 50).  
 
It might be worth stressing here that Foucault’s views on the Enlightenment and 
individual liberty are not to be confused with the romantic notion of liberation. I 
suggest, moreover, that it is also here that it is crucial to make a distinction 
between Foucault’s aesthetics of the self and Friedrich Schiller’s, for example, 
whose writings might at first glance seem to reflect some of the main themes of 
Foucault’s late work.  
 
For unlike in Schiller, whose critical aesthetics and political theory are centred 
around the link between the domination of nature and the domination of man 
(especially in Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man 1795), for Foucault the 
domination of man’s inner nature comes about not just through a change of 
attitude towards nature (the exaltation of instrumental reason), but primarily 
through training and the internalization of certain aesth/ethical disciplines and 
practices, including sexual behavior, the diet of pleasures, and care for the self and 
others. In other words, for Foucault, the creation of individual aesthetics of the 
self is not either a question of “overcoming” one’s nature, or of transforming 
one’s life and body into an artifice, but rather one of turning the material we 
usually call the self (or individual life) into a site of creative action and political 
contestation. 
 
So conceived, the main problem of Enlightenment thought for Foucault is not so 
much in preserving the primacy of reason (as in Kant and the intellectualist 
communication theory of Jürgen Habermas), or in the domination of nature 
(Schiller), but rather in the attempt to respond to one’s historical situation in a 
critical and creative manner. This critical “ontology of the present,” as Foucault 
terms it, has two separate but related components: it demands work on oneself 
(ontology of ourselves), and responding critically to one’s time and surroundings 
(ontology of the present time) (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1999, 112). I will describe 
shortly the main contents of this differentiation in the following section.  
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Ontology of the Present and Ourselves 
 
In his presentation of the idea of the ontology of the present Foucault mentions 
three axes, the specificity of and interconnections between which have to be 
analysed if we are to grasp something of the questions “who are we?” and “what 
is our own era?” These are the axis of knowledge, the axis of power, and the axis 
of ethics. According to Foucault, the historical ontology of ourselves has to 
provide answers to an open series of questions. It has to make an indefinite 
number of inquiries, which might be specified and multiplied, but which will all, 
in one way or another, address the following important issues: How are we 
constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects 
who exercise and submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral 
subjects of our own actions? (WE 48-49.)  
 
Elsewhere, Foucault describes this sort of question as a diagnosis of “what today 
is.” This diagnosis does not consist in some simple characterization of what we 
are, but rather demands us to follow “the lines of fragility in the present – in 
managing to grasp why and how that which is might no longer be that which is” 
(SPS 449-450).148 In more concrete terms, Foucault demands that all critical 
thinking analyses freedom as concrete and historically limited, that is, as a site of 
concretely possible transformation. This work could also be described as the 
microphysics of power, because it represents attempts to clarify what forms of 
rationality are involved in the process of domination and how knowledge is used 
as a technique of power.  
 
As I have suggested, the primary site of this sort of (positive) critical analysis and 
transformation in Foucault’s later thinking is the individual self. For him, 
realizing one’s freedom consists, first of all, in one’s willingness to face the idea 
that action is not grounded in universal and ahistorical theories of the individual 
subject, any more than it is in the conditions of community and speaking, but that 
it demands active agency on the part of an individual. Hence, Foucault’s notion of 
freedom is not only ontological, but also political and historical: he strives to find 
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out what historical (and political) limits there are that restrict our freedom and 
how the aesthetic practices of the self could work to “free” this freedom.  
  
Yet, the critical question soon arises that if Foucault does not even attempt to 
provide universally valid norms for human action and morality, how can we avoid 
the situation in which the subject who commits crimes, rapes or kills, for example, 
is merely considered to be realizing his/her freedom and creating a unique 
aesthetics of the self? (McNay 1992, 45; Plaza 1980, 31; Oksala 2002, 230). From 
where, in other words, can we seek moral criteria for action if the only critical 
basis we have is that individual autonomy tests the limits of the self and the 
present? 
 
This is not an easy question, as Foucault himself acknowledges in his essay on the 
Enlightenment. For if we limit ourselves to exclusively partial and local inquiry 
(such as studying the individual practices of the self), we seem to run the risk of 
letting ourselves be determined by some more general structures over which we 
have no control, and of which we may even not be conscious (WE 47). He offers 
two solutions to this dilemma. Firstly, he suggests that we need to give up hope of 
acceding to a point of view that would give us access to complete and definitive 
knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits. In other words, Foucault 
suggests that we cannot grasp the whole of our historical time, but we can 
construct a valid perspective on our era, as well as on our selves.149  
 
Secondly, Foucault emphasizes that this does not mean that we cannot do any 
work except in disorder and contingency, and that the work on our limits 
(practices of the self) also has a certain generality, systematicity and homogeneity. 
(WE 47.) Despite the engaged and historicist character of his thinking, Foucault 
retains some notion of transcendence in the sense that he sees us as being able to 
go beyond the limits that have been imposed on us historically.  
 
For Kant, the Enlightenment and autonomy consisted, at least in part, in one’s 
mature use of reason defined as the moment when humanity will “put its own 
reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority,” as Foucault comments 
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(WE 38). Similarly, for Foucault, the notion of the mature, autonomous use of 
reason is used as the basis of the critique that is directed towards an investigation 
of the self, which he nevertheless takes as a historical and practical entity rather 
than as ontologically and transcendentally given.  
 
Yet, the aim of Foucauldian autonomy is not to achieve a state of impersonal 
moral transcendence, but rather to refuse to submit to the “government of 
individualization” by constantly questioning what seems to be natural and 
inevitable in one’s own identity: an interrogation of the “contemporary limits of 
the necessary” (WE 43). For him, the subject is autonomous in the sense that it is 
capable of critique, but this critique has no purely transcendental or ahistorical 
value. Rather, it is always historically situated and contextual. Therefore, I 
suggest that the transcendence embedded in Foucauldian rationality is still 
transcendence but it should be understood as historicized or fallen transcendence, 
rather than that which could bypass this very historical present. 
 
Moreover, it could be argued that it is exactly this idea of “fallen transcendence” 
that makes Foucault claim that the historico-critical attitude of the autonomous 
subject must be an experimental one if we are not to settle for the affirmation or 
the abstract empty dream of freedom. For what he means by this is that all work 
done at the limits of ourselves must open up a realm of historical inquiry, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, it must put itself to the test of contemporary reality so 
that we can both grasp the points at which change is desirable and possible, and 
determine the exact form this change should take.  
 
Therefore, as Foucault states, “The historical ontology of ourselves must turn 
away from all projects that claim to be global or radical,” for we know from 
experience that “the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as 
to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, 
another culture, another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most 
dangerous traditions” (WE 46). So conceived, the ethos of the Enlightenment is 
not faithfulness to doctrinal elements, but rather “the permanent reactivation of an 
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attitude – that is, of a philosophical ethos that could be described as a permanent 
critique of our historical era” (WE 42).  
 
In the light of these notions, Foucault concludes that it is better to prefer the very 
specific transformations that might, for example, concern our ways of being and 
thinking, our relations to authority, and the ways in which we usually perceive 
insanity or illness. With this in mind, he characterizes the philosophical ethos that 
is appropriate to his critical ontology of ourselves as “a historico-practical test of 
the limits that we may go beyond, and thus as work carried out by ourselves upon 
ourselves as free beings” (WE 46-47).  
 
As a concrete example of this sort of critical work on subjectivity and the present, 
he refers to Baudelaire’s consciousness of modernity as “the ephemeral, the 
fleeting, and the contingent” (WE 39). In Foucault’s view, Baudelaire’s modernity 
is both a form of relationship to the present and a mode of relationship that one 
has to establish with oneself. To be modern in the Baudelairean sense is not to 
accept oneself as one is in the flux of passing moments. What it demands instead 
is a certain asceticism and active aesthetic self-shaping. As Foucault points out, it 
is this taking of oneself as an object of complex and difficult elaboration that 
Baudelaire, in the spirit of his day, called dandyism.  
 
 
Dandyism 
 
As I will show in this section, Baudelaire’s writings on modernity and modern 
aesthetic subjectivity have inspired not only Foucault’s views on the “ontology of 
the present,” but also his attempts to rethink the subject. As was the case with 
Kant, he does not merely repeat the views of Baudelaire, however, but rather 
attempts to create a new version of enlightenment rationality on the grounds of 
Baudelaire’s thinking. As I will suggest, for Foucault, the “enlightened” aesthetics 
of the self includes both the rationalist “high” dimension of Kant’s thinking and 
the “low” affective side of Baudelaire’s aesthetics. Thus considered, Foucault’s 
late analysis of the aesthetic subject does not ignore the importance of reason for 
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individual aesth/ethics and political autonomy, as Baudelaire does in some 
respects. Yet it acknowledges the importance of the body, sexuality and 
affectiveness in critical thought and action – all aspects of subjectivity that are 
largely lacking in Kant’s rational account. 
 
Foucault’s interest in bringing together the critical aspects of the Kantian 
Enlightenment and Baudelaire’s notion of modernity might, at first sight, seem 
surprising. However, it should be noted that, just as the idea of the Enlightenment 
is not restricted by Kant to his own time, Baudelairean modernity should not be 
regarded as a mere periodizing label, despite its strong historical connections to 
late-19th-century European reality and aesthetics. What Baudelaire means by 
modernity is each present in its presentness, in other words, the present in its 
purely instantaneous quality (doomed to become antiquity in the future), which 
also contains an element of the eternal (or classical). In this sense, as Foucault 
bears out, Baudelaire’s analysis of modernity contains elements that are 
applicable to various other historical phases of modernity as well, including our 
own time.  
 
Foucault approves of Baudelaire’s analysis of modernity for two reasons. Firstly, 
he is interested in Baudelaire’s way of defining it in terms of the discontinuity of 
time. At this level, Baudelairean modernity represents for him a certain break with 
tradition, a feeling of novelty, or vertigo in the face of the fleeting moment. 
However, as Foucault points out, these ephemeral, fleeting and contingent aspects 
of the present are also connected to another aspect of modernity in Baudelaire’s 
work, namely, to the attempt to recapture something eternal in this very present. 
This eternality is not, in Foucault’s (or in Baudelaire’s) view, something that goes 
beyond the present time, however. Rather, it is to be found within the present 
instant (WE 39). As I have indicated, I understand that Foucault means by this 
sort of eternity something like a fallen transcendence or some sort of historicized 
universal (as Sartre would call it).  
 
Secondly, Foucault finds in Baudelaire’s writings a model of the modern art of the 
self, and understands this model as a mode of relationship that has to be 
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established with oneself. He also refers to “the deliberate attitude of modernity” in 
Baudelaire’s work, which is “tied to an indispensable asceticism.” (WE 41.) The 
famous Baudelairean spokesperson for this sort of modern attitude is the dandy, 
or, almost synonymously with him, the flâneur/modern artist.  
 
What this partly fictive, partly real Baudelairean modern man aims at – and what 
interests Foucault in his character – is an individual attempt to cultivate the idea of 
modern beauty in his personality, to satisfy his passions, to feel, and to think 
(Baudelaire 1999, 535). On this level, modernity for Baudelaire represents a new 
kind of existential “cult of oneself” (culte de soi-même), which is based on ideas 
of disinterestedness (dandyism as a manifestation of social inactivity and non-
utilitarian liberty), and on attempts to constantly bring forth one’s originality in 
relation to one’s own historical era (ibid. 536-537).  
 
For the Baudelairean modern man, the city streets function as transitory stages of 
modern life on which those who seek modernity can find living expressions of 
actual beauty – be this expressed in fashion, gestures or human faces, or just 
simply in the heterogeneity of the crowd (ibid. 517). This modern beauty is not 
conventional and pretty, however, but rather discontinuous, fleeting, bizarre and 
strange. In this sense, it could be seen as offering space for differences and 
ruptures – or perhaps more appropriately, ruptures and discontinuities are to be 
seen as its essential traits. 
 
As we find in the writings of Baudelaire, on the formal level, modern artistic 
achievements depend upon individual innovation in language and in modes of 
representation. Modern art, so conceived, can speak to eternity only by freezing 
time and all its fleeting elements. (Harvey 1989, 21.) For Baudelaire, however, the 
historical, affective and transitory (“low”) dimension of modernity was even more 
important than the eternal and immutable (high, classical) aspect of art, given his 
belief that eternal beauty exists only as an abstraction, or as a “general surface of 
diverse beauties.” He also considered the particular and fleeting element of 
modern beauty more challenging in that it grows from our individual passions: in 
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Baudelaire’s view, it is due to the particular nature of our passions that we have 
our own specific conceptions of beauty (Baudelaire 1999, 237).150 
 
Being part of “low” rather than “high” (Kantian, rational) modernity, dandyism 
was for Baudelaire an example of the specifically modern attitude of making 
one’s body, behavior, passions, and existence a work of art. According to 
Foucault, a dandy is nevertheless not a perfect being, nor does he have any 
specifically modern essence. He is rather an individual who is aware of the 
historical limits of himself and his situation, but who tries to invent himself as a 
kind of transgression of these limits (WE 40-42). Therefore, Baudelaire’s 
modernity does not liberate man in his own being, but rather compels him to face 
the task of producing himself (WE 42). In other words, modern man is not going 
off to discover himself, his truth, and his hidden inner secrets, but he rather tries to 
invent himself through creating his personal aesthetics of the self.  
 
To put it another way, to be modern in the Baudelairean sense is to choose to be 
modern. It is, first of all, a question of a new attitude or sensuousness, manifested 
in one’s critical relation to the present era. At the same time, I suggest that for 
Baudelaire (as well as for Foucault), the modern attitude represented a new form 
of existential heroism, because the path to modernity is difficult: it is full of 
uncertainties and risks. This uncertainty is largely due to the imaginative and 
contingent nature of modern man’s creation: modernity or the “present in its 
presentness” is not a reality to be copied by the artist, but far more a work of his 
or her own imaginative creation by which he or she penetrates beyond the banality 
of observable appearances where eternity and ephemerality are one.151 
 
Moreover, what I wish to emphasize, by taking up Foucault’s connections to the 
low modernity of Baudelaire is that, for Baudelaire the modern cult of the self 
was, first of all, a manifestation of the culture of difference. In other words, a true 
dandy does not follow any given rules, laws or norms, nor does he care for official 
values such as money, conformism, heterosexuality and marriage (Saidah 1993, 
141). Despising the limits of common sense, and the typical or normal, the dandy 
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creates his own aesthetics of the self, which is dedicated to useless passions and 
extreme leisure.  
 
On this level, I suggest that the dandy is a perfect example of individual alienation 
from society and official culture. His enchantment also expresses a certain revolt 
against bourgeois and capitalist values with their rationalized and utilitarian 
lifestyle ideals. In this respect, the dandy’s aesthetic cultivation of the self is also 
political and socially transgressive: it is meant to illuminate the limits that society 
places on individuals, and to test these limits by doing things differently – 
imaginatively and often without any other useful purpose than one’s personal 
pleasure and aesthetic satisfaction. 
 
 
The Body as a Site of Artistic Creation 
 
One more important aspect of Baudelaire’s modern aesthetics of the self for the 
work at hand – an aspect that Foucault for some reason ignores – is that his 
modern reflexivity of the self pervasively affects not only one’s psychic processes 
or gestures but also the experience of the body. In this section, I will illustrate 
briefly what I mean by this statement.  
 
In Baudelaire’s texts on dandyism, the body could not function outside of the 
internally referential systems of modernity (Giddens 1991, 7). As Baudelaire’s 
writings clearly evidence, the body of the dandy is itself reflexively mobilized: he 
conceives of it as some sort of raw aesthetic materiality that has to be cultivated 
into a work of art. What this also means is that, in the aestheticist culture of 
dandyism, the body becomes torn apart from all images of nature. This separation 
is well echoed in the writings of some other analysers of dandyism as well. To cite 
the words of Oscar Wilde: “The first duty in life is to be as artificial as possible” 
(Wilde 1983, 156), hence his conclusion: “One should either be a work of art, or 
wear a work of art” (ibid. 157). Or, as Baudelaire puts it, asserting that because 
nature does not provide us with morality, “everything that is good is always a 
product of art/skills (d’art).” Therefore, in Baudelaire’s view, morality, just like 
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beauty, should be grounded on the “order of the beautiful” rather than on nature 
(Baudelaire 1999, 542).152 
 
In Baudelaire’s texts, the dandy serves both as the creator and the object of his art. 
The aesthetic cultivation he practices on his body is meant to transform his art into 
an art of living, and his style into a personal style of living (Saidah 1993, 145). 
The primal point of interest in the dandy’s search for happiness is thus his own 
body, understood as an artificial work of art that is to take over the naturally 
beautiful. Much the same as in Greco-Roman cultures, this demands some 
aesthetic moderation on the individual’s part. Examples of this self-control are to 
be found, for example, in the 19th century dandy’s admiration of slenderness and 
in his use of corsets, which squeezed the body so tightly that the famous dandy 
Barbey d’Aurevilly once blurted out to Baudelaire: “If I were to partake in Holy 
Communion, I’d blow up” [“Si je communiais, j’éclaterais”] (Natta 1989, 12, 
translation mine).  
 
These principles of nineteenth-century aestheticism might at first sight appear as a 
movement towards the narcissistic cultivation of one’s bodily appearance. The 
question is not quite that simple, however. As Anthony Giddens points out, the 
modern interest in the aesthetic cultivation of one’s personality and body could 
also be seen as the expression of a much more deeply-rooted concern to actively 
construct and control the body (Giddens 1991, 7). For here we can also see an 
integral connection between work on the body and lifestyle – manifest, for 
example, in the dieting and exhibitionist dressing of dandies.  
 
Another typically modern example is the cultivation of the sexual characteristics 
of the body, also frequently referred to in Baudelaire’s descriptions of the 
androgynous gender of dandies (Monneyron 1993, 199-200; Carassus 1971). By 
cultivating the sexual body as a site of aesthetic re-creation, a dandy represents a 
culture of difference and differentiation. His aesthetics of the self, in this sense, 
becomes the basis, or, perhaps better, the essential means of testing the limits of 
the present and “ourselves” and at the same time manifesting not only an 
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individual lifestyle, but also one’s philosophical, moral and political attitudes 
toward present society. 
 
Despite the fact that the dandy’s critical action is grounded far more on individual 
passions and feelings than on reason, his critical project also seems to be, in some 
respects, close to the Kantian subject of enlightenment. For both Kant and 
Baudelaire seek the autonomy of the modern subject in the context of the present, 
attempting to free individuals from the normative and materialist chains of 
society, as well as from religion, moralism and tradition. Both of them also repeat 
another essential characteristic of enlightenment thought, namely the idea that 
nature must be overcome in order to become “mature.” In the process of creating 
a modern aesthetics of the self, nature thus becomes a sort of negative other, a 
dark reverse side of the enlightenment process that an autonomous individual 
attempts to re-shape and control through various aesthetic practices.  
 
Yet, it is also crucial to note that the critical re-shaping of one’s aesthetics of 
existence has come to mean somewhat different things for Baudelaire and Kant. I 
will discuss these differences in the following section in terms of two modernities 
(high and low), as well as of two different interpretations of the term 
‘enlightenment’: the Enlightenment and enlightenment. 
 
 
The Modern Aesthetic Subject: On the Edges of High and Low 
 
As I have shown, for Foucault, the enlightened aesthetics of the self includes both 
the “high” dimension of Kant’s thinking and the “low” side of Baudelaire’s 
aesthetics. In this respect, his late theorizations of the aesthetics of the self can be 
said to offer a new version of enlightenment rationality.  
 
We could express the same idea by saying that, when coming to terms with 
rationality and Enlightenment thought, Foucault links together two different 
aspects of modernity and enlightenment. Following Scott Lash’s and Jonathan 
Friedman’s analysis, I use the expression “high modernity” or “high modernist 
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subjectivity” to refer to a version of identity that assigns extraordinary privilege to 
judgement and especially to cognition, and devalues, correspondingly, the aspects 
of the libidinal, affective, body, touch, and the faculty of perception, so that vision 
itself is, so to speak, “colonized by reason” (Lash and Friedman 1992, 5).  
 
In the face of this, the so-called “low modernist” alternatives stress instead 
experimental living, change and movement, as well as the bodily level of 
existence, including aspects of sexuality, desire and pleasure. Like high 
modernity, low modernity works toward an ethics, but as Lash and Friedman 
remark, “an ethics without blueprints.” For its universalism is “one which fosters 
cosmopolitanism, but cosmopolitanism without emancipation” (ibid. 3).  
 
As these terminological differentiations concerning modernity already suggest, 
there are some crucial differences between Kant’s and Baudelaire’s critical 
insights – differences that I am convinced must be taken up in order to fully 
understand Foucault’s position in this specifically modern network of ideas. I will 
emphasize three points in my analysis of these differences. 
 
First, unlike Kant, who guides the modern subject to follow the “high” lines of 
reason, the Baudelairean modern subject tends to turn toward the aesthetic 
cultivation of the “low,” that is, the body, passions and sexuality. This low interest 
in human life reasserts itself against the high modernist cult of reasoning and 
civilizing by different means. It emphasizes the importance of aestheticist 
perception and the aesthetic stylisation of the self against the modernist 
colonialization of perception by our logical faculties (Hoffmann-Axthelm 1993), 
it turns toward tactile and passionate alternatives to cognitivist assumptions of 
high modernity, and it produces a template for the modern unconscious that tends 
to reassert itself against the high modernist civilization process (Lash and 
Friedman 1993, 5-6). I suggest that, in this respect Foucault is on much the same 
lines as Baudelaire, notably in coming to terms with the aesthetic subject, the 
experimental body, limit-attitudes and sexuality. 
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In my opinion, the second difference between Baudelaire’s and Kant’s critical 
modernities is in their different viewpoints on historical progress. What connects 
Kant’s essay on the Enlightenment with Baudelaire’s dandyism is, in Foucault’s 
view, the fact that the promesse de bonheur (promise of reconciliation or 
happiness) of both thinkers is embedded in the promise of critique. Yet, I contend 
that, at the same time, there are some significant differences between the two, 
which are worth taking up here so that we may better understand the specific 
character of Foucault’s own interpretation of the terms ‘modernity’ and 
‘Enlightenment’. What I particularly have in mind here is that, unlike in Kant, the 
promise of reconciliation in Baudelaire’s modern aesthetics is not rooted in the 
individual’s public usage of reason. Instead, the possibility of redemption or 
reconciliation is actualised in the aesthetic constitution of what he simply calls 
‘modernity’ or ‘modern subjectivity.’  
 
Therefore, the critical task in the Baudelairean (and Foucauldian) aesthetics of the 
self is not to construct universally valid structures of reason. What Baudelaire was 
aiming at, I suggest, was to recognize the modern individual as a non-determined 
subject who has the power to test the limits that society and others place on the 
self (the requirement to be rational, to marry, to produce, to rationalize relations 
between work and leisure, art and life, for example). What Foucault finds valuable 
in this account is that this critical quest leads Baudelaire to stress the importance 
of autonomous self-government and aesthetic self-creation rather than universal 
structures of reason.  
 
Altogether, for both Kant and Baudelaire modernity represents an individually 
chosen attitude and ethos that arises out of and is at the same time an attempt to 
respond critically to one’s own historical situation. What has changed on the road 
from German idealism to Baudelaire’s mid-nineteenth-century aesthetics is the 
spirit of rational optimism inherent in Kant’s thought. This brings us to cross the 
third difference between Kant’s and Baudelaire’s views on critical modernity. 
Whereas Kant’s essay on the Enlightenment still promotes reliance on rational 
reasoning and universally valid statements, Baudelaire’s modern aesthetics of the 
self has turned passionate, tragic, historically embedded and sad. Neither do his 
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modern heroes manifest the same belief in progress and promesse de bonheur as 
Kant’s modern heroes, scholars and academically trained men of genius do. 
Rather, he concentrates on searching for fleeting experiences of modernity. In 
Baudelaire’s texts, such experiences are more often found on the dirty faces of 
rag-and-bone men, beggar-girls and prostitutes than on the scrubbled faces of 
well-educated upper class scholars, the Kantian spokespersons of the 
Enlightenment. In this respect, I suggest that Baudelaire’s position – like 
Foucault’s – is far more low, popular and avant-garde than the high aesthetics of 
Kant and his followers.  
 
The same lack of reconciliation is also to be found in Baudelaire’s notions of 
modern art. While in the late 18th century writings of Kant the aesthetic subject 
might still experience reconciliation and wholeness by referring to the organic 
character of an artwork, the application of reason and the universal validity of 
aesthetic judgement, the low modern subjectivity of Baudelaire and Foucault 
remains without reconciliation despite the modern subject’s constant attempts to 
find “a way out” of or “an exit” from the limitations imposed on one’s existence.  
 
As Baudelaire suggests, the more remote from everyday life modern art becomes, 
the more it withdraws into complete aesthetic autonomy – and the more painfully 
the lack of reconciliation is brought to conscious awareness. In my view, the same 
pain is reflected in the endless ennui of the Baudelairean outsider (a dandy) who 
identifies himself with Parisian rag-and-bone men, beggar girls and prostitutes 
rather than with Kantian academics and geniuses. Like Foucault in his analysis of 
madmen and homosexuals, Baudelaire sees in these figures examples of modern 
heroism, which nevertheless does not lead to reconciliation or happiness. 
(Benjamin 1992, 96 and Harvey 1989, 26.) 
 
Unlike Kant, both Baudelaire and Foucault thus doubt the success of the process 
of enlightenment. As Foucault remarks, “I do not know whether we will ever 
reach mature adulthood” (WE 49). This belief is also echoed in his argument that, 
despite the possibility to create critical aesthetics of the self, and to effect changes 
in social conditions, we can never become totally free, because freedom is not a 
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fixed state of being. It is far more a name that can be ascribed to our possibilities 
to create ourselves and transgress the limits imposed on us by society and others 
(not in the sense of overcoming these limits, but as illuminating and critically 
testing them). In other words, we can never attain freedom because we cannot get 
rid of power relations and domination, not even in the domain of aesthetics.  
 
Yet, despite the doubt that Foucault expresses with respect to Enlightenment 
thinking on rational utopianism, he regards the task of creating critical aesthetics 
of the self to be extremely important. For him, its importance lies, first of all, in 
the attempt to set individuals free from domination by others – although he 
considers this utopian freedom more a rhetorical means of directing our actions to 
support the practices of liberty instead of accepting the stages as given. He 
summarizes his view on enlightenment in the following words: “I do not know 
whether it must be said today that the critical task still entails faith in 
Enlightenment; I continue to think that this task requires work on our limits, that 
is, a patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty” (WE 50). 
 
What Foucault’s views on enlightenment bring out, moreover, is that he actually 
never rejects the notion of the subject, but instead aims to criticize our ways of 
using it as an essential basis of creativity, of the self, of the body, artistic value, 
for example. At the same time, this criticism is meant to open up new perspectives 
in terms of practical ethical and political goals: it is used to support the view that 
human beings are unstable processes, and contain the potential for their own 
undoing. Individuals are not, in short, mere puppets in the networks of power, 
because they are granted the possibility of transgressing the limits imposed on 
them, and might be able to become something in their own right.  
 
Hence the creation of individual aesthetics of the self is, for Foucault, a site not 
only of aesthetic stylization but also of an individual’s political contestation. It 
might be worth emphasizing, however, that Foucault does not claim that such a 
creation would be enough in the attempt to resist power in modern societies. What 
he stresses is that critical practices of the self might function as a source of 
powerful critique and even transformation, because all governmentality implicates 
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“a relation of oneself to one-self.” For wider changes in power to take place, 
however, new laws and new techniques of government need to be created, which 
would better serve the liberty of the subjects. (ECP 31.) 
 
Against this background, I maintain that, even in the context of modernity, 
Foucault’s aesthetics of the self is a specific theoretical constellation. Preoccupied 
with the same urge for historicism and engagement as both Kant and Baudelaire, 
but working at the same time in the context of ancient theories of the self and 
contemporary sexual politics, he repeats the same question that Kant and 
Baudelaire both posed in ways that were typical of their own eras: What is our 
own time, and how are we to constitute ourselves as subjects in its conditions?  
 
Yet, as I have shown, the suggestions Foucault offers do not merely repeat the 
views of Kant or Baudelaire, but rather present a new version of enlightenment 
rationality and modernity. Moreover, with respect to Kant, I propose that, to the 
degree that Baudelaire and Foucault both attempt to turn the life and body of an 
individual into a transgressive site of a living artwork, they do not merely 
continue the tradition of Kant’s philosophical Enlightenment (Aufklärung), they 
also turn it into a program of exceeding (Aufhebung), that is, of exceeding the 
limits of the autonomous spheres of aesthetics, ethics and politics, as well as those 
between the high (rational, universal) and the low (passionate, bodily, historically 
engaged). 
 
To put it another way, the character of the “high” radically changed in 
Baudelaire’s and Foucault’s critical description of modern subjectivity: it is no 
longer grounded (at least not primarily) on the usage of reason and universally 
valid judgments, but rather on some sort of fallen transcendence, which is still 
transcendence but cannot avoid soiling itself in the passionate chaos and mess of 
everyday life.  
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8. CRITICAL INSIGHTS INTO FOUCAULT’S LATE AESTHETICS 
 
As indicated thus far, Foucault’s late emphasizing of the active aspect of the self 
suggests a dynamic relationship between social structures and individuals. What 
he argues is that by creating aesthetic practices of the self, the individual can stop 
being a mere docile body and enter the domain of power as an active agent. This 
attitude does not belong to victims or slaves, but rather to self-empowering 
individuals who try to transform their situation by partaking actively in the 
strategic play or struggle (la lutte) over the government of their selves.  
 
In short, Foucault’s message is that we are products of history and power 
relations, but given their shifting nature, we can also try to transform ourselves 
and the world we live in. In this sense, he suggests that individuals are 
autonomous and free. Free to try to construct themselves; free to attempt to break 
away from the normalizing mechanisms of knowledge-power, and “to counter the 
grip of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their 
multiplicity and their possibility of resistance” (HS 157).153 
 
Despite the importance of these ideas in reconsidering notions of the self, identity 
and sexuality, Foucault’s late writings on aesthetics have also been the subject of 
heated debate, not least among feminist intellectuals. In the following sections, I 
will therefore consider how these late Foucauldian ideas are echoed in recent 
feminist debate on the subject/the self, and what kind of difficulties and merits 
arise when his insights are brought together with current feminist questions.  
 
As in the earlier sections of this work, I will not come out simply for or against 
Foucault, but will attempt to discuss both the strengths and weaknesses of his 
work. The final intention of my consideration is to move beyond polarized debate 
on his work by further developing some practical and theoretical implications of 
his aesthetics of the self. Therefore, although I strongly defend the usefulness of 
his late aesthetics to current feminist debate on aesth/ethical and political 
subjectivity, I also wish to point out that there are some aspects of his work that 
should be further developed. In my view, it is only through this sort of 
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“unorthodox” reading of Foucault, or “moving beyond Foucault,” that we might 
discover the positive implications of his aesthetics for feminist theorizations and 
practices, and maximize the benefits of his insights for feminist ends. 
 
 
A Feminist Critique of the Aesthetics of the Self 
 
One of the most searing criticisms of Foucault’s late aesthetics concerns, again, 
his indifference to the implications of gender. As I will exemplify in this section, 
feminist theorists have criticized him on two main points: 1) his presentation of 
masculine forms of erotic practice as his model for ancient sexuality and aesthetic 
practices of the self in general, and 2) his omission of the historical construction 
of sexuality as gender-specific.154 
 
According to Rosalyn Diprose, there is a fundamental gender problem already in 
Foucault’s depiction of the sovereign self, which goes deep into the very 
structures of his thinking (Diprose 1994). Diprose does not mean by this that 
Foucault positions the self as an innate or abstract entity – she is well aware of his 
way of explaining subjection as a historically and culturally specific process that 
precedes interiority. The problems rather arise from the fact that the Greek 
aesthetics of the self disqualifies women on two counts, which Foucault, in 
Diprose’s view, tends to reiterate in his own theory.  
 
For Diprose, the first problem is that women’s use of pleasure was derived by 
Greek men not from women’s own selves and bodies, but from their roles as 
wives, mistresses and mothers. Secondly, she pays attention to the fact that 
moderation, which was perceived to be a necessary prerequisite for self-mastery, 
was considered by the Greeks an essentially masculine structure of active virility. 
In other words, self-mastery and active self-creation was possible only for a 
person who was both free and active in character, and these attributes were 
addressed to men only – men as free citizens and men as active penetrating 
participants of sexual intercourse. 
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Along similar lines, Ellen Greene suggests that one of the most disturbing gender 
problems in Foucault’s late aesthetics is the fact that he, just like ancient Greco-
Roman thinkers, ignores the question of what a not-male-centred version of erotic 
relationships would be like. As we have seen, in his inquiries Foucault valorizes 
the phallic mode of representation, which represents and organizes erotic relations 
as necessarily hierarchical and power-driven. What results from this, in Greene’s 
view, is that he fails to identify his “analytic of power” as male-specific and as 
linked to the larger patriarchal ideology of Greek culture. Moreover, as a result, he 
does not recognize that the model of domination and discourses that produce 
sexuality in his own analyses are also strongly gendered: they reflect a male-
centered perspective that takes patriarchy for granted, and always constructs 
sexual subjectivity as male. (Greene 1996, 2.)  
 
With similar problems in mind, Teresa de Lauretis argues in her book 
Technologies of Gender (1987) that Foucault’s gender blindness is manifest in his 
insistence that sexuality and power are coextensive. For to deny gender in the 
analysis of this “coextension,” she insists, is to deny the social relations of gender 
that validate and constitute the sexual oppression of women – and to retain an 
‘ideology’ that is manifestly self-serving to the male-gendered subject (de 
Lauretis 1987, 15; Thornton 1991, 186.) 
 
Foucault was not unaware of these problems. He explicates in the second part of 
his history of sexuality (L’usage des plaisirs 1984) how the masculine character 
and structure of ancient moderation and ethics echoes the views of Aristotle, who 
explicitly rejected the Socratic argument for a basic unity of virtue that implied 
that virtue was identical in men and women.  
 
As Foucault points out, Aristotle only focused on the masculine male virtues, and 
ignored those that were exclusively feminine. Thus, in Aristotle’s view, for the 
relationship between men and women to be in good order, both partners must 
have a share in the same virtues, although both sexes possess them in their own 
specific ways. The one who is ruling, i.e., the man, possesses moral goodness in 
its full and perfect form, while the ruled, including women, need only have moral 
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goodness to the extent required of them (as not-free and not-citizens). So 
conceived, man as a ruler embodies moderation and courage as full virtues, while 
in women these virtues merely serve other virtues. As a result, as Foucault aptly 
notes “the man stands both as a complete and finished model of these virtues and 
as that principle motivating their practice.” (UP 84.)155 
 
Hence, Foucault concludes, the Greeks gave moderation an essentially masculine 
structure, which meant that immoderation must necessarily imply something else. 
As his analysis evidences, this negative other (my term) was connected by Greek 
male thinkers to the feminine characteristics of an individual, be they present in 
the male or the female body. Therefore, to be moderate and available for active 
aesthetic self-creation and ethics demands one to be male and masculine, while 
being feminine or a woman means being passive, weak and immoderate, and in a 
state of non-resistance with regard to the force of pleasure.  
 
With this division in mind, Foucault remarks that being feminine or a woman 
“meant being incapable of that virile stance with respect to oneself that enabled 
one to be stronger than oneself. In this sense, the man of pleasures and desires, the 
man of non-mastery (akrasia) or self-indulgence (akolasia) was a man who could 
be called feminine, but more essentially with respect to himself than with respect 
to others.” (UP 84-85.)156 So defined, femininity and government of the self (and, 
along with it, aesthetics of the self) are defined as opposite characteristics. 
 
Yet, despite the fact that Foucault registers some of the ambivalences of Classical 
representations of women, Diprose accuses him of not really attempting to analyse 
their significance or structural importance for his own understanding of the 
expressions freedom and self-government. Moreover, she argues that his premise 
that the Greeks were primarily interested in passivity and activity, and not in 
masculinity and femininity, is also problematic, because Greek males associated 
passivity so strongly with women and femininity that these two terms cannot be 
separated from each other.  
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Passivity and femininity are, in other words, two sides of the same coin, binary 
opposites to the terms masculinity and activity – opposites that both produce and 
maintain each other. They are irretrievably linked in patriarchal societies, which 
use the negative female value to produce the positive value of being male (or 
masculine). Therefore, as McNay, in turn, observes, “At points the artificial 
separation Foucault tries to maintain between femininity and passivity breaks 
down and the two categories are shown to be imbricated in each other” (McNay 
1992, 78). 
 
According to McNay’s evaluation, for Foucault to remain at the very basic level 
of gender analysis and to be content with asserting that women did not figure in 
the exclusive domination of the virile model is to remain at a rather banal level of 
analysis, given that the value and importance of masculinity only gains 
significance in relation to the lack of femininity. In addressing this problem, 
McNay concludes that this blind spot of Foucault’s is even more remarkable given 
“that most of his previous works – most notably Madness and Civilization – have 
been dedicated to demonstrating how domination is achieved through the 
constitution of a marginalized and inferior ‘other’” (ibid. 79).  
 
In a similar vein, Diprose accuses Foucault of re-creating a model of self-mastery 
and ethics, which depends upon a struggle to subordinate the feminine 
characteristic of immoderation to the male body and self, and which (unlike the 
female body and self) also becomes a locus of artistic creation. Again, the 
problem is, first of all, in the exclusion of the female or feminine other from the 
domain of active subjectivity. With these notions in mind, the criticisms of 
Diprose and McNay suggest that the shutting away of women from the domain of 
aesthetic (and ethical) self-creation in Foucault is not necessarily mere omission, 
but could be seen as a structural necessity. (Diprose 1994, 30.)  
 
Following similar critical lines, Mariam Fraser goes on to suggest that the 
exclusion of women from the aesthetics of the self is repeated in Foucault, who 
prioritises care of the self over care of others. As a result, she finds that Foucault 
maintains “the relation with the self over and above relations with others or any 
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intersubjective – or indeed non-subjective – experience.” (Fraser 1997, 30.) 
McNay argues, in much the same spirit, that the most problematic aspect of 
Foucault’s aesthetics of the self is its disengaged and undialectical character, 
which she sees to conflict with recent feminist attempts to understand more fully 
the intersubjective dimension of social relations. In her view, Foucault did not 
want “to relinquish some notion of political engagement in favour of an uncritical, 
extreme particularism.” (McNay 1992, 163.) She suggests, therefore, that he fails 
to explain how “the potential uncovered in the exploration of identity can be 
communicated to others in order to initiate progressive change at the level of the 
group, community or class” (ibid. 165). 
 
In my view, these feminist critiques of Foucault’s late aesthetics are to some 
extent justified, but rather too polarized (I will return to this latter aspect a little 
later). For it is true that in his late aesthetics, too, he mainly ignores the question 
of the feminine and female other, and concentrates once again on idealizing 
traditions of transgressive aesthetics that are clearly gendered and that associate 
aesthetic subjectivity with masculine values and self-images.  
 
Consequently, Foucault never properly considers the question of what not-male-
centred versions of aesthetics of the self might be like. Furthermore, he also 
ignores the fact that women’s problems have been very different in questions 
concerning aesthetic self-creation, as well as in their experiences of individual 
sexual selves and pleasures. Perhaps partly as a result of this, he excludes from 
consideration all those alternative texts that present women’s viewpoints on erotic 
relations and “styles of loving,” such as the one presented by Sappho, the ancient 
Greek poet (Greene 1995 and 1996; Benjamin 1988; Richlin 1991; Skinner 1993; 
Williams 1995; Snyder 1997).157  
 
Due to these problems, it seems justifiable to say that Foucault’s theorizations of 
the aesthetics of the self clearly remain in the tradition of male-centred thinking. 
Moreover, the exclusion of women as positive active agents from the domain of 
aesthetics and active self-government seems, indeed, to have had some structural 
importance in his thinking: despite the fact that he recognizes the oppositional 
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character of the terms ‘feminine’ and ‘masculine,’ he never really tries to 
deconstruct this binary opposition, but repeats it through a rather traditional 
(masculine) definition of individual self-government – and clearly to the benefit 
of masculinity.  
 
In my view, it is specifically here that we must interrupt and disturb Foucault’s 
theorizations and add to his agenda at least some traits of the historical female 
voices that are kept silent in his inquiries. As I will illustrate next, this also seems 
to be true of his analyses of modern aesthetics of the self, which similarly focus 
on male experiences of limit-attitudes and aesthetic subjection. 
 
 
Culte de moi and the Question of Gender 
 
Similar problems in terms of gender to those I mentioned above in Foucault’s 
reading of the ancient texts recurs in his essay on the Enlightenment, in which he 
connects the ancient theme of the aesthetics of the self to Kant’s and Baudelaire’s 
notions of modernity. Allow me to elaborate, therefore, a little further on this 
critical journey beyond Foucault’s insights by showing that his analyses of 
Baudelairean dandyism and Kantian Enlightenment are also in need of some re-
thinking when considered in the light of feminist studies. 
 
As I have shown, Baudelaire came to represent for Foucault some sort of idealized 
aesthetic male icon – an icon representing modern attitudes and the active 
individual (dandy) who attempts to turn his life into a site of art. Foucault 
considers dandyism, in brief, an example of a specifically modern attitude (culte 
de moi), which is characterized by the willingness to make one’s body, behavior, 
passions and existence a work of art. Like his earlier interest in avant-garde 
literature, in which Foucault turned toward mad male thinkers and mad male 
artists, his late interest in arts of living was also restricted to transgressive male 
figures and their sexual liberation. Women, as well as their art, are, again, 
excluded totally from Foucault’s insights on transgressive aesthetics. 
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In my view, the lack of female examples is not the most serious problem in 
Foucault’s account, however. I contend that what is even more problematic is the 
fact that he misses or actively ignores the fact that for Baudelaire a dandy is by 
definition the opposite of a woman. In other words, just as in ancient theories of 
the self, in which femininity and self-government are largely taken as opposite 
conceptions, in Baudelaire there is a deep structural opposition between women 
and dandies, and the two cannot be brought together within his theoretical order 
(Wolff 1985 and Pollock 1990, 70-71). In my view, this is well evidenced in his 
early definition of a dandy, which places a strict opposition between the terms 
‘dandy’ (artificial, pure beauty) and ‘woman’ (something natural and sexually 
uncontrolled). In Baudelaire’s own words: 
 
A woman is the opposite of dandy. Therefore, she is horrible. A woman is 
hungry and she wants to eat, she’s thirsty and wants to drink. She is in heat 
and wants to be fucked. […] A woman is natural, that is, she is disgusting 
[abominable]. Therefore, she is always vulgar… (Baudelaire, cit. in Kempf 
1997, 69, translation mine.)158  
 
For Baudelaire, women’s sexuality represented something questionable and even 
horrifying, which he, just like the Greek male thinkers read by Foucault, rather 
associated with immoderation and the drive for instant pleasure than with 
individual self-government (without which, as we have seen, there is no need for 
the aesth/ethical training of one’s self). Moreover, Baudelaire differentiated the 
aesthetic enjoyment men might feel when observing women from what they feel 
when the observing the aesthetic appearance of dandies. In his view, the female 
body is aesthetically imperfect by nature and thus it cannot, cause pure aesthetic 
enjoyment, as perfect male bodies do (Baudelaire 1999, 540). In short, for 
Baudelaire, the word ‘dandy’ implied beauty and high intelligence at the same 
time, while female beauty was fragile, decorative and part of a whole that is 
“stupide peut-être” (possibly stupid) (ibid. 513, 539).  
 
Furthermore, what Baudelaire’s texts show is that it is his text itself that constructs 
the notion of woman across the fictive map of urban spaces, in other words, the 
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spaces of modernity (Pollock 1990, 72). As a result of this productive imagining 
of the sign ’woman,’ women are excluded from the category of active aesthetic 
subjects and are suppressed by the logic of the same (male rationality). In other 
words, female otherness, not to mention alternative forms of women’s lives and 
loves, is not appreciated or even recognized as a positive value in Baudelaire’s 
male-centred modernity.  
 
Perhaps partly due to this, Baudelaire does not appreciate at all the androgynous 
character of dandies as characteristic of women. Quite the contrary: he refers to 
the well-dressed female dandies of Parisian cafés as manifestations of “Narcissism 
and stupidity,” despising their modern aesthetic appearance.159 The strict 
structural opposition between a woman and a dandy is also manifest in his 
statement that female dandies do not exist because women who dress and act like 
dandies “do not think,” nor do they contemplate the crowds and city streets in the 
ways in which a “true flâneur” does. This is, in fact, all he has to say about the 
transgressive aesthetics of the self of his female contemporaries! 
 
As Griselda Pollock points out, Baudelaire’s texts on dandyism are marked by an 
opposition between the home and the outside space of freedom in which there is 
liberty to look without being watched or even recognized in the act of looking. 
This space is the imagined freedom of the voyeur, of the flâneur/dandy/modern 
artist. (Pollock 1990, 70-71.) However, as Janet Wolff argues, this space is clearly 
reserved for male agents. Hence, there is no female equivalent of the masculine 
figure of the flâneur/dandy – or, perhaps better, there is not and could not be a 
female flâneuse (Wolff 1985). 
 
Throughout his writings, Baudelaire also repeats a common presupposition of his 
era concerning the oppositional nature of women and intelligence. As Frédéric 
Monneyron comments, mid nineteenth-century aesthetic misogyny in France 
reflected, in this respect, the conceptions of women developed by eighteenth 
century philosophers such as Arthur Schopenhauer, Immanuel Kant and Edmund 
Burke (Monneyron 1993, 200). Reduced to the roles of mothers, wives, mistresses 
and passive aesthetic objects, women found that their only available tasks were to 
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please the male eye, to love men and to take care of their children. Being 
introduced as belonging to the uncontrolled nature that modern enlightened men 
are to overcome, women remain victims of the dualism of enlightenment thinking 
– in other words, they are not included in the program of individual liberation, but 
are positioned on the reverse side of the process of enlightenment.  
 
Sigfried Weigel crystallizes this problem in her Body- and Image-Space (1996) in 
the following words, which are worth citing in full: 
 
[W]hen it comes to [...] women’s desire for a subject position, and to a 
speaking position located as it were on the reverse side of enlightenment, it 
soon becomes tangible how the dialectic is then set into motion in such a 
way that it is not easy to gain a secure foothold. For women cannot simply 
be turned into, or declared to be, the obverse. Any attempt to make up lost 
ground in terms of the self-realization hitherto denied her or to reduce the 
male subject’s head start in the process of enlightenment would have far 
more serious consequences for women than the detrimental effects of 
progress as attested by and for man. Whereas for man the process and 
practices of laying claim and subjugating Nature were largely carried out on 
the material and the images of the other, and above all of the other sex, for 
women this work on the process of civilization would affect what is her 
own: mater-materia, the mastering and rationalization of which is the prime 
goal of the preservation of selfhood; the woman’s body as the skandalon of 
a rationally oriented history. The sacrificial structure of the history of the 
enlightenment not only repeats itself more corporeally and closer to the 
bone, as it were, in the female subject, but women at the same time also 
have a share in both the reverse and the observe sides. (Weigel 1996, 67-
68.) 
 
As a result of this repressive logic, the female variant of the dialectic of 
enlightenment (in addition to Reason and Other) introduces what might be 
described as a third position. This position is highly unstable, however, due to the 
fact that it must maintain relations with both sides of the dialectic, that is, with 
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both reason and the Other (nature). The position of the female subject is thus far 
more complicated than that of the male. It also introduces a doubly-reversed 
perspective in the sense that the perception and speech of the second sex wishes to 
occupy the position of the first, but it cannot simply shake off its provenance from 
the dark reverse side. The complexity of this constellation also seems to 
constantly elude conceptual articulation. (Ibid. 68.) In this respect, as Weigel 
further observes, what the tradition of enlightenment seems to be in need of is the 
introduction of a polyperspectival and topographical dimension to dialectical 
thinking.  
 
Given the above notions, Foucault’s choosing of Baudelaire, and to some degree, 
Kant as the spokespersons of the experience of modernity is problematic, in that 
this experience is clearly gendered (McNay 1994, 149). Following the traditional 
lines of white male aesthetics of the self, Foucault, just like most of his male 
predecessors, comes to ignore the question of the female other. In my view, one of 
the most serious ethical and political problems in his aesthetics of the self derives 
from this fact. In other words, despite his stress on multiplicity, difference and 
discontinuity, he takes it for granted that his reading of the history of the 
aesthetics of the self is primarily from the free-white-male perspective. Moreover, 
he never practices self-interrogation or offers a critique of the racial, class and 
gender biases in his own theorizing, and consequently various other others also 
remain largely invisible to his thinking.  
 
In this connection, some feminists have commented that the problems inherent in 
Foucault’s degendered or impersonal perspective go beyond simple gender 
blindness. Lois McNay, for example, suggests that his failure to analyse the 
implications of presenting the Baudelairean dandy as the paradigm of modern 
ethics “results in tensions and aporia which undermine Foucault’s explicit 
arguments” (ibid. 150). What she means by this is that 
 
Foucault insists that the starting point for an ethics of the self is a critical 
ontology or politics of location that is as “precise as possible,” that is 
oriented to the “contemporary limits of the necessary.” Yet, having stressed 
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the necessity for a rigorous and detailed form of self-critique, the detail that 
remains significantly unaddressed in Foucault’s own politics of self-location 
is the deflection or identification that permits him to situate a conventional 
and gendered notion of the ‘heroization’ of the self at the centre of a radical 
ethics. (Ibid. 151.) 
 
McNay thus criticizes Foucault for insisting that modern ethics of the self 
embodies some sort of limit-attitude, and yet the frontiers of modern identity are 
clearly located in a figure who belongs to a canon of male avant-garde literature. 
Against this interpretation, she suggests that we could find much more forceful 
and relevant examples of the contemporary exploration of identity from the cases 
of women who are increasingly stepping into social settings in which the only 
available identities are often those offered by dominant, masculine stereotypes. 
(Ibid.; Giddens 1991, 216.) In her view, this also seems to be the case in the 
domain of contemporary critical art, in which the feminist problematizations of 
identity and the self form one of the strongest avant-garde challenges of our own 
time.  
 
In my opinion, the critical comments I have presented above are important 
because they imply that not all philosophically valid practices of the self are 
simply exercises in freedom or critical aesthetics, as Foucault seems to suggest, 
but some might also support the maintenance of gender hierarchies and even 
political practices of exclusion. Therefore, we should not be content with the 
theoretical celebration of individual freedom, but should give special attention to 
various practical limitations individuals might face, depending on their gender, 
ethnicity, class and sexual identity.  
 
With this in mind, I suggest that a critical interrogation of the aesthetics of the self 
demands that we pose the critical question: Whose body and self is it that is free to 
change its aesthetic appearance at will and to affect others through this self-
creation? Alternatively: Whose aesthetics of the self is taken in each theory as 
presenting an ideal case? Is this self gendered? Does it belong to some specific 
class and ethnicity? This sort of pluralizing (and politicising) of the theory of 
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aesthetics of the self is crucial, I maintain, because without it we are in danger of 
romanticizing our ideals of the aesthetics of the self, and of ignoring its potentially 
oppressive aspects. 
 
With the same sort of critique in mind, a variety of theorists have resorted to 
criticism of Foucault’s late aesthetics of the self in terms of his “retreat to 
aesthetics.” Moreover, his aesth/ethical insights have also been criticized for the 
lack of normative standards for moral action. In the two following sections I react 
to these last critical sets of arguments before moving on to an analysis of the 
advantages of Foucault’s late theorizations for feminism. 
 
 
The Retreat to Aesthetics 
 
Foucault’s theorizations of the aesthetics of the self have also been an object of 
heated criticism outside the feminist circles. Many of these critics have 
acknowledged the aestheticist tone underlying Foucault’s idea of the care of the 
self. Richard Wolin (1986), for example, assigns Foucault’s work of addressing 
aesthetics a utopian critical function, which, in his view, may at best lead to the 
imaginative creation of new realities “by offering alternative, powerful views to 
the present and possibilities to exist otherwise” (Wolin 1986, 85). However, he 
feels strongly that the aesthetic realm should not be differentiated from other 
realms, such as the ethical and the cognitive, if attitudes to creative aesthetic 
practices are not to remain merely abstract or elitist.  
 
The problem in Foucault’s account, according to Wolin, is that aesthetic action 
per se is prioritised over the validity of the action. What he means, in more 
concrete terms, is that Foucault endorses the adoption of any kind of non-
conventional subject position, rather than trying to specify what subject positions 
should be adopted. As a result, Wolin argues, he ends up with a decisionist 
position, according to which the only criterion for an individual’s action is that 
acts have to be performed tastefully; with due respect for “stylistic concerns 
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which elevate such actions above the mundane actions of the vulgar ‘many’” 
(ibid. 84).  
 
With these critical remarks, Wolin concludes that Foucault’s aesthetics of the self 
introduces no difference between manipulative practices of the self that are 
predatory in relation to others, and practices that attempt to break down what 
Foucault regards as oppressive forms of identity. Hence, Wolin claims that 
Foucault’s ethical approach is no more than an aesthetic game of one-upmanship, 
totally lacking in any kind of collective politics. Foucault’s standpoint favours, in 
Wolin’s view, “either an attitude of narcissistic self-absorption or one of 
outwardly directed, aggressive self-aggrandizement” (ibid. 85). 
 
Charles Taylor (1989) concentrates instead on demonstrating how the modern 
sense of the self, to which Foucault’s ideas are also tied, is structurally 
underpinned by an aesthetic expressionism that has its roots in the Romantic 
epoch. By expressionism Taylor means here the late-eighteenth-century idea that 
all individuals are different and original, and this originality determines how they 
ought to live. Along with romantic, expressive view of human life there also arose 
a new understanding of art, which was seen as the activity through which 
expression of the self was achieved. This shift in the focus of aesthetic theory led 
to a concentration on the idea of expression instead of imitation or mimesis.  
 
From his analysis of this historical development Taylor then goes on to explicate 
how the Romantic notion of aesthetic expressionism is still central to the modern 
understanding of identity, although in thinkers such as Baudelaire and Nietzsche, 
the emphasis shifted from concentration on the relation between nature and the 
self to a more reflexive stress on the self’s relation to itself. Even the most anti-
subjectivist modernist positions share, and indeed accentuate, the Romantic 
emphasis on the poet or artist as an ideal paradigm of being human. (Taylor, 1989, 
most notably 461-462, 481.) 
 
If we consider Foucault’s aesthetics of the self as part of the specifically modern 
tradition of understanding the self as Taylor, for example, does, it is, in my view, 
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somewhat problematic to accuse him of simple elitist aestheticism. Referring to 
this, Lois McNay comments that it may be more interesting to view his work “as 
yet another variation of the Romantic/modernist quest to retrieve a more intense 
or worthwhile form of experience which escapes the deadening effects of the 
instrumental rationality which pervades contemporary culture” (McNay 1992, 
161). McNay also points out that Wolin’s criticizing of Foucault for irrationalist 
decisionism is rather superficial, if not misleading and suggests that a close 
reading of Foucault’s texts soon reveals that his relation to Enlightenment thought 
(as well as to ethics and politics, I would add) is much more complex than Wolin 
is prepared to admit.  
 
Moreover, Foucault’s prioritising of aesthetics as a realm of critical contemporary 
action could be seen as the continuation of a tradition of critical modern thinking. 
This tradition runs from Nietzsche’s emphasis on the process of creative 
destruction in order to affirm the self in a fragmented world, through Simmel, 
who stressed the notion of the stylisation of life in order to break free from the 
homogenizing tendencies of modern culture, and through Adorno and his focus on 
the potentiality of the modernist work of art to transcend the commodifying forces 
that have come to dominate modern mass culture, to John Dewey’s and Richard 
Shusterman’s intergration of art and life. (McNay 1992, 160.) In the context of 
this tradition, it is my contention that Foucault’s drawing on the notion of 
aesthetic self-creation could also be seen as an attempt to rethink the subject as a 
site of ethical (and political) action that escapes the utilitarian logic and 
instrumental rationality that structures contemporary social experience.  
 
Seen in this context, it could be argued, in response to all those who accuse 
Foucault of simple elitism or irrational descisionism, that in his late aesthetics of 
the self, the creation of one’s self as a transgressive work of art is not meant to 
represent a gesture of withdrawal, or elitist aestheticism, but rather emphasizes the 
fact that everyone’s life and identity always involve a process of self-creation and 
are open to re-creation and change. Therefore, I maintain that it is not completely 
justified to insist that the aesthetic element in his ethics of the self simply 
represents a turning into some sort of narcissist aestheticism. For it could also be 
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seen as an attempt to free moral imagination from the mere repeating of existing 
norms and laws, and to establish new experimental ways of existing. From this 
perspective, Foucault’s aesthetics of the self aims to activate a critical utopianism, 
which carries a clear promise of the possibility of change (or at least the promise 
of multiple local changes). (McNay 1994, 147-148.) As I see it, this idea is crucial 
to all current feminist viewpoints on women’s critical aesthetics of the self. 
 
In my view, another aspect that should not be ignored is that in many respects, 
Foucault’s position is close to that of the radical avant-garde art of the 19th and 
20th centuries, which also attempted to overcome the differentiation between art 
and life in capitalist societies by turning the life of an individual into a 
transgressive art of living (I am thinking here of Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Dadaism, 
early surrealism, parts of Russian avant-garde, International Situationists and 
Joseph Beuys, for example). In this context, I believe that we have to 
acknowledge that Foucault’s aesthetics is not grounded on Kantian ideas of pure 
and disinterested aesthetics, or on aesthetic decisionism, as Wolin suggests. 
Rather, throughout his oeuvre, he attempted to continue the tradition of critical 
aesthetics and political avant-garde art, which, since the early 19th century, has 
sought to connect aesthetic values with ethical and political values, and to turn the 
life of an individual into a site of radical art.160  
 
One more criticism of Foucault’s late aesthetics that is worth taking up here – at 
least to which I wish to react in this study – concerns his apparent lack of 
normative standards for moral action. This aspect has been addressed most 
forcefully by Jürgen Habermas, who has accused Foucault of a lack of normative 
grounding in his analyses (Habermas 1987).  
 
With Habermas’s evaluations in mind, Lois McNay goes on to argue in her book 
Foucault and Feminism. Power, Gender and the Self (1992), that, in order to 
respect others and difference concretely, that is, in order to incorporate the ideas 
of the other and difference into the feminist political program and also to respect 
differences in the theory of the aesthetics of the self, it is necessary to work within 
some normative framework (McNay 1992, 156). Because her book is one of the 
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few existing broader feminist attempts to “move beyond” Foucault’s aesthetics of 
the self, I will summarize her main ideas here, despite my disagreement with her. 
 
 
McNay’s Normative Solution 
 
The most intense criticism that McNay directs at Foucault’s late work concerns 
the lack of normative criteria in his ethics of the self. She begins her critique by 
labelling Foucault a postmodern thinker because of some parallels between his 
thought and that of Lyotard. Attacking the whole postmodern debate (which she 
interprets quite superficially), she argues against Foucault’s and Lyotard’s 
pluralizing of truths, moralities and reasons, claiming that “feminist critique 
necessarily rests on normative judgements about what constitutes legitimate and 
non-legitimate forms of action in relation to the political goal of overcoming the 
subordination of women.” (McNay 1992, 117.) This is so because feminists 
cannot, in her view, “afford to sacrifice such validity judgements for the more 
relativist position of performative or local justification espoused by postmodern 
theorists” (ibid.). She then turns to Habermas’s discourse ethics, which, she 
believes, succeeds in providing the basis for feminist politics that combines 
respect for difference with ideas of solidarity and collective political aims.  
 
In a nutshell, Habermas’ normative discourse ethics is grounded on the 
supposition that social norms are legitimated if they are or could have been the 
product of a reasoned conversation achieved under certain idealized conditions 
that Habermas calls an “ideal speech situation” (Habermas 1990). As his 
“discourse principle” is meant to illustrate, discourse ethics is a proceduralist 
account of moral rightness. It is his belief that only the norms that meet (or could 
meet) with the approval of all participants in practical discourse can claim to be 
morally valid (ibid. 66).  
 
Habermas argues, moreover, that if this common approval of a moral norm is to 
be taken as belonging to a process that participants can regard as rational, the 
process must meet certain conditions. These conditions turn out to be rather 
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demanding when they are examined and include unlimited time, freedom from 
oppression, and the availability of all relevant information.161 According to 
Habermas, they are not, however, externally imposed criteria developed by the 
moral theorist, but are to be found within the attitudes of the participants 
themselves. This is so, he argues, because in order for participants to be able to 
think of the justificatory process as good enough for what they agree counts as 
fully valid, they must believe that each of them has met these conditions. They 
may discover, of course, that the conditions do not hold, but this does not lessen 
their critical potential. (Habermas 1999, 298.)  
 
In Habermas’s view, truth is also defined essentially in terms of this sort of 
rational consensus. So conceived, it means, first of all, the promise to attain a 
rational consensus of what counts as “true.” Moreover, Habermas links his notion 
of rational consensus with emancipatory critique, stating that emancipatory 
critique is governed by the supposition that rational consensus between individual 
participants can be achieved not only with regard to some problematic truth 
claims but also with regard to problematic norms. (McNay 1992, 183.) If this is 
applied to the feminist concept, it suggests that women’s emancipation should 
also be sought from the rational consensus between different groups of women, 
rather than in the acceptance (or “celebration”) of their differences. 
 
What McNay finds valuable in Habermas’s account is that he models social 
relations along the lines of rational interaction and intersubjectivity, rather than 
basing his ethics (like Foucault) on the idea of individual “solitary activity.” It is, 
in her view, in this contradiction that Habermas offers a way of “conceiving of a 
politics of difference which does not necessarily slide into an atomized politics, an 
attitude of laissez-faire or a simplistic celebration of difference qua difference” 
(ibid. 181.) McNay suggests that there is in Habermas’s ethics the suggestion of a 
theory of communicative action, which posits the political aim of “establishing a 
community based on the tolerance and protection of individual and group 
differences” (ibid.).  
 
  
 
 
 
 
188
Ignoring totally the fact that Foucault’s notion of care also implies care of the 
other, as I have shown earlier in this study, as well as the fact that he also sought 
some systematic political forces (as I suggested in connection with his work on 
homosexuality, for example), McNay simply reduces Foucault’s aesthetics of the 
self back to some sort of rough relativism or extreme subjectivism or, as she 
expresses it herself, “simplistic celebration of difference qua difference.” Yet, her 
legitimation of this sort of interpretation remains extremely contradictory (she 
praises Foucault at the same time for offering better tools for coping with 
individual existence than Habermas, for example). Moreover, I maintain that her 
way of solving the problems of Foucault’s ethics comes undone when it is 
examined more closely. I will explicate briefly what I mean by this statement. 
 
Despite his stress on the importance of the autonomous use of reason in different 
groups and individuals, Habermas’s discourse ethics is largely grounded on the 
idea of commonly-valid reason, the application of which will lead individuals to 
understand each other and to communicate successfully with each other. My 
argument is that this sort of viewpoint, notably when it is taken as the basis for a 
theory of ethics, runs counter to many of Foucault’s aims and also threatens to 
destroy what I find ethically (as well as politically) valuable in his account. This is 
so, I contend, because Habermas’s account denies the existence of multiple 
reasons or different reasons by suggesting that, in idealized speech situations, all 
participants will end up drawing similar conclusions if they use their reason 
autonomously (in this respect, Habermas is a Kantian thinker).  
 
Secondly, I suggest that, partly as a result of this, Habermas’ theory of 
communication does away with notions of the ‘other’ and ‘difference’ rather than 
preserves them. For if these notions are conceived of as something that can be 
fully understood, the otherness of the other is not actually allowed to exist but is 
rather taken as some sort of intellectual obstacle that should be removed by using 
tools of common reason. Alternatively, and perhaps better, the existence of the 
other in communication is taken as a metaphor for the immature stance of 
communication, that is, as something that has to be overcome in the process of 
emancipation.  
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By pluralizing reason and truth, Foucault, in my view, attempts to strengthen this 
very ethical dimension of intersubjectivity and communication. This is not to say, 
for sure, that his ethical theory is perfect (I’m thinking here of his gender-
blindness, for example). What I wish to stress against McNay, however, is that the 
tendency to develop the ethical relation of the self to otherness and not-me is 
clearly present in Foucault’s thought. Therefore Foucault, in contrast to 
Habermas, stresses that we must re-write our notion of reason so as to offer space 
for the fact that, in fact, “reason is self-created, which is why I have tried to 
analyze forms of rationality: different foundations, different creations, different 
modifications in which rationalities engender one another, oppose and pursue one 
another” (SPS 443).162  
 
For Foucault, in other words, there is not just one common reason that makes 
communication possible, and which should overcome the communicative problem 
of the other. Rather, there is an endless number of different reasons and 
reasonings, one example of which is the techniques of the self in Greek and 
Roman antiquity. In my view, this supports the idea that there is also a 
multiplicity of individual lifestyles, or aesthetics of the selves, the ethical traits of 
which cannot be reduced back to the logic of the same, or explained in terms of 
one single rationality. 
 
Therefore, when interpreting the aesthetic techniques of the self, Foucault does 
not even try to offer us a coherent and universally valid ethical theory, which 
McNay seems to be in need of. Rather, he attempts, first of all, to construct a 
genealogy of problems, or problematizations, which is meant to show not that 
everything is bad (mauvais), but that everything is dangerous, as Foucault himself 
comments in his essay on ethics (GE 231). This does not mean, however, that 
Foucault’s emphasizing of individuality is a sign of ethical irresponsibility or 
irresponsible relativism, or that it simply ignores the notion of the other, as 
McNay suggests. On the contrary, I argue that he emphasizes pluralist 
individuality precisely for ethical reasons, in his very resistance to the tendency to 
ignore the existence of individual differences and otherness.  
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Why, then, does Foucault end up stressing the importance of difference rather 
than intersubjective communication or the prioritising of the other? I suggest that 
the reason may lie in his practical supposition that opposition to normalizing and 
oppressive state power grows in an important sense from individuals, that is, from 
attempts to shape one’s way of existing and relating, as well as from associating 
one’s self with the critical interrogation of the cultural limits imposed on our 
subjectivity. So conceived, the quest for individual freedom and aesthetics of the 
self legitimately turns into a question of creating new forms of subjectivity that 
may function as sites of resistance, at both the individual and collective levels, 
stretching the limits of what our selves and existences might entail. (Oksala 2002, 
229.) In my view, this account does not run counter to demands to respect the 
other, but rather supports them on both ethical and political levels.  
 
The problem with McNay’s solution is, in short, that she wishes to create space 
for differences and, at the same time, to offer a universally valid normative ethical 
theory. It is, of course, true that “consensus” does not necessarily entail 
“sameness” of viewpoint, and it can also be a function of setting aside differences 
without eliminating them. I maintain, however, that McNay does not succeed in 
this too well, because in her aim to create a universally valid ethical theory, 
somewhat ironically, she tends to reduce all differences back to the rationality of 
the same. Moreover, in accusing Foucault of extreme particularism and 
subjectivism, she ignores the fact that his position is not simply subjectivist, 
irrationalist, or non-ethical simply because he stresses the multiplicity of 
rationalities and truths. Rather, as I have already suggested, care of the self can 
also be seen as implying care for others, given that this care is practised in the 
name of freedom.  
 
What should be noted, moreover, is that the idea of freedom of individual choice 
does not actually imply the freedom of acts in Foucault’s work. Rather, as he 
comments in a late interview, freedom is a choice made in the name of freedom 
(note, again, his Sartrean tone of voice). In other words, we are free to choose, but 
this does not mean that we are free to act against other individuals as we like. In 
his own words: 
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I say freedom of sexual choice and not freedom of sexual acts because there 
are sexual acts like rape which should not be permitted whether they involve 
a man and a woman or two men. I don’t think we should have as our 
objective some sort of absolute freedom or total liberty of sexual action. 
However, where freedom of sexual choice is concerned one has to be 
absolutely intransigent. This includes the liberty of expression of that 
choice. By this I mean the liberty to manifest that choice or not to manifest 
it. (SC 289.)163 
 
It may be true that, in his aesthetic inquiries of the self, Foucault does not provide 
a coherent theory of ethics. Yet, I maintain that this does not lessen the ethical (or 
political) strength of his writings. The usefulness of Foucault’s late insights for 
feminism lies mainly in his way of looking at our theories of the self and society, 
and in his attempt to re-evaluate them, in “freeing up possibilities for new forms 
of experience that might lead to a different understanding of theory, of ourselves, 
of reality,” as Jana Sawicki puts it (Sawicki 1991, 11).  
 
What this means, in practice, is that what I find valuable in Foucault’s late 
theorizations is, first of all, that he is not willing to reduce his views according to 
some normative principle, but attempts to encourage philosophers to cope with 
difference in ways that do not reduce them back to the same (common reason, 
cogito, rational consensus). This effort is valuable, I maintain, not only because it 
shows respect for differences and others, but also because only in this way is it 
possible to truly point beyond existing alternatives in questions concerning the 
issue of the self, not least in terms of sexual freedom and gender. 
 
As the above comments suggest, there are some evident strengths in Foucault’s 
late theorizations of the aesthetic subject, also for feminist ends. I therefore wish 
to emphasize that, when analysing Foucault’s late writings, acknowledging the 
weaknesses of his account is not enough, especially if we are to move beyond the 
polarized and simplifying analyses of his work. With the same sort of idea in 
mind, Jana Sawicki notes that  
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In the ‘final’ analysis, proof of the value of using Foucault for feminism will 
be in the puddings, that is, in the practical implications that adopting his 
methods and insights will have. Attending to the exigencies of feminist 
practice will sometimes require that we either ignore Foucault or move 
beyond him. A Foucauldian feminism would require no less. (Sawicki 1991, 
109.)  
 
Allow me therefore to make my own contribution to this “moving beyond 
Foucault” by further developing some aspects of his late thinking which seem to 
benefit feminist theorizations of the subject. 
 
 
The Advantages of Foucault’s Late Aesthetics for Feminism 
 
There are five main points in my analysis of the advantages of Foucault’s late 
aesthetics for feminist theorizations of the subject. Firstly, I maintain that his idea 
of the subject’s active self-creation, based on the problematization of 
straightforward causal connections between individual practices and either social 
or natural determinants, brings his insights closer to the non-reductive analysis of 
women’s status and identities proposed in recent post-feminist theory. This 
emphasis is important and also practically useful for feminist ends, I suggest, 
because it implies that, although there are structures of domination, notably 
constructions of gender, which ensure the overall subordinate position of women 
in society, in their daily lives many women do not find themselves oppressed, but 
rather experience that they exercise an amount of power and influence over other 
individuals and themselves (McNay 1992, 66-67).  
 
What this also suggests is that women, as social subjects, do not always fit the 
picture of women as representations. In other words, there is a certain discrepancy 
and slippage between the stereotypical representations of women and women as 
the subjects of real historical relations, of which gender is perhaps the primary but 
not the only relation (McNay 1992, 67-69; de Lauretis 1987, 10). Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to argue that, despite their oppressed position in Western 
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patriarchies (inequalities in power position and wages, prostitution), women also 
use power, and can affect their historical situation and selves in one way or 
another. 
 
In order to grasp this discrepancy between women’s representations and their 
actual stages of everyday life, a number of contemporary feminists have suggested 
that power must be analysed not just as a mechanism of domination, but also from 
the perspective of microphysics of power, including the individual’s possibilities 
of functioning as an active agent in the constitution of the power relations that 
form her/his historical being.  
 
With this in mind, feminist intellectuals have emphasized that, for example, 
women who work in their domestic sphere do not necessarily perceive themselves 
as powerless or as oppressed victims of patriarchy, but might just as well view 
their domestic functions in terms of an alternative system of positive values 
through which they interpret their experiences. Therefore, the argument has been 
that we should not just accept the negative clichés associated with women’s social 
position, in domestic work for example, but we should open up our perspective to 
include the positive and more complex experiences women might have, including 
their experiences of their/our own power (Waerness 1987, 35). 
 
This change in perspective from older feminist ideas of colonized and oppressed 
females – and also from the Foucauldian-influenced feminism that centres on 
normalization, bio-power and docility – toward the notion of the subject as an 
actively acting agent has led many feminists, quite naturally, to stress possibilities 
of resistance, both at the individual and collective levels (possibilities to create 
diverse alliances). At the level of feminist theorization, this has produced new key 
words, such as contestation, intervention and subversion. The Foucauldian post-
feminist, Susan Bordo, terms this shift in feminist theory the postmodern position: 
 
Postmodern feminism [...] criticizes both the “old” discourse and the 
[Foucauldian] reconstruction of it [...] for over-emphasizing [...] control, for 
failing to adequately acknowledge the creative and resistant responses that 
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continually challenge and disrupt it. From this post-modern perspective, 
both the earlier emphasis on “social conditioning” and the later move to 
“normalization” underestimate the unstable nature of subjectivity and the 
creative agency of individuals, “the cultural work” (as one theorist puts it) 
“by which nomadic, fragmented, active subjects confound dominant 
discourse. “Gaps” in that discourse are continually allowing for the eruption 
of “difference,” and even the most subordinated subjects are therefore 
continually confronted with opportunities for resistance, for making 
meanings that “oppose or evade the dominant ideology.” There is power and 
pleasure in this culture, television critic John Fiske insists, “in being 
different.” (Bordo 1994, 235.)  
 
The second advantage of Foucault’s late aesthetics for feminism partly overlaps 
the above notions: it is embedded in his vision that the individual constitution of 
identity might be considered as critical strategy and a way of affirming alternative 
lifestyles. To put it in Foucauldian terms, through the formation of a critical 
ontology of the self, and through the affirmation of one’s personal stylistics of the 
self, it becomes possible to formulate an alternative political (and ethical) 
standpoint from which individuals, male and female alike, can actively resist 
normalizing power and its government of individualization.  
 
In my view, this idea seems at least to benefit feminist theorizations that attempt 
to build up new perspectives on women as political subjects who might cause 
changes in their social position through the creation of alternative identities and 
aesthetic practices of the self. With similar ideas in mind, Mariam Fraser notes 
that “Foucault’s work has enabled feminists both to recognize the individuality of 
the self and also to work against it. Since individuality is itself found to be a 
technique which contributes to the creation of coherent selfhood, it is possible for 
the relation between an individual and its identity to be opened up, and to be made 
available as a site of political contestation.” (Fraser 1997, 24.)  
 
These sorts of ideas to do with women’s active self-government have recently 
been put forward most forcefully in post-feminist gender theorizations, parts of 
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which I have described earlier in this report. Instead of explaining one’s biological 
sex as the foundation of identity and sexual pleasure, post-feminist gender 
theorists have emphasized the role of gender as a strategic play and cultural 
performance that has the power to effect changes too, even in ‘sex’. So conceived, 
the individual’s sexual self is not understood as an innate destiny, but is seen far 
more as an open coalition and a site of political contestation.  
 
The third advantage of Foucault’s late aesthetics is that it pluralizes aesthetic 
resistance and individual “stylistics” of desire, thereby offering space to consider 
the differences among feminisms as a resource rather than a weakness or a threat. 
As I have pointed out, in Foucault’s terms, there need not be a coherent subject of 
sexual politics, nor need there be any essential connection between an individual’s 
sexual practices and one’s gender identity (or its aesthetic performing). Sexual 
identity and the self can rather be understood in terms of the diversity and 
multiplicity of sexual experiences and individual styles.  
 
This notion fits well with Jana Sawicki’s suggestion that Foucault’s work enables 
us to think of difference as a resource rather than a threat. To cite the words of 
Sawicki: “Difference can be a resource insofar as it enables us to multiply the 
sources of resistance to the many relations of domination that circulate through 
the social field.” For, as she continues, if there is no single locus of power, “then 
neither is there a central locus of resistance. Moreover, if we redefine our 
differences, discover new ways of understanding ourselves and each other, then 
our differences are less likely to be used against us.” (Sawicki 1991, 45.) 
 
With similar thoughts in mind, many post-feminist analysts have taken up not 
only the oppression of women as a large group of people, but also the different 
forms of active self-government that women might employ as individuals and as 
specific groups. This stressing of individuality of resistance is extremely 
important, I maintain, because without the concrete study of the specificity of 
each case, women’s activities as autonomous social subjects cannot be properly 
understood, nor can we present (or respect) differences among feminists.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
196
Quite naturally, this sort of pluralist standpoint has paved the way for new visions 
of feminist politics, too. Unlike the foundationalist theories of the subject, which 
assume that common identity (‘woman’) precedes the elaboration of political 
interests, many current gender theorizations view identity and the self as variable 
cultural constructions, which can be practised politically without any stable 
identity. What this also means is that female subjectivity and the self are 
understood as sites of political contestation and individual acts, which might 
create space for multiple transgressive practices of womanhood and hence support 
new models of living and alternative forms of subjection. In other words, female 
subjectivity is perceived as a complexity and site of differences, which demands 
active re-creation and repetition, and therefore remains open to change.  
 
So conceived, the female subject is allowed to have a unique relation not only to 
politics but also to aesthetics, the body, pleasure and sexuality. As a result, many 
feminists have ceased searching for a universal Woman or universally valid 
feminine aesthetics, and emphasize instead the multiplicity of the possibilities 
embedded in one’s being a woman – or, perhaps better, in the aesthetic creating of 
each female self.  
 
The fourth advantage of Foucault’s late aesthetics is embedded in his linking of 
the aesthetic subject with the ethical subject. As I have demonstrated, his late 
notion of care of the self also includes the aspect of the care of others. In my view, 
this ethical aspect is so crucial for Foucault that he even denies the value of 
aesthetic practices of the self that do not carry ethical care of others in their 
structures (as in the California cult of the self, or in the superficial aesthetic 
cultivation of one’s “health” or athletic body). For this reason, I regard feminist 
critics who accuse Foucault of simply prioritising the care of the self over the care 
of others to be too simplistic, if not misleading.  
 
My suggestion is rather that despite the fact that there are some gender problems 
inherent in Foucault’s late aesthetics – problems that we must analyse and 
overcome – his late notion of the self is also of use in feminist attempts to re-write 
the notion of the subject so as to include ethical and political aspects of otherness. 
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Moreover, I propose that the usefulness of his insights is evident in cases such as 
those in which feminists consider gender identity and its aesthetic formation as a 
site of cultural performance and parody, which might express political resistance 
through individual – and sometimes also collective – aesthetic choices 
(manifested in “lesbian chic,” and gender-blending, for example). Therefore, I 
maintain that, in the context of feminist re-considerations of the self and political 
subjectivity, Foucault’s aesthetic insights into the construction of individual 
selfhood also offer a useful set of tools for developing feminist theorizations of 
the aesthetics of the self, be this done in terms of feminist theory or subversive art 
(I will return to this shortly).  
 
Last but not least, I maintain that Foucault’s late aesthetics also strengthens the 
counter-tendencies in philosophical aesthetics that have sought to overcome the 
earlier limitations of “high” (Kantian) aesthetics by including in the notion of 
aesthetic subjectivity the “lower” dimensions of human existence such as 
sexuality, affectiveness, desire, and the body. Due to the fact that it is exactly 
these aspects of subjectivity that have been excluded from philosophical 
mainstream definitions of aesthetic subjectivity (as “feminine” or “female” 
characteristics, in contrast to the idealization of “disinterested” male rationality), it 
is, in an important sense, these very aspects that are also of great use in attempts 
to deconstruct the theoretical tools and methods of aesthetic research to better 
meet the challenges of contemporary feminist thinking and art. 
 
It is with these advantages of Foucault’s late aesthetics in mind that I turn next to 
consideration of the implications of his work for feminist theorizations of the 
aesthetics of the self. 
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9. FEMINIST AESTHETICS OF THE SELF: PLURALIST POLITICS OF PARODY 
 
As I have demonstrated, in his theorizations of the aesthetics of the self, the 
project of turning one’s self or subjectivity into an object of art came to represent 
for Foucault an attempt to liberate the modern individual, to allow him or her to 
exist in ways other than he/she is perhaps “supposed” to exist. With this in mind, 
Foucault suggested that the practices and aesthetic techniques individuals might 
use to reshape their selves are actually practices of freedom that include important 
ethical and political promises of more autonomous ways of living. In this study, I 
have termed this aspect of Foucault’s power analysis his “positive aspect of 
power.”  
 
In the following final sections, I suggest that this positive aspect of Foucault’s 
power analysis parallels contemporary feminist theory in its attempt to reconsider 
the subject in terms of multiplicity, transgression and limit-attitudes. In 
interpreting these connections, I will focus specifically on two current feminist re-
interpretations of the subject, namely, those put forward by Jana Sawicki and 
Judith Butler.  
 
When coming to terms with Foucault’s late aesthetics and the issue of the feminist 
aesthetics of the self, we should, in my view, bear in mind his argument that there 
is no “single locus of resistance” and no “source of all rebellion,” as Foucault 
suggests in the first part of his History of Sexuality. Rather, power is to be 
understood as depending on a multiplicity of points of resistance, which are 
present everywhere in the power network. In my view, this holds true also of the 
feminist aesthetic practices of the self, which should be understood not so much as 
a single locus of great refusal or revolt, but far more in terms of a plurality of 
resistances, each of which is a special case. Thus conceived, feminist aesthetic 
practices of the self are spread over space and time at varying densities and in an 
irregular fashion, sometimes mobilizing groups of individuals in a definitive way, 
and sometimes inflaming certain moments in life, certain points of the body, and 
certain types of behavior, as Foucault’s genealogical analysis of resistance 
suggests. (HS 94-96.)  
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Following much the same lines of thought, Sawicki and Butler proceed to 
reconstruct Foucault’s thinking, not through any universally-valid normative code, 
as in McNay’s case, but far more in his own terms, which in Sawicki’s work are 
used to fit into the terminology of radically pluralist feminism, and in Butler’s 
writings, to the post-feminist theorizations of gender identity. 
 
 
Sawicki’s Radically Pluralist Feminism 
 
In this section, I will introduce the main principles of Jana Sawicki’s 
interpretation of Foucault’s thinking, which functions as an important theoretical 
background in my own understanding of feminist aesthetics of the self. 
Recognizing well the challenge offered by Foucault’s genealogies on the self, 
Sawicki interprets his thinking in terms of “radical pluralism,” rather than as 
relativism, extreme particularism, decisionism, aestheticism, or something that 
should be judged according to normative principles.  
 
What Sawicki means by the expression “radical pluralism” is pluralism that 
differs from so-called liberal pluralism on three points. First, it operates with a 
model of identity that is relational, dynamic and constantly in formation at the 
microlevel of society. In other words, radical pluralism exists only in the 
hierarchical context of power relations. This kind of relational and dynamic notion 
of identity also recognizes plurality both within and between subjects. In this 
respect, it differs from so-called liberal pluralism, which sees political power as 
decentralized and dispersed among competing interest groups that are supposed to 
have a relatively stable identity and to compete on an equal basis for political 
representation and influence. (Sawicki 1991, 8.) 
 
The second point of difference is that radical pluralism operates with an expanded 
sense of the political. What this means is that it also politicizes social and personal 
relationships, which liberal theory tends to overlook. Moreover, it politicizes 
theory. Therefore, it treats theories, first of all, as practices that serve as 
instruments of domination as well as of liberation. In so doing, like Sawicki 
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denotes “it adopts historically inflected categories and attends to the theoretical 
prerequisites for addressing diversity.” Hence, it might also uncover experiences 
of domination that are often overlooked within traditional emancipatory theories. 
With this in mind, she concludes, “One could argue that a political strategy that is 
attentive to differences, to using and bridging them, is vital if we are to build the 
global networks of resistance necessary for resisting global forms of domination.” 
(Sawicki 1991, 9.)  
 
Third, and finally, radical pluralism is distinct from liberal pluralism insofar as it 
challenges hegemonic power structures. For as Sawicki comments, it is “based on 
a form of incrementalism in which the distinction between reform and revolution 
is collapsed” (ibid.). Yet, this incrementalism is not grounded on a narrow 
definition of politics, nor does it deny the need for major structural 
transformation, or the existence of hegemonies based on gender, class, race and 
other forms of domination. It is an incrementalism, which “recognizes 
domination, but also represents the social field as a dynamic, multidimensional set 
of relationships containing possibilities for liberation as well as domination.” 
(Ibid.).  
 
In developing her main ideas of radically pluralist feminism, Sawicki admits to 
having found Foucault’s discourse immensely useful for feminist purposes. The 
key difference between her interpretation and of McNay’s is that, while McNay 
clearly fails in promoting the idea of difference by turning toward the consensus 
of rationality, Sawicki looks for the solution in Foucault’s thinking itself, 
suggesting that his remarks concerning the plurality of resistances and struggles – 
both within and between subjects – could be used to account for the struggles over 
the differences that exist within feminism (ibid. 10). What Sawicki is after, in 
short, is pluralistic feminist politics and theory that do not reduce the different 
experiences of women’s oppression back to common rationality and rational 
consensus, but rather express increased sensitivity to differences among women as 
well, leaving space for the otherness to emerge. As I show in the following, this 
sort of pluralism also offers an interesting basis on which to develop feminist 
politics of difference, as well as radically pluralist aesthetics of the self. 
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The Politics of Difference 
 
Although there has been much dissatisfaction with the postmodern jargon of 
difference during last ten years or so, in my view, the issue is still extremely 
relevant to contemporary feminist thinking. I am not thinking here of the simple 
celebration of difference, but rather of rigorous rethinking through of what “living 
with difference” might entail in practice, both at the intersubjective level and 
within each subjectivity itself. (McRobbie 1993, 129-130 and Mercer 1990.)  
 
In other words, it is my contention that the demand to cope with difference in 
everyday life is still undoubtedly one of the most serious political and ethical 
challenges feminism has to face, both inside its own circles and in relation to non-
feminist realities. Along similar lines, Angela McRobbie calls the contemporary 
tendency to better cope with difference a “necessary inclusion in the new 
intellectual agenda of difference,” which also recognizes the importance of the 
hidden dimensions of subjectivity that modern discourse has not offered a 
legitimate place, in other words, “that of a black woman, that of the mother, the 
daughter, that of the feminist intellectual, the feminist teacher” (ibid. 130). 
 
Bringing to light the practical existence of differences among women could also 
be seen as one of the central tasks of actual feminist aesthetics of the self. In this 
sense, just as Foucault came to see the creation of active practices of the self as an 
aesthetic, ethical and political task, so the feminist constitution of identity should 
not be interpreted as a mere superficial aesthetic stylization of one’s selfhood, 
gender and body. Rather, I suggest that it could be seen as offering possibilities to 
reconstruct identity as a site of political contestation and alternative self-
formation. 
 
The question of difference is not, of course, anything new in feminist theory. On 
the contrary, it has often been conceptualized in the debates on women’s 
differences from men (biological, psychological and cultural), for example. 
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However, in these accounts, the notion of difference has often incorporated the 
idea that there exists some specific form of women’s experience, or women as a 
unified category, distinct from men. Just like many contemporary post-feminist 
thinkers, Sawicki is not content with this solution. Rather, she stresses that the 
cause of conflict in everyday life is also rooted in an important sense in the 
differences among women (class, sexual practices and ethnicity, for example).  
 
In terms of differences among women, it should be emphasized that the notion of 
difference is not simply strength in the feminist theory. For the very existence of 
differences among women forces one to ask: how, in that case, there can be any 
effective form of political action and theory. Who, in other words, could stand up 
and represent the feminist subject and agent of feminist politics if there is no 
longer a common denominator called women?  
 
In pointing out this problem, Sawicki comments, rightly, that difference is not 
necessarily critical or counter-revolutionary, because power sometimes utilizes 
difference to fragment opposition. Just as Foucault argued that difference might 
be the source of resistance and change, but it is also the source of disunity and 
fragmentation, Sawicki goes on to point a picture that emphasizes difference and 
heterogeneity among women, while at the same time trying to create a basis for 
radically pluralist feminist politics.  
 
In Sawicki’s view, the notion of difference is turned into strength in feminist 
politics and theorization only if the practical implication of the plurality of 
women’s problems and identities is implemented in multiple local struggles 
against the many forms of power exerted over women on the everyday level of 
social relations. This raises the question of whether some forms of resistance are 
more effective than others. It is, for her, 
 
a matter of social and historical investigation and not of a priori theoretical 
pronouncement. The basis for determining which alliances are politically 
viable ought not to be an abstract principle of unity, but rather historical and 
contextual analysis of the field of struggle. Thus feminism can mobilize 
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individuals from diverse sites in the social field and thereby use differences 
as a resource. (Ibid. 26.) 
 
So defined, there is no common abstract denominator (‘Woman’) that could be 
used as a promise of women’s reconciliation. Nor is there any coherent 
revolutionary subject (rational woman, for example) whose interests and problems 
intellectuals could represent globally. Rather, there is a social need for specific 
intellectuals who operate, not with universals or global revolutions, but rather 
with local battles, specific groups of people and specific problems (families, 
hospitals, universities, sexual subgroups, social relations, women’s objectivation 
and representation, self-determination, and so forth).  
 
According to Sawicki, emphasizing the importance of specific rather than 
universal intellectuals is connected to the historical evidence that what often looks 
like a change for the better might have undesirable consequences (ibid. 27). 
Therefore, “struggle must never grow complacent. Victories are often overturned; 
changes may take on different faces over time. Discourses and institutions are 
ambiguous and may be utilized for different ends.” (Ibid. 27-28.) 
 
If feminist thinking is to take these notions seriously, it cannot base its criticality 
on the ideas of universal emancipation or mere consensus of reason. The radically 
pluralist viewpoint involves using history in genealogical ways instead, that is, in 
ways which attempt to lend an ear to the marginal and subsumed voices that lie “a 
little beneath history” – the voices of the abnormal, the disempowered, the mad, 
the delinquent, and all sorts of women (ibid. 28). These voices are not ones that 
would lead to mere “atomized politics,” or “an attitude of laissez-faire,” as 
McNay argues. Rather, as Sawicki suggests, they “are the sources of resistance, 
the creative subjects of history” (ibid.). Rather than promoting rational consensus, 
universalism, and the common emancipation of all women, this sort of 
Foucauldian feminism holds a promise of radical pluralism, which locates a 
number of discontinuous and local struggles against different forms of power in 
both the present and the future.  
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Yet, an important and difficult question arises from these critical remarks. 
Namely, if there is no common feminism, and not even common problems among 
women, what, then, is the difference between the radically pluralist point of view 
and aesthetic decisionism, or the anything-goes relativism that some of Foucault’s 
critics accuse him of promoting? Furthermore, does the emphasis on the politics 
of difference offer any reasonable grounds for constructing a feminist theory of 
social transformation – or grounds for constructing critical theorizations of 
feminist aesthetics of the self? 
 
In my view, Sawicki offers a challenging response to these questions in her 
comment that although a politics of difference “does not offer feminists a morality 
derived from a universal theory of oppression, it need not lapse into a form of 
pluralism in which anything goes.” For it is possible to make generalizations on 
the grounds of specific theoretical analyses of particular struggles. Moreover, 
studying these struggles enables individuals to identify patterns in relations of 
power, thereby helping them to identify the “relative effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness, safety or danger of particular practices.” (Sawicki 1991, 32.) 
 
As an example of the dangers one might face when coping with particular 
struggles, Sawicki mentions a series of links that have been drawn between the 
radical feminist strategy of anti-pornography legislation and the New Right’s 
efforts to censor all sorts of sexual practices that, in their view, might pose a threat 
to the heterosexual and patriarchal model of the family. As Sawicki points out, 
acknowledging this danger 
 
is not to suggest that the anti-pornography movement is essentially 
reactionary, but rather that at this time it may be dangerous. Similarly, one 
ought not to assume that there is any necessary connection between 
transgression of sexual taboos and sexual liberation. Denying that 
censorship is the answer to patriarchal sexual oppression is not tantamount 
to endorsing any particular form of transgression as liberatory. (Sawicki 
1991, 32.) 
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Bearing this in mind, we could say that genealogically enlightened pluralist 
feminism also acknowledges of the dangers inherent in the feminist theory itself. 
Instead of purporting to offer a universally valid viewpoint on the problems of all 
women, it stresses the importance of the politics of difference, including different 
views on moral and political judgements, which are all geared to specific contexts 
and problematizations. Yet, at the same time, it may support some wider 
structures of resistance that are often reflected in local struggles. In other words, 
despite their different questions, and different social contexts and solutions, most 
feminisms seem to seek, in one way or another, to effect changes in the patriarchal 
hegemony that tends to reduce women to objects of male desire and ownership, 
and to support their autonomy and rights to self-determination.  
 
In my view, these insights also offer a valid perspective for constructing 
theorizations of feminist aesthetics of the self. In this context, these are formulated 
in terms of radical pluralism rather than universal femininity, common 
womanhood, or unversal rational consensus between different women. Unlike 
McNay’s normative solution, the critical pluralist standpoint does not preclude 
systematic analysis of the present, but rather requires that our categories be 
primarily provisional (Sawicki 1991, 32).  
 
What this means is that it supposes that, if feminists are really to cope with 
differences and also to respect them in practice, they have to cope with the 
uncertainty and stress that arise from the fact that there are unbridgeable 
differences among women and feminist viewpoints; differences which might be 
used either to divide feminist critics, or to enrich feminist politics and aesthetic 
practices of the self. This effort to better cope with difference is extremely 
important for, as Sawicki concludes, “if we are not the ones to give voice to them, 
then history suggests that they will continue to be either misnamed and distorted, 
or simply reduced to silence” (ibid.).  
 
In my opinion, giving space to these misnamed, distorted or silenced subjects of 
history could also be taken as one of the most challenging ethical (as well as 
political) tasks in contemporary feminist theorizations of the aesthetics of the self. 
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For it is my contention that only by developing our reactions to real historical 
differences might we succeed a little better in rethinking the subject in ways that 
enable political subjects to preserve their otherness and to transcend the master-
slave dialectic of recognition (often practised by women themselves, too).  
 
In the following section, I develop this idea a little further by turning once more to 
Judith Butler´s post-feminist gender analysis, which in my view also offers some 
useful tools for “moving beyond Foucault” in questions of the aesthetics of the 
self. 
 
 
Gender Identity as a Site of Political Contestation 
 
In this section, I will suggest that Judith Butler’s much analysed Gender Trouble 
(1990) is also on much the same lines as Foucault’s late aesthetics, although 
Butler herself associates her affiliations with Foucault merely in terms of his 
genealogical period. Reading Butler’s gender theorizations through the lenses of 
Foucault’s late work, rather than merely through his genealogy, I will propose that 
her notions on identity and gender offer one real and challenging basis for 
constructing views on the feminist aesthetics of the self. 
 
As I have shown, one of the most pressing political struggles for Foucault was the 
struggle against forms of subjection, that is, against the regulated and 
stereotypical forms of identity and sexuality that are tolerated in contemporary 
society. I have also argued that it is this very struggle against the government of 
individualization that lies at the heart of his analysis of (modern) aesthetics of the 
self. Once more, in his own words:  
 
T]he political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try 
to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state’s institutions, but 
to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization 
which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity 
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through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on 
us for several decades. (SP 216.)164   
 
In line with Foucault’s analysis, Judith Butler does not consider culturally 
intelligible subjects to be the result of their biological essence or innate self, but 
rather sees them as the resulting effects of a rule-bound discourse (Butler 1990, 
145). Despite her genealogical terminology, Butler’s gender theory offers more 
than a mere genealogy of the subject of feminism: it also represents an attempt to 
elaborate tools for the active undermining and thwarting of the cultural practices 
that limit women’s aesthetic creation of their selves. Just as in Foucault, this 
resistance does not happen outside of the power relations – it is rather a question 
of power being undermined by its own means.  
 
In other words, if it is discourse and representation, for example, that largely 
produce our identities, and even our sexed and bodily experiences, it is also 
discourse and representation that offer the means for opposition. To put it in the 
terminology of aesthetics: if it is through the controlling and normalizing of our 
aesthetic practices of the self that the cultural networks of power tend to limit our 
self-creation and modes of subjection, it is also the undermining of these aesthetic 
practices by aesthetic means that offers us the possibility to make “emancipatory” 
moves away from this controlling power. Butler explains her view in the 
following words:  
 
In a sense, all signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to 
repeat; “agency,” then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation 
of that repetition. If the rules governing signification not only restrict, but 
enable the assertion of alternative domains of cultural intelligibility, i.e., 
new possibilities for gender that contest the rigid codes of hierarchial 
binarisms, then it is only within the practices of repetitive signifying that a 
subversion of identity becomes possible. (Ibid. 145.) 
 
Butler supposes that, in the production of one’s sexual identity, gender is some 
sort of cultural norm and ideal to which one is always somehow related, despite 
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the fact that this norm can be never fully internalized. This negative aspect of self-
governmentality is not all that she has to say on the subject, however. In Gender 
Trouble she suggests some new perspectives on the shaping of gender identity, 
which include both the negative and positive sides of Foucauldian power 
analysis.165 Like late Foucault, she ends up stressing the importance of aesthetics 
in her considerations of the positive aspects of individual empowerment. 
 
In my view, the positive aspect of Butler’s analysis of women’s power is 
crystallized in her notion that the subject is not determined by the cultural rules 
through which it is produced, because “signification is not a founding act, but 
rather a regulated process of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its 
rules precisely through the production of substantializing effects” (Butler 1990, 
145). In other words, the internal core or substance of one’s self is not originally 
given, but is produced and reproduced through a series of acts, gestures and 
desires that project the self on the surface of the body. However, the body, or its 
aesthetic sign language, cannot fully incorporate one’s self. Rather, the self is 
aesthetically performed through the body “through the play of signifying absences 
that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity as a cause.” 
(Ibid. 136.)  
 
In my view, the radicalism of Butler’s re-reading of the notion of the (sexual) 
subject lies mainly in her way of politicising the assumed naturalness of sexual 
identity and appearance, and in showing the artificial and changing nature of 
gender differences. This leads to a rebuttal of the simple alternatives of nature and 
culture, sex and gender. As Diana Elam puts it, for Butler, nature is a sort of retro-
projected illusion of the real origin of culture, yet that illusion is necessary to 
culture, in its very capacity to represent itself. (Elam 1994, 50.)  
 
Moreover, a crucial notion for the work at hand is that if gender is seen as a 
cultural performance and not as a natural fact, it can also be aesthetically re-
created, criticized, transgressed and altered. In Foucauldian terms, it can be re-
made given that we know how it was made. As Butler shows, this is well 
evidenced in all of the parodic cases in which gender identity is turned into 
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explicit imitation and gender performance, such as in the cultural practices of 
drag, cross-dressing and the aesthetic stylisation of butch/femme sexual identities. 
Applying the same idea to artistic terminology, Butler defines gender identity as 
an open “assemblage,” the totality of which is permanently deferred (Butler 1990, 
16).166  
 
Despite the fact that there are some problematic limitations in Butler’s account, 
notably her stressing of the purely linguistic character of identity, her insights are, 
in my view, extremely useful in the contemporary debate on women’s identities 
and critical aesthetics of the self. For if gender identity is considered primarily as 
a cultural practice that demands the repetition of gestures that embody cultural 
meanings (heterosexual woman and gay man, for example), the possibility to 
repeat differently and to construct one’s aesthetic performance of the self in new 
and different ways remains open. With this in mind, Butler places the politics of 
difference not only on the level of intersubjective relations, but also on the level 
of the constitution of the relation to one’s self. So conceived, the critical 
contestation of one’s gendered self has significance for both social reality and the 
individual her-/himself.  
 
Individual style, in this context, comes to represent a name for what individuals 
seek to enhance, nurture or shelter even when they attack sexual regimes. To cite 
the words of the Foucauldian feminist Ladelle McWhorter: “The work of style is 
the artistry with which we live our lives. We can’t just say no to sexual regimes; if 
we want to undermine the regimes of power and knowledge that oppress and 
threaten to dominate us, we have to cultivate a new way of life that stands counter 
to them and eventually that is just other to them. And that is a matter of the 
deliberate cultivation of style.” (McWhorter, 1999, 190.) 
 
Butler’s way of defining gender as a cultural ideal that cannot be fully internalized 
has drawn attention to the demands placed on women through the cultural 
production of their gender. In this context, the idea of the normality of the 
heterosexual identity is also critically re-thought. As Butler points out, it seems 
that no one can completely embody the ideals of the “heterosexual matrix” 
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because one’s injunction to be a given gender necessarily produces failures, which 
disturb the coherence of gender identity in their multiplicity. Moreover, the 
injunction to be a given gender takes place through discursive routes that are not 
always compatible with each other, and that also vary historically.  
 
To give an example: to be at the same time a heterosexually desirable object, a 
good mother, and a fit worker, signifies a multiplicity of demands, which are not 
part of one’s natural or transcendental self but are rather discourses of a 
conflictual cultural field; ambiguous discourses that women have to relate 
themselves to, and that they have to take up in one way or another. (Ibid. 145.) In 
Butler’s own words: “There is no self that is prior to the convergence or who 
maintains “integrity” prior to its entrance into this conflicted cultural field. There 
is only a taking up of the tools where they lie, where the very “taking up” is 
enabled by the tool lying there.” (Ibid.) 
 
I maintain that the most challenging argument in Butler’s gender theory is 
precisely this. Women have to repeat the multiple and often contradictory 
discourses addressed to them in order to perform their gender identity, but just as 
bodily surfaces are enacted as natural, so these surfaces might become the site of 
denaturalized and dissonant aesthetic performance that reveals the performative 
status of what is considered natural.  
 
In the field of contemporary subversive art, we find convincing examples of this 
sort of dissonant gender perfomance in the work of artists such as Cindy Sherman, 
Barbara Kruger, Nan Goldette, Carolee Schneemann, Jenny Holzer, Hannah 
Wilke, Heli Rekula, Aurora Reinhardt, Kari Soinio, and many more. In Butler’s 
inquiries, the aesthetic practices of self, which many of these artists critically 
study, are discussed in terms of gender parody and drag. 
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Drag and the Aesthetic Politics of Parody 
 
As I will suggest in this final section, the cultural practice of drag offers one 
interesting possibility for studying the artificial and floating nature of gender 
identity, and along with it, women’s possibilities to actively affect the creation of 
their individual selves. As Butler notes, imitating gender drag “implicitly reveals 
the imitative structure of gender itself – as well as its contingency” (ibid. 137). 
For her, the notion of gender parody does not assume the existence of an original, 
which such parodic identities imitate. It rather represents the perpetual 
displacement and fluidity of identities, suggesting openness to re-signification and 
re-contextualization. Moreover, “parodic proliferation deprives hegemonic culture 
and its critics of the claim to naturalized or essentialist gender identities. Although 
the gender meanings taken up in these parodic styles are clearly part of 
hegemonic, misogynist culture, they are nevertheless denaturalized and mobilized 
through their parodic recontextualization.” (Ibid. 138.) 
 
Butler hence argues that drag, at least in principle, is a cultural practice that has 
the virtue of revealing the imitative structure of gender by showing how being 
male or female, masculine or feminine, entails a performance that requires the 
production and repetition of specific bodily signs. Instead of claiming that drag 
simply copies an original gender identity, she claims that it shows how all gender 
identities are actually mere derivative copies. So conceived, it is through 
performative acts that each one of us learns to become a woman or a man, a 
heterosexual, a lesbian, a homosexual. Here Butler adopts a strong constructionist 
position, thus making her affiliation with Foucault very clear. (Bristow 1997, 
215.)  
 
It is not difficult to find a practical application of Butler’s argumentation: the 
notion of primary or original gender identity is often parodied within various sub-
cultural practices, such as the sexual stylization of gender identities. This sort of 
gender parody is also a common phenomenon in contemporary subversive art, 
which often plays with the parodic representation of gender identity, womanhood, 
manhood, heterosexuality, queer practices, and so forth. The interesting aspect of 
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these representational gender parodies is, in my view, that they show how parodic 
uses of identity can function as occasions for subversive laughter, and this reveals 
that normality or sexual naturality are actually mere copies, ideals that no one can 
totally embody. What they also show, is that parodic repetitions of gender might 
function as active political practices of resistance by which aesthetic performers 
may try to challenge the existing norms and stereotypes addressed to women or 
men. 
 
 
 
 
Heli Rekula, Dèsire (flirt) 1996, lamda C-print 
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Aurora Reinhardt, So Feminine (part of a triptyck) 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
Kari Soinio, Mother Nature's Son 1992/94 
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By showing that gender is nothing but a series of acts that demands repetition, the 
whole notion is opened up to self-parody, break-up, self-criticism, and “those 
hyperbolic exhibitions of ‘the natural’ that, in their very exaggeration, reveal its 
fundamentally phantasmatic status” (Butler 1990, 146-147). As Butler 
emphasizes, the parodic deconstruction of gender identity does not in itself mean 
the deconstruction of politics, however. Rather, it “establishes as political the very 
terms through which identity is articulated” (ibid. 148). So conceived, the term 
‘women’ and ‘men,’ for example, comes to present a whole series of aspects, 
which are not taken as natural or essential but rather politicised and pluralized, in 
other words, read anew in a critical light. 
 
Yet, as Butler observes, parody is not subversive in itself – just as the recognizing 
of difference does not necessarily support difference – since parodic laughter 
depends on context and reception. In other words, parody must meet certain 
conditions for the subversive laughter to emerge. If, for example, a feminist 
parodic performance is given to an audience that does not belive there could be 
anything wrong with the existing gender norms and stereotypes, parodying them 
will hardly do much to change such opinions, nor will it make the perceivers 
laugh, at least not subversively. Similarly, a listener who does not have the basic 
knowledge of, say, rock/pop culture can hardly understand what critical function 
might be embedded in the acts of a female guitarist who performs parodic riffs 
that imitate the overtly masculine gestures of the average rock guitarist.  
 
Thus, there are good reasons to argue that feminist gender parody can have a truly 
effective function only when the audience is capable of interpreting it as a parody. 
In this sense, parodic usages of identity seem to be subversive only to the degree 
that people are able to interpret these practices as parodies, or, alternatively, to the 
degree that they are enlightened enough to grasp what is going on in the parodic 
uses of gender. In this respect, feminist aesthetics of the self is necessarily, I 
argue, an intellectual and often also an elitist expression of thought and action. 
This is not, indeed, to deny or lessen its importance, but rather to affirm that there 
is no feminist aesthetics of the self that could solve the problems of all women or 
effect global transformation in the living conditions of everybody.  
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With similar thoughts in mind, Butler makes the salient observation that there 
must be a way to understand “what makes certain kinds of parodic repetitions 
effectively disrupted, truly troubling, and which repetitions become domesticated 
and recirculated as instruments of cultural hegemony” (ibid. 139). The 
contemporary ideals of slenderness and androgyny, for example, do not 
necessarily function as emancipatory or subversive practices in which gender 
differences become blurred or transgressed, despite the fact that this might seem 
to be the case. They might well offer aesthetic ideals of the female body that 
actually function to essentially torment many women’s lives, leading to eating 
disorders and self-normalization, and even death.  
 
On the same subject, Susan Bordo has pointed to the fact that some contemporary 
commercial strategies actually represent the body as a site, not only of creative 
self-fashioning but also of cultural and political resistance. Yet, upon closer 
examination, the slogans, which might suggest that the ideals represented in the 
advertisements support the freedom of women, and their self-determination and 
choice, are often nothing but nice commercial tricks that take advantage of the 
jargon of feminist debate. What Bordo’s comment suggest, in short, is that the 
ideals of female resistance and emancipation that advertisements typically project 
are often only superficially or commercially subversive, and do not seem to have 
any real emancipatory impact on women’s lives or aesthetic appearance.167 
 
Nevertheless, there is no ready-made formula by which we could differentiate 
truly troubling repetitions of identity from those that merely tend to promote the 
maintenance of cultural hegemonies. What remains to be done, I suggest, is to 
study each case as a specific one, which entails asking certain questions. If the 
subject is constituted largely through the aesthetic practices of the self, and if this 
constitution could also be seen as a form of resistance, what are the new types of 
struggle that are immediate and particular rather than centralized and mediatized? 
Alternatively, what are the new modes of subjection, which tend to have no fixed 
identity? (Deleuze 1988, 115.) What of the intellectual’s new functions, which in 
this scheme are particular and specific rather than universal? What are they, more 
precisely?  
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As I see it, the existing discourses and representations of women that affect our 
constitution of the gendered self, most notably their homogenizing and 
stereotypical character, are a major cause of women’s oppression and 
discrimination, also also of the huge amount of eating disorders and self- 
dissatisfaction. Therefore, the potential for change is rooted, at least partly, in the 
potential to affect the gender discourses and ways of representing women. 
Although I am rather sceptical about vision of a future in which oppression and 
stereotypical and normalizing practices no longer exist, my outlook is by no 
means thoroughly negative. Like Susan Bordo, Judith Butler, bell hooks, Teresa 
de Lauretis and various other feminist thinkers, I believe that we can affect the 
normalizing gender stereotypes by bringing into focus some marginalized or 
ambiguous aspects of our identities (sexual, gendered and ethnic, for example), 
which is an act that in itself might transform these discourses.  
 
This proposal has, of course, a lot to do with Foucault’s analysis of power, 
notably with his arguments that power comes from below and that resistance is 
always there where the power is. In the context of normalizing gender discourses, 
this means that I believe that we can turn power discourses against themselves, or 
at least undermine their effects, by using them differently, in different contexts 
and in different chains of meaning. As I have suggested, various sub-cultural 
practices, as well as critical feminist art, offer a lot of interesting material for this 
turning of stereotypical gender discourses against themselves using their own 
methods.  
 
However, subcultures and radical art are not the only area in which individuals 
can be subversive and critical. I believe that the same resistance can also be 
expressed on the level of everyday existence by effecting local and often minute 
shifts in discursive power. One effective manifestation of this sort of resistance 
(although not the only one) is an individual’s ways of performing her-himself to 
others, in other words, on the level of one’s personal politics of appearance. In a 
similar vein, Judith Butler and Susan Bordo suggest that, by presenting a mocking 
enactment of the performative nature of gender, drag and other parodic practices 
(cross-dressing and gender-blending, for example.) that are proliferated from 
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within gender-essentialist culture might effectively disturb and subvert our culture 
and its belief in the notion of a true, natural gender identity (Butler 1990, 137-38; 
Bordo 1994, 236). As Butler puts it: 
 
This perpetual displacement constitutes a fluidity of identities that suggests 
an openness to resignification and recontextualization; parodic proliferation 
deprives hegemonic culture and its critics of the claim to naturalized or 
essentialized gender identities. Although the gender meanings taken up in 
these parodic styles are clearly part of hegemonic, misogynist culture, they 
are nevertheless denaturalised and mobilized through their parodic 
recontextualization. (Butler 1990, 138.) 
 
In considering these remarks, it should be borne in mind that feminist aesthetics of 
the self cannot provide one single form of resistance, but must take each 
resistance form as a special and local case. This is because all power discourses 
are special cases as well, and thus need unique reactions in order to be 
undermined. What this means in practice is that the problems poor black women 
living in Nigeria face in their everyday lives are certainly not the same ones as 
faced by white middle-class women living in Finland. The discourses and 
representations that tend to make these women docile or oppressed also differ 
significantly. Therefore, it is my contention that the genealogical feminist’s task 
is, first of all, to study carefully how discourse, representation and normalizing 
power are linked to each other in each special case, and to develop specific 
creative critical responses to each oppressive power structure.  
 
Moreover, along with Susan Bordo, I suggest that true resistance to the 
normalizing directives demands no less than personal risk-taking in terms of 
making one’s self different in practice, and not only in being radical or subversive 
in textual play (Bordo 1994, 243). In other words, the subversions of dominant 
cultural practices happen much more easily on the textual level than in the world 
of true everyday human interaction, in which the repression is real (hooks 1990, 
22). What this means, finally, is that subversive practical action is possible, 
although not easy or safe. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this dissertation, I have attempted to identify the type of theoretical tools that 
Foucault’s analyses of the subject offer in terms of feminist attempts to rethink the 
aesthetic subject in ways that enable political subjects to transcend the 
homogenizing tendencies of power in modern societies. In addressing this 
problem, I have on the one hand sought to investigate how the problem of the 
aesthetic constitution of the subject/self relates to questions of the politics of 
representation and identity, of the body, and of power, and on the other hand, how 
aesthetic (re)formation of the subject could function as a source of critical action 
and resistance.  
 
In the first two parts of this study, I presented an overview of Foucault’s 
archaeological and genealogical insights into these issues. This inquiry has shown 
that even in his earlier archaeological work, he connects the question of the 
subject intimately to the issues of aesthetics, transgression, discourse, ethics and 
the sexual body. As I have suggested, Foucault’s archaeological analyses of the 
aesthetic subject bring forth his early attempt to highlight affective and embodied 
dimensions of human experience – dimensions that Foucault, like French 
feminists such as Irigaray and Cixous, associate with experimental avant-garde 
literature and the birth of the new ethical subject. With this in mind, I have argued 
that, although Foucault’s archaeological analysis of the aesthetic subject suffers 
from gender blindness in its idealization of the transgressive male subjectivity, it 
also includes challenging insights for feminist theorists who, like Foucault, 
attempt to preserve radical otherness in their theorizations of the subject. 
 
Through the development of his genealogical method, Foucault extends his 
archaeological constellation of ideas and begins to consider how discourse 
structures modern forms of subjection through various disciplinary practices the 
function of which is to form people into isolatable individuals who enact their 
own self-controlling order that he calls “docility.” In Foucault’s view, power, 
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especially in its modern form, has a particular locus in the body, not primarily in 
repressive or limiting bodies, but rather by directing their energies towards 
production, normalization and control. The first part of The History of Sexuality is 
an attempt to show that this is nowhere as evident as in the realm of sexuality. 
With this in mind, Foucault considers the practices of subjection dangerous, 
because they often lead to normative practices that regulate individuals’ freedom 
as they impose ready-made limits and truths on their selves.  
 
Another key aspect I have taken up in my analysis of Foucault’s genealogical 
analysis of the modern constitution of the subject is the idea that it is only through 
these very discourses in power that resistance and expressions of freedom are 
made possible. In other words, since modern individuality is itself found to be a 
technique that contributes to the creation of a coherent selfhood, the relationship 
between an individual and his/her identity could also be opened up and made 
available as a site of political contestation. As I have shown in the second part of 
this dissertation, these genealogical ideas are much in line with so-called post-
feminist theory – a term I have used to designate some contemporary feminists 
who are interested in working on the genealogical analysis of issues such as 
women, the self, sexuality, gender identity and the body.  
 
In the final phase of his work, the practice of refuting categories of subjectivity 
via the transgression of limits became the basis of Foucault’s discussion of the 
aesthetics and ethics of the self. Unlike the earlier archaeological and genealogical 
phases of his writing, in which Foucault concentrated primarily on analysing the 
discursive formation of the subject and relations between the subject, knowledge 
and power, his late theorizations on the aesthetics of the self seek new ways of 
critically considering the possibilities open to each individual for affecting his or 
her self-formation and self-government in modern societies. Following the lines 
of thinking that he had earlier traced in his essay on “Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History” (1971), Foucault’s late theorizations concentrate on discovering ways of 
actively disturbing and undermining power to achieve the benefit of a more-
heterogeneous culture and more-ethical ways of existing. 
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In his late work, by positing ethics as aesthetic practices of the self, Foucault 
demonstrates that the subject is immanent within the limits of discursivity, but 
also irreducible to them. With this in mind, he argues in an interview entitled “The 
Subject and Power” (1982) that we have to promote new forms of subjectivity 
through the refusal of what he calls “victimized individuality” (SP 216). This idea, 
as I have demonstrated, is important for all feminists who attempt to show that 
power is not merely a negative force of victimization and oppression, but also 
includes possibilities for its own undermining, not least in the domain of aesthetic 
self-formation. 
 
Opening up these questions has also led me to consider both the problems and 
strengths of Foucault’s late aesthetics for feminist ends. As far as the problems 
with his account are concerned, I have not only criticized his analysis for its 
gender blindness and for the lack of positive images of female agents. I have also 
tried to point out the advantages of his account for feminist theorization, and to 
move beyond the polarized views of his thinking. In this respect, I have attempted 
not only to present and interpret Foucault’s insights. I have also tried to suggest 
some ways out of the problematic gender limitations in his thinking. 
 
To counter those critical interpreters who have accused Foucault’s aesthetic 
theorizations of a relativism in which “anything goes,” I have therefore argued 
that the individualization and pluralization of reason in his late aesthetics is a 
crucial element in any critical reconsideration of the status of subjectivity in the 
social space, qua the status of the other as something that might be so radically 
different no possibility for rational consensus between the subjects perhaps exists. 
In opposition to the views of Lois McNay, for example, who sees in the 
pluralization of truth and reason an attitude of laissez-faire, I have therefore 
maintained that to respect others in a concrete manner and to admit that deep, 
even unbridgeable, differences between individuals actually exist, demands the 
sort of rational disintegration and fragmentation that Foucault offers us.  
 
In the last part of this study, I have sought support for these insights from the 
writings of two “Foucauldian” feminists, Jana Sawicki and Judith Butler. As I 
  
 
 
 
 
221
have argued, theorizations of the aesthetics of the self in terms of radically 
pluralist feminism do not lead to irresponsibility or extreme relativism (as 
Habermasian feminists such as McNay argue), but rather refer to ethics (and 
practical politics), which is itself based on attempts to preserve radical otherness 
and difference, and, by so doing, shows respect for other subjects, sexualities and 
bodies.  
 
As I have shown, in this respect Foucault’s insistence on the heterogeneity of 
aesthetic practices of the self does not, as some of his critics have claimed, run 
counter to feminist efforts to effect changes in women’s social position, nor does 
his theory deny the possibility of feminist political programs. On the contrary, 
meeting the need to cope with differences in a pratical manner, among women 
also, appears to be the only way to create more space for a truly heterogeneous 
society and culture in which the existence of individual differences is not only 
defended but also affirmed through multiple, individual, “caring” styles of living.  
 
In Foucault’s view, this kind of affirmation of alternative practices of the self 
might, indeed, create more space for a truly heterogeneous society – a society in 
which individuals are better allowed to do their self-transforming work on the 
grounds of their own choices, pleasures and desires. As I have argued, in this 
respect, Foucault’s theory of the aesthetics of the self attempts to fulfil the same 
utopian task as both Kant’s and Baudelaire’s critical modernity did in their own 
time, although in somewhat different terms. In other words, it works to set 
individuals free from the normative and oppressing structures of everyday life, 
and to create space for a more autonomous and creative culture. Such a culture 
would, through the concrete experimental aesthetic practices of our selves, allow 
us more space to study the critical questions both Kant and Baudelaire addressed 
to critical modernity: What is our own era and how are we to constitute ourselves 
as subjects under its conditions?  
 
In sum, as this lengthy journey to considering the usefulness of Foucauldian tools 
in feminism has shown, even thought there are some gender problems in 
Foucault’s theorizations of the aesthetic subject, his insights nevertheless offer a 
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set of useful tools for critical analysis of the current problems suffered by women, 
and even provides some practical suggestions that might help individuals to bring 
about changes in the dominating networks of knowledge and power and to create 
different kinds of selves and communities no longer bound by the dictates of 
heterosexualizing identification, or some other normalizing net of practice and 
discourse. 
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1
 Like Wolfgang Welsch, I use the term ’aestheticization’ to refer to the tendency to stylize one’s 
life through a commodified lifestyle and role models. For more detailed discussion on this issue, 
see Welsch 1995 and 1997; Schultze 1997. 
 
2
 See, for example, Giddens 1991; Lash and Friedman 1993; Kolb 1986. 
3
 This sort of development has also happened inside of analytical aesthetics itself, which has come 
to incorporate issues to do with the environment, feminism and politics. (For a more detailed 
discussion of this, see Hein and Korsmeyer 1993; Brand and Korsmeyer 1995; von Bonsdorff and 
Seppä 2002.) 
 
4
 See, for example, Richard Shusterman’s pragmatic approaches to the aesthetic construction of the 
self (Shusterman 2000a and 2000b). The philosophical aspects of the arts of living have interested 
other American pragmatists too, such as William James and C.S. Peirce. So-called post-analytical 
aesthetics has also been influenced by this tradition. As Wilhelm Schmidt suggests, this explains 
why Foucault’s work has been attractive to philosophers such as Richard Rorty, Paul Rabinow, 
Martin Jay and Charles Taylor (see Schmidt 1999, 47). 
 
5
 In “The Subject and Power,” Foucault says, “It is […] the subject, which is the general theme of 
my research” (SP 209). [“le sujet […] constitue le thème général de mes recherches” (SPO 223).] 
When reading this sort of generalisation made by Foucault himself, we need to be aware that he 
was quite prone to providing overall interpretations of his work, as David C. Hoy rightly 
comments, and that he stressed the importance of different themes on different occasions (Hoy 
1999, 3). Yet, I contend that there is no reason to ignore Foucault’s statement on the specific 
importance of the issue of the subject for his whole oeuvre, not least if we consider this statement 
in the light of the texts he wrote in the different periods of his life (see also Oksala 2002, 15). 
 
6
 Foucault’s writings are generally interpreted along three primary axes. First, he appears as a 
philosophical historian who developed his archaeology of discourse in the History of Madness 
(1961), The Birth of the Clinic (1963), The Order of Things (1966) and The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1969). The essays he wrote on literature and “other works of imagination” are 
also usually included in this first phase of his work. Second, Foucault created a genealogy of 
power relations in Discipline and Punish (1975) and The History of Sexuality I (1976), which 
was meant to deepen his methodological innovations and mutually-supporting theories of 
knowledge, power and the subject (Gutting 1995, 2). The third axis represents a 
problematization of aesthetics and the ethics of the self, as is manifest in the second and third 
parts of The History of Sexuality (The Use of Pleasure, 1984 and The Care of the Self, 1984) 
and in the articles and interviews that appeared around the late 1970s and early 1980s. This 
last phase of his work is often described as his “return to the subject” (see, for example, 
Gutting 1995, 13; Jones 1991). 
 I would, however, characterize Foucault’s work in slightly different terms. For the question of 
the subject always seems to be at the core of his thinking, even though his interpretations and 
theoretical framework change during the different periods of his writing. Whether he is analyzing 
the construction of objects of knowledge such as the subject, the body, the author, madness, 
sexuality or criminality, one of his central intentions is to show that the human subject is not a set 
of permanent structures that constitute or condition reality, but is produced historically in and 
through its social world. Foucault therefore never represents the subject as an abstract, innate, 
essential, neutral or universal entity. What interests him is the “genealogy of the modern subject” 
as a historical and cultural reality. (SS 9. See also Kritzman 1985.) 
 
7
 As I explicate further on, for Foucault, the problematic of aesthetics represents at the same time a 
theory of individual ethics, because he sees the individual’s ethos as being grounded on the same 
“aesthetic order” of the self. He takes as his model the ancient moral of Greek free men, which in 
his view was centred on the problem of personal choice and an aesthetics of existence. In the 
second part of his History of Sexuality, Foucault defines the ethical subject as a “process in which 
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the individual delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, defines 
his position relative to that percept he will follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will 
serve as his moral goal.” This, in his view, “requires him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, 
improve, and transform himself” (UP 28). 
 
8
 “donner à leur existence la forme la plus belle et la plus accomplie possible” (UPL 275). 
A general formal definition of what Foucault understands by the expressions aesthetics of the self, 
and arts of existence is described in Use of Pleasure as follows: “What I mean by the phrase are 
those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, 
but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make 
their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values, and meets certain stylistic criteria” 
(UP 10-11). 
The citation in French runs: “Par là il faut entendre des pratiques réfléchies et volontaires par 
lesquelles les homes, non seulement se fixent des règles de conduite, mais cherchent à se 
transformer eux-mêmes`, à se modifier dans leur être singulier, et à faire de leur vie une oeuvre qui 
porte certaines valeurs esthétiques et répondre à certains critères de style” (UPL 16-17). 
 
9
 There are also interpretations that present post-feminism as a position after feminism (a term 
that may be used only when feminism is no longer needed), or as a position that runs counter to 
the aims of feminist theories (On pejorative uses of the term, see, for example, Jones 1994 and 
Coppock, Haydon and Richter 1995).  
As Leena-Maija Rossi pointed out (Rossi 1999, 17), post-feminism nowadays is rather generally 
understood as a term that refers to an area of discussion in which post-modern, post-structuralist 
and feminist perspectives intersect. My usage of the term is grounded on this kind of 
interpretation. For more detailed discussion on post-feminism, see Gamble 2000; Butler 1990a, 1-
7; Butler 1990b; Butler 1992; Bordo 1990; Brooks 1997, 1-3; Vavrus 2002. On the connections 
between post-feminism and post-colonialism, see hooks 1995; Mohanty 1997 and 1991; Spivak 
1999 and 1988. On the Finnish debate on post-feminism, see Rossi 1999, especially pp. 17-43; 
Jenu 1999; Hekanaho 1996, 10-14; von Bonsdorff and Seppä 2002, 8-17. 
 
10
 See most notably Lois McNay’s book Foucault and Feminism (1992), which studies Foucault’s 
late aesthetics of the self from the feminist perspective, and John Rajhman’s Michel Foucault. The 
Freedom of Philosophy (1985), which addresses Foucault’s connections with modernism. See also 
Johanna Oksala’s Freedom in the Philosophy of Foucault (2002), which illuminates some 
important aspects of Foucault’s late aesthetics with respect to ethics and sexual identity. 
 
11
 The line of argumentation that has stressed the disinterested, universal and pure character of 
aesthetic perceptions was taken to its extreme in the article “The Intentional Fallacy” (1946) 
written by Monroe C. Beardsley and W.K. Wimsatt. They argue that all things that exist outside of 
concrete artwork (the poem, in their text) should be left outside of the sphere of aesthetics. Other 
standard treatments of this view include Frank Sibley’s “Aesthetic Concepts” (1959); J.O. 
Urmson’s “What Makes a Situation Aesthetic” (1957-58); Monroe C. Beardsley’s Aesthetics: 
Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism (1981/1952); and Monroe C. Beardsley’s “The Aesthetic 
Point of View” (1970). 
 
12
 On the ideological and political character of autonomous aesthetics, see, for example, Bourdieu 
1998; Bürger 1989; Murphy 1999; Rossi 1999. 
 
13
 “Ce qui m’étonne, c’est le fait que dans notre société l’art est devenu quelque chose qui n’est en 
rapport qu’avec les objects et non pas avec les individus ou avec la vie; et aussi que l’art est un 
domaine spécialisé fait par des experts qui sont des artistes. Mais la vie de tout individu ne 
pourrait-elle pas être oeuvre d’art? Pourqoui une lampe ou une maison sont-ils des objects d’art et 
non pas notre vie? (GEA 392.) 
 
14
 For a more detailed discussion of these terms, see Wirth 1997; Welsch 1996, 136. 
 
15
 For Baumgarten, the term ‘aesthetics’ was primarily an abbreviation of the longer expression 
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episteme aisthetike (1735; Alexander Gottlieb B, Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad 
poema pertinentibus, Halle 1735, Hamburg 1983, CXVI, 86). He gave his first lecture on 
aesthetics in 1742, and published the first part of his Aesthetica in 1750. In this book, he uses the 
term aesthetics (Ästhetik) to designate the “science of sensuous cognition,” which is to 
comprehend all kinds of sensuous cognition.  He also uses examples from the arts, notably from 
poetry, but only to illustrate what aesthetic perfection, as the perfection of sensuous knowledge, 
could be. 
 
16
 See, for example; Sawicki 1991; Braidotti 1991 and 1994; Probyn 1993; Butler 1990 
and 1993; Pulkkinen 2000; Rossi 1999. 
 
17
 It might be worth adding here that the expression “sexual difference” (la différence sexuelle), 
which is favored by many French feminists, differs in some significant respects from the 
expression “gender difference.” As my analysis of contemporary feminism will show, the French 
usage of sexual difference often refers to the idea that women and men are biological opposites, 
which differ from each other both naturally and essentially. In sharp contrast to this view, in recent 
post-feminist theories such as that of Judith Butler, the expression gender difference rather implies 
that all “biological” or “natural” oppositions between the two sexes are also culturally produced 
and maintained, and can, thus, be critically questioned. For Butler (and various other “post-
feminists”) both sex and gender are hence understood historically. This view also differs 
considerably from earlier sex/gender theorizations, such as Gayle Rubin’s now classical “The 
Traffic in Women” (1975), which still implies that sex is relatively fixed and stable and only 
gender varies from culture to culture. 
 
18
 I refer here to the neo-Kantian and formalist tradition of autonomous or pure aesthetics, which 
long dominated the discussion on modern arts, suggesting that works of art are designed to elicit 
nonconsummatory and idealized aesthetic indifference. Seen in this way, the possession of 
artworks indirectly testifies to the spiritual superiority of whoever possesses them. Hence the terms 
’neutral’ and ’universal’ – and hence the ignorance of factors such as the spectator’s gender. (See 
also Brand 1995.) 
 
19
 On the differences between the terms ’feminine’, ’female’ and ’feminism’, see Hein 1997, 133-
134; Battersby 1989; von Bonsdorff and Seppä 2002. The term ’female’ is usually associated with 
the biological and cultural aspects of one’s being a woman. Feminist research that is centred on 
this term might, for example, focus on questions of the equality of the sexes in the artistic field, or 
on studying traditional ways of representing women. Many earlier feminist critiques concentrated 
on the notion of the female. In post-feminist discussions, more interest has been paid instead to the 
notion of feminine, which is typically taken to represent a series of culturally-shaped 
characteristics that can be used to describe qualities of biological women and men. As Estella 
Lauter notes: “Most feminists believe that “feminine” characteristics associate with women and 
are not mandated by biology but are instead constructed by cultures.” Thus the term ’gender’ 
refers typically to the effects of acculturation as expressed in behavior and attitudes (see Lauter 
1993, 24). 
20
 As Foucault points out, the concept of man had no role in the preceding Classical period, which 
simply identified thought with representation and thus could not form a concept of man defined in 
terms of its representation. In this sense, man did not even exist in the Classical period, but was 
only produced in the modern era. (OT 308.) Foucault also details ways in which the viability of 
the concept of man has come into question in the modern period, mentioning “the analytic of 
finitude,” which highlights the failure of modern philosophical efforts (from Kant to Heidegger) 
to forge a coherent view of an entity that is both the source and an object in the world. (OT 312-
318.) 
 
21
 In 1963 Foucault published a study on the French experimental novelist Raymond Roussel, and 
from 1964 he participated in literary colloquia, most of which included members of the journal Tel 
Quel and an elite of the same name associated with Philippe Solliers. In 1963 he gave out an essay 
devoted to George Bataille, and in 1966 one devoted to Maurice Blanchot (“Préface à 
transgression,” Critique 195, Aug.-Sept. 1963, pp. 751-769, and “La pensée du dehors” Critique 
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229, June 1966, pp. 523-546. For English translations of these texts, see AME (“Preface to 
Transgression” and “The Thought of the Outside”). Among other literary characters who 
interested Foucault were Gustave Flaubert, Jorge Luis Borges, Alain Robbe-Grillet, and surrealists 
such as André Breton and Antonin Artaud. 
 
22
 To concretise the artificial nature of the notion of the author, Foucault points out four features in 
the books or texts of various modern “authors” – authors from the late 18th century onward – that 
are constructed by the specific discourses centred on the notion of what an author is. First, the 
products of the author have been made objects of appropriation, a form of property (ownership, 
copyright, etc.), and as a result, literature is no longer seen as material (tales, stories) that anyone 
can tell (WA 124-125). Second, the author-function is not universal or constant in all discourse, 
but must be seen as historical and changing, for the meaning of the term ’author’ in the 18th 
century, for example, differs remarkably from the meanings addressed to the authors of our day 
(WA 125). Third, the author-function is not formed spontaneously through the simple attribution 
of a discourse to an individual, but results from a complex operation whose aim is to construct the 
rational entity we call an author (as a result of which we speak, for example, of the individual’s 
creative power or originality) (WA 127). And finally, the term ’author’ does not simply refer to 
any actual individual insofar as it simultaneously gives rise to a variety of egos and to multiple 
subjective positions that individuals of any class may come to occupy. (WA 130-131.)  
 
23
 “Si un individu n’était pas un auteur, est-ce qu’on pourrait dire que ce qu’il a écrit, ou dit, ce 
qu’il a laissé dans ses papiers, ce qu’on a pu rapporter de ses propos, pourrait être appelé une 
“oeuvre”? Tant que Sade n’a pas été un auteur, qu’étaient donc ses papiers? Des rouleaux de 
papier sur lesquels, à l’infini, pendant ses journées de prison, il déroulait ses fantasmes.” (QA 
794.) 
 
24
 “Dans l’écriture, il n’y va pas de la manifestation ou de l’exaltation du geste d’écrire il ne s’agit 
pas de l’épinglage d’un sujet dans un langage” (QA 793).. 
 
25
 “il est question de l’ouverture d’un espace où le sujet écrivant ne cesse de disparaître” (QA 793). 
 
26
 “n’a pas à être représenté dans les livres, puisqu’il est accompli dans l’existence même de 
l’écrivain” (QA 793). 
 
27
 “La mort de Dieu ne nous restitue pas à un monde limité et positif, mais à un monde qui se 
dénoue dans l’expérience de la limite, se fait et se défait dans l’excès qui la transgresse” (PTR 
236). 
 
28
 ”Il opère comme une glorification de ce qu’il exclut; la limite ouvre violemment sur l’illimité, se 
trouve emportée soudain par le contenu qu’elle rejecte, et accomplie par cette plénitude étrangère 
qui l’envahit jusqu’au coeur. La transgression porte sa limite jusqu’à la limite de son être; elle la 
conduit à s’éveiller sur sa disparition imminente, à se retrouver dans ce qu’elle exclut (plus 
exactement peut-être à s’y reconnaître pour la première fois), à éprouver sa vérité positive dans le 
mouvement de sa perte.” (PTR 237.) 
 
29
 “La transgression est un geste qui concerne la limite; c’est là, en cette minceur de la ligne, que 
se manifeste l’éclair de son passage, mais peut-être aussi sa trajectoire en sa totalité, son origine 
même. Le trait qu’elle croise pourrait bien être tout son espace.” (PTR 236.) 
 
30
 Foucault borrows the term ‘contestation’ from Maurice Blanchot who, according to Foucault’s 
interpretation, used it to designate exactly the philosophy of non-positive affirmation, the testing 
of the limits. (See PT 36). 
 
31
 “[La contestation] ne s’agit pas là d’une négation généralisée, mais d’une affirmation qui 
n’affirme rien: en pleine rupture de transitivité. La contestation n’est pas l’effort de la pensée pour 
nier des existences ou des valeurs, c’est le geste qui reconduit chacune d’elles à ses limites, et par 
là à la Limite où s’accomplit la décision ontologique: contester, c’est aller jusqu’au coeur vide où 
l’être atteint sa limite et où la limite définit l’être.” (PTR 238.) 
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32
 Foucault’s usage of the term ‘transgression’ changes slightly in different texts, as McNay has 
pointed out (McNay 1994, 46). 
 
33
 “[philosophie qui] ne peut reprendre la parole, et se reprendre en elle que sur les bords de ses 
limites” (PTR 242). 
 
34
 “nous ne sommes pas tout” (PTR 242). 
 
35
 “comme un dieu secret et tout-parlant” (PTR 242). 
 
36
 “[il découvre qu’il y a, à côté de lui] un langage qui parle et don’t il n’est pas maître; un langage 
qui s’efforce, qui échoue et se tait et qu’il ne peut plus mouvoir; un langage qu’il a lui-même parlé 
autrefois et qui maintenant s’est détaché de lui et gravite dans un espace de plus en plus 
silencieux.” (PTR 242.) 
 
37
 “vidé de soi jusqu’au vide absolu – ouverture qui est la communication” (PTR 243). 
 
38
 “[I]l ne s’agit pas d’une fin de la philosophie. Plutôt de la fin du philosophie comme forme 
souveraine et première du langage philosophique.” (PTR 242.) 
 
39
 “Ce qui est en jeu dans l’érotisme est toujours une dissolution des formes constituées […] de ces 
formes de vie sociale, régulière, qui fondent l’ordre discontinu des individualités définies que nous 
somme” (Bataille 1957, 25). 
 
40
 “[peut-être] s’illumine-t-elle pour ceux qui ont enfin affranchi leur pensée de tout langage 
dialectique” (PTR 249). 
 
41
 “Peut-être un jour apparaîtra-t-elle aussi décisive pour notre culture, aussi enfouie dans son sol 
que l’a été naguère, pour la pensée dialectique, l’expérience de la contradiction. Mais malgré tant 
de signes épars, le langage est presque entièrement à naître où la transgression trouvera son espace 
et son être illuminé.” (PTR 236.) 
 
42
 On the ideological basis and context of the avant-garde, see Murphy 1999; Orton and Pollock 
1999; and Krauss 1985. 
 
43
 In McNay’s view, Foucault forgets his own earlier insistence in Mental Illness and Psychology 
(Maladie mentale et personnalité 1954) on understanding madness in relation to its social 
conditions of existence, which results in too much reliance on an aestheticized notion of madness 
(McNay 1994, 47). 
 
44
 The idea of a female language is presented in Ce sexe qui n’en est pas un, Parler n’est jamais 
neutre and L’aime à toi. In these works, Irigaray associates women’s ways of using language 
directly with the female body and sexuality. 
 
45
 Irigaray’s ideas have been applied to other genres of art too. For example Mary Ann Doane and 
Anette Kuhn have both suggested that there could be an essentially feminine cinematic aesthetic 
which would express and reproduce feminine identity. 
 
46
 Unlike the rational subject, Irigaray’s female subjectivity does not attempt to master the object 
of her speech and thinking, but rather comes and goes, in herself and outside of herself, endlessly. 
If this subject seems to be without qualities of her own, and if she is unable to talk about herself 
without getting lost in the process, this is not because she has no qualities of value, or place or 
identity on her own. It is rather because metaphysics does not speak her language, because she 
cannot be grasped by counting and quantification. 
 
47
 Cixous’s notion of the phallogocentric order is linked with Jacques Lacan’s notion of the 
Symbolic Order. She understands that Lacan’s naming the center of the Symbolic Order as the 
Phallus clarifies what a patriarchal system language is – or, more specifically, what a 
phallo(go)centric system it is. The expression ‘phallogocentric’ is also tied to Jacques Derrida’s 
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idea that in Western culture, the structure of language relies on spoken words that take precedence 
over written words, which makes the word “logocentric” describe Western culture in general. 
Cixous (as well as Irigaray) combine these two ideas in their attempt to show that Western cultural 
systems and structures are “phallogocentric” in the sense that they are based on the primacy of 
certain terms in an array of binary oppositions. For them, a phallogocentric culture is one which is 
structured by binary oppositions – male/female, order/chaos, language/silence, presence/absence, 
speech/writing, light/dark, good/evil, and so forth – and in which the first term is usually valued 
over the second term. Both Cixous and Irigaray insist that all valued terms (male, order, language, 
presence, speech) are aligned with each other, and that all of them together provide the basic 
structures of Western thought. 
 
48
 For a more detailed discussion on jouissance as it operates in Cixous, see Betsy Wing’s notions 
in her translation of Cixous, and Catherine Clement The Newly Born Woman (Cixous and Clement 
1986, 165). See also Singer 1989. 
 
49
  Cixous describes differences between what she considers to be a feminine and masculine 
“economy” in terms of different attitudes to giving. Relying on Marcel Mauss’ ideas on the gift 
(Mauss 1950), she argues that the masculine is concerned with property, and that all gifts, 
therefore, function to reinforce his position. The feminine gift, in contrast, is given without 
calculation and simply for the other’s pleasure. (See The Newly Born Woman, pp. 84-88. The 
French reference is pp. 155-63 of La Jeune Née.)  
 
50
 Julia Kristeva’s work also converges with these ideas, notably her distinction between what she 
calls the “semiotic” and the “symbolic,” which she develops in texts such as Revolution in Poetic 
Language [La Révolution du langage poétique, 1974] and Powers of Horror [Pouvoirs de 
l’horreur, 1980]. Kristeva maintains that all signification is composed of these two elements. For 
her, the semiotic element is the bodily drive as it is discharged in signification.  As the discharge 
of bodily drives, it is also associated with the maternal body, the first source of rhythms, tones and 
movements for every human being, since we have all resided in that body. The symbolic element 
of signification is associated instead with its grammar and structure. In brief, it is what makes 
reference possible (for example, words have referential meaning because of the symbolic structure 
of language). 
Yet, is must be noted that Kristeva’s relation to feminism has been somewhat ambivalent, 
and that she also rejects many of Irigaray’s and Cixou’s ideas by criticizing all attempts to seek a 
uniquely feminine language. In Kristeva’s view, this task is impossible. Neither does she agree 
with feminists who maintain that language and culture are essentially patriarchal and must 
therefore be somehow abandoned. Instead, she argues that culture and language are the very 
domains of speaking beings, and that this must be the case with women too - since women, in her 
view, are primarily speaking beings. Against the second wave of feminism to which she associates 
this critique, Kristeva endorses what she identifies as the third phase, which refuses to choose 
identity over difference, but rather explores multiple identities, including multiple sexual 
identities. With this in mind, Kristeva proposes that there are as many sexualities as there are 
individuals. (Kristeva 1984, 22-27.) 
 
51
 Judith Butler, for example, criticizes Irigaray for globalizing the problem of a masculinized 
economy, and accuses her of practicing “epistemological imperialism” and “colonizing gestures” 
(Butler 1990, 13). In much the same spirit, Susan Hekman warns readers of Irigaray and Cixous of 
their essentialism (Hekman 1990, 45). 
 
52
 As Diane Elam puts it, rather than celebrating a hypostatized female body, Irigaray’s use of the 
rhetoric of biological discourse refigures anatomy and multiple female pleasure, writing through 
and with the body rather than writing of the body, and this is the sense in which Cixous has also 
spoken of “writing the body” (Elam 1994, 62). 
 
53
  On colonialist and ethnically biased problems in Irigaray and Cixous, see for example, Kanneh 
1997. 
 
54
 Foucault’s Nietzschean attitude towards the idea of epistemology is that there is nothing 
optimistic to say. To question the will-to-power is to reject the common motive of Hegelian 
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eschatological historiography and Cartesian epistemology. Thus, Foucault, like Nietzsche, wanted 
to abandon the striving for objectivity, denying the intuition that Truth is one. To see him as a 
Nietzschean enemy of historicism (rather than as one more historicist enemy of Cartesianism), we 
must see him as trying to write history in a way that denies the notion of historical progress, as 
Richard Rorty remarked (Rorty 1999, 46). This means taking seriously his asserted aim to 
introduce into the very roots of thought the notions of “change, discontinuity and materiality” (AK 
231), and thereby, as Rorty comments, “to help us drop the notion that later and more inclusive 
thought is automatically closer to the real” (Rorty 1999, 46). 
 
55
 According to Foucault, the question of power is inherent already in The Order of Things, but 
what is lacking is reference to the “discursive regime.” In an interview  “Truth and Power” (1976) 
he says: “I confused this too much with systematicity, theoretical form, or something like a 
paradigm. This same central problem of power, which at that time I had not yet properly isolated, 
emerges in two very different aspects at the point of junction of Madness and Civilization and The 
Order of Things.” (TP 113.) 
 
 
56
 “[La sexualité] ne faut pas la concevoir comme une sorte donnée de nature que le pouvoir 
essaierait de mater, ou comme un domaine obscur que le savoir tenterait, peu à peu, de dévoiler. 
C’est le nom qu’on peut donner à un dispositif historique: non pas réalité d’en dessous sur laquelle 
on exercerait des prises difficiles, mais grand réseau de surface où la stimulation des corps, 
l’intensification des plaisirs, l’incitation au discours, la formation des connaissances, le 
renforcement des contrôles et des resistances, s’enchaînent les uns avec les autres, selon quelques 
grandes strategies de savoir et de pouvoir.” (VS 139.) 
 
57
 Foucault’s genealogical method, and in fact already his archaeology, could also be viewed as 
interpretive analyses as Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest (1999). This means that the one who 
practices interpretive analytics realizes that he/she him/herself is also produced by what he/she is 
studying, and consequently he/she can never stand outside it. The task of the genealogist, so 
conceived, is to realize that cultural practices are more basic than any theory. Seen in this light, the 
seriousness of theory can only be taken as part of society’s on-going history. According to Dreyfus 
and Rabinow, we need to be aware that the archaeological step back that Foucault takes in order to 
be able to grasp the strangeness of our society’s practices does not mean that he considers these 
practices meaningless. Quite the opposite: “[S]ince we share cultural practices with others, and 
since these practices have made us what we are, we have, perforce, some common footing from 
which to proceed, to understand, to act. But that foothold is no longer one which is universal, 
guaranteed, verified, or grounded.”(Dreyfus and Rabinow 1999, 115.) 
 
58
 As Foucault says, once more citing Nietzsche: “Devotion to truth and the precision of scientific 
methods arose from the passion of scholars, their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending 
discussions, and their spirit of competition – the personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons 
of reason (NGH 78; See also Nietzsche 1988c, no 34). 
 
The citation in French runs: “L’attachement à la vérité et la rigueur des methods scientifiques [est 
née] de la passion des savants, de leur haine réciproque, de leurs discussions fanatiques et toujours 
reprises, du besoin de l’emporter – armes lentement forgées au long des lutes personelles.” (NGLH 
138.) 
 
59
 “La où l’âme prétend s’unifier, là où le Moi s’invente une identité ou une cohérence, le 
généalogiste part à la recherche du commencement – des commencements innombrables qui 
laissent ce soupçon de couleur, cette marque presque effacée qui ne saurait tromper un oeil un peu 
historique; l’analyse de la provenance permet de dissocier le Moi et de faire pulluler, aux lieux et 
places de sa synthèse vide, mille événements maintenant perdus” (NGLH 141). 
 
60
 “La généalogie, c’est l’histoire comme carnaval concerté” (NGLH 153). 
 
61
 “[C]ette identité, bien faible pourtant, que nous essayons d’assurer et d’assembler sous un 
masque, n’est elle-même qu’une parodie: le pluriel l’habite, des âmes innombrables s’y disputent” 
(NGLH 155). 
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62
 “[Si la généalogie] pose à son tour la question du sol qui nous a vu naître, de la langue que nous 
parlons ou des lois qui nous régissent” (NGLH 156) […] “[c’est pour] mettre au jour les systèmes 
hétérogènes qui, sous le masque de notre moi, nous interdisent toute identité” (NGLH 154). 
 
63
 “[L]es religions jadis demandaient le sacrifice du corps humain; le savoir appelle aujourd’hui à 
faire des expériences sur nous-mêmes” (NGLH 155). 
 
64
 “il est rompu à des rythmes de travail, de repos et de fêtes; il est intoxiqué par des poisons – 
nourritures ou valeurs, habitudes alimentaires et lois morales tout ensemble; il se bâtit des 
résistances.” (NGLH 147). 
 
65
 “[R]ien en l’homme – pas même son corps – n’est assez fixe pour comprendre les autres 
hommes et se reconnaître en eux” (NGLH 147). 
 
66
 “le stigmate des événements passés, tout comme de lui naissent les désirs, les défaillances, et les 
erreurs” (NGLH 143). 
 
67
 “surface d’inscription des événements (alors que le langage les marque et les idées les 
dissolvent), lieu de dissociation du Moi (auquel il essaie de prêter la chimère d’une unité 
substantielle), volume en perpétuel effritement” (NGLH 143). 
 
68
 “montrer le corps tout imprimé d’histoire, et l’histoire ruinant le corps” (NGLH 143). 
 
69
 “C’est par le sexe […] que chacun doit passer pour avoir accès à sa proper intelligibilité […] à la 
totalité de son corps […] à son identité […] nous en sommes arrives maintenant à demander notre 
intelligibilité à ce qui fut, pendant tant de siècles, considéré comme folie, la plenitude de notre 
corps à ce qui en fut longtemps le stigmate et comme la blessure, notre identité à ce qu’on 
percevait comme obscure poussée sans nom.” (VS 206.) 
 
70
 “elle a permis de faire fonctionner cette unite fictive comme principe causal, sens omniprésent, 
secret à découvrir partout” (VS 204). 
 
71
 “qui produirait secondairement les effects multiples de la sexualité tout au long de sa surface de 
contact avec le pouvoir” (VS 205). 
 
72
 “le plus speculative, le plus idéal, le plus intérieur aussi dans un dispositif de sexualité que le 
pouvoir organize dans ses prises sur les corps, leur matérialité, leurs forces, leurs energies, leurs 
sensations, leurs plaisirs” (VS 205). 
  
73
 Foucault’s point of departure could, once againm, be linked with Nietzsche, whose Gay Science 
(Fröhliche Wissenschaft) introduced a doctrine according to which there is no order in human 
nature or in how we are, and no possibility of judging or evaluating between ways of life. There 
are only different orders imposed on men by primal chaos, following their “will-to-power.” 
 
74
 “Est docile un corps qui peut être soumis, qui peut être utilizé, qui peut être transformé et 
perfectionné” (SPU 160). 
 
75
 “roi minutieux des petites machines” […] “des regiments bien dresses et des longs exercices” 
(SPU 161). 
 
76
 “pas seulement la croissance de ses habiletés ni non plus l’alourdissement de sa sujétion, mais la 
formation d’un rapport qui dans le même méchanisme le rend d’autant plus obeisant qu’il est plus 
utile, et inversement” (SPU 162). 
 
77
 “un element indispensable au développement du capitalisme; celui-ci n’a pu être assure qu’au 
prix de l’insertion contrôlée des corps dans l’appareil de production et moyennant un ajustement 
des phénomènes de population aux processus économiques” (VS 185). 
 
78
 “[S]i le dévelopement des grands appareils d’État, comme institutions de pouvoir, a assure le 
  
 
 
 
 
231
                                                                                                                                     
maintien des rapports de production, les rudiments d’anatomo- et de bio-politique, inventés au 
XVIIIe siècle comme techniques de pouvoir présentes à tous les niveaux du corps social et 
utilisées par des institutions très diverses (la famille comme l’armée, l’école ou la police, la 
médecine individuelle ou l’adminitration des collectivités), ont agi au niveau des processus 
économiques, de leur déroulement, des forces qui y sont à l’oeuvre et les soutiennent; ils ont opéré 
aussi comme facteurs de segregation et de hiérarchisation sociale, agissant sur les forces 
respectives des uns et des autres, garantissant des rapports de domination et des effects 
d’hégémonie” (VS 185-186). 
 
79
 “Pour la première fois […] dans l’historie, le biologique se réflichit dans le politique; le fait de 
vivre n’est plus ce soubassement inaccessible qui n’émerge que de temps en temps, dans le hazard 
de la mort et sa fatalité; il passé pour une part dans le champ de contrôle du savoir et 
d’intervention du pouvoir. Celui-ci n’aura plus affaire seulement à des sujets de droit sur lesquels 
la prise ultime est la mort, mais à des êtres vivants, et la prise qu’il pourra exercer sur eux devra se 
placer au niveau de la vie elle-même.” (VS 187-188.) 
 
80
 Foucault uses this expression in his article “On the Genealogy of Ethics” (1984), in which he 
states that he is arguing not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous. Hence, he 
concludes, “my position leads not to apathy but to a hyper- and pessimistic activism” (GE 231-32) 
(“ma position ne conduit pas à l’apathie, mais au contraire à un hyper-militantisme pessimiste” 
GEA 386). 
 
81
 “L’implantation des perversions est un effect-instrument: c’est par l’isolement, l’intensification 
et la consolidation des sexualités périphériques que les relations du pouvoir au sexe et au plaisir se 
ramifient, se multiplient, arpentent le corps et pénètrent les conduits. Et sur cette avancée des 
pouvoirs, se fixent des sexualités disséminées, épinglées à un âge, à un lieu, à un gout, à un type de 
pratiques.” (VS 66.) 
 
82
  “qui grâce à l’intermédiaire de la médecine, de la psychiatrie, de la prostitution, de la 
pornographie, se sont branches à la fois sur cette majoration du pouvoir qui le contrôle” (VS 66). 
 
83
 See, for example, Foucault’s critique of the notion of ideology in TP 119. His critique of the 
superstructure model is to be found in HS 94. 
 
84
 “[L]e pouvoir, ce n’est pas une institution, et ce n’est pas une structure, ce n’est pas une certaine 
puissance don’t certains seraient dotes” (VS 123). 
 
85
 “[C]’est le nom qu’on prête à une situation stratégique complexe dans une société donnée” (VS 
123). 
 
86
 Foucault’s notion of hegemony has been connected to the writings of Antonio Gramsci. Some 
commentators see similarities between Foucault and Gramsci’s views on the relations that are 
central to the establishment of hegemony, while others interpret Foucault as “anticipated on 
several points” by the latter (see Smart 1999, 158; Olssen 1999, Chapter 7). 
 
87
 “comme une série de segments discontinues, don’t la fonction tactique n’est ni uniforme ni 
stable” (VS 133). 
 
88
 “Il faut admettre un jeu complexe et instable où le discours peut être à la fois instrument et effect 
de pouvoir, mais aussi obstacle, butée, point de résistance et depart pour une stratégie opposée” 
(VS 133). 
 
89
 Butler draws the expression heterosexual matrix from Monique Wittig’s (1990) notion of the 
heterosexual contract and from Adrienne Rich’s (1987) notion of compulsory heterosexuality. 
 
90
 Other French theorists such as Shoshana Felman and Monique Wittig have also examined the 
questions concerning the constitution of women’s bodies by language, what language and 
knowledge are, and how women ought to speak and write. 
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90
 “le plus idéal, le plus intérieur aussi dans un dispositif de la sexualité que le pouvoir organize 
dans ses prises sur les corps, leur matérialité, leurs forces, leurs energies, leurs sensations, leurs 
plaisirs” (VS 205). 
 
91
 “le plus idéal, le plus intérieur aussi dans un dispositif de la sexualité que le pouvoir organize 
dans ses prises sur les corps, leur matérialité, leurs forces, leurs energies, leurs sensations, leurs 
plaisirs” (VS 205). 
 
92
 Teresa de Lauretis has developed another version of this argument. In her Alice Doesn’t (1984), 
she maintains that the female spectator is classically split between her identification with “the 
image of the screen, perceived as spatially static, fixed, in frame, and feminine,” and identification 
with the camera, “apprehended as temporal, active or in movement, and masculine” (de Lauretis 
1984, 123). 
 bell hooks has described a similar phenomenon in black women, who in her view tend to 
identify themselves with white male movie makers and see black people as these whites typically 
see them (Mulvey 1975 and 1981; hooks 1992. See also Brand 1999 and 2000.)   
 
93
 As Bordo notes, in earlier times, a fatless, muscled body was not generally considered sexually 
desirable, because muscles were associated with the insensitive, the unintelligent and the 
animalistic: the more body one had, the more uncultured or uncivilized one was expected to be. 
This was especially true of the female body, whose aesthetic function was rather to represent 
weakness and small size and to leave associations of strength to the “naturally” strong other sex. 
(See Bordo 1993.)  
 
94
 Philosophical aesthetics has also based many of its central categories, such as taste, beauty and 
sublime, on the heterosexual matrix and its rigid differentiation of the two sexes. Among the 
classics that link aesthetic ideals directly to the differentiation of the two sexes are Immanuel Kant 
(1798) Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht; Kant (1764) Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des 
Schönen und Erhabenen; Edmund Burke (1757) A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our 
Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful; Georg Gessner (1818) Bestandtheile der Weiblichen 
Schönheit; and Hochfelden (1903) Glück bei Damen. Oder dir Kunst das weibliche Herz zu 
erobern. Praktische Leitfaden für junge Männer. 
On this issue, see Wiseman 1993, 169-178; Korsmeyer 1995, 49-65; Kellner 1993; 
Armstrong 1996. On the Finnish discussion see Hekanaho 2002; von Bonsdorff and Seppä 2002. 
 
95
 In other words, it is through a number of seemingly trivial routines (table manners, toilet habits, 
etc.) that culture is “made body,” that is, converted into automatic, habitual activity (Bordo 1993, 
165). 
 
96
 Some social theorists have also given attention to the one-dimensional nature of Foucault’s 
theory of power. See Habermas 1987; Rose 1984. 
 
97
 Maurice Blanchot, for example, interprets Foucault’s thinking as negative theology, showing 
that there remains almost nothing for him to say due to his endless rejections (“it’s not... nor is it... 
nor is it for that matter...”)  (Blanchot 1987, 74). 
 
98
 See, most notably, “Technologies of the Self,” “L’écriture de soi,” “What is Enlightenment?,” 
“On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress,” “The Ethics of Care of the Self 
as a Practice of Liberty,” “The Concern for Truth,” and “The Return of Morality.” 
 
99
 See, for example O’Farell (1989), who argues that Foucault’s late work on the subject of the self 
undermines his earlier views so effectively that his theory runs itself into a dead end.  In much the 
same spirit, Luc Ferry and Alain Renault claim that Foucault’s late work is entirely inconsistent 
with his earlier views and “profoundly problematical” (Ferry and Renault 1990, 107-21). 
 
100
  “Les discours, pas plus que les silences, ne sont une fois pour toutes soumis au pouvoir ou 
dressés contre lui.  Il faut admettre un jeu complexe et instable où le discours peut être à la fois 
instrument et effect de pouvoir, mais aussi obstacle, butée, point de résistance et depart pour une 
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stratégie opposée.” (VS 133.) 
 
101
 In Foucault’s words: “I believe [...] that there is no sovereign, founding subject, a universal 
form of subject to be found everywhere. [...] The subject is constituted through practices of 
subjection, or, in a more autonomous way, through practices of liberation, of liberty, as in 
Antiquity, on the basis [...] of number of rules, styles, inventions to be found in the cultural 
environment.” (PPC 51.) 
 
The citation in French runs: “[J]e pense effectivement qu’il n’y a pas un sujet souverain, 
fondateur, une forme universelle de sujet qu’on pourrait retrouver partout. […] le sujet se constitue 
à travers des pratiques d’assujettissement, ou, d’une façon plus autonome, à travers des pratiques 
de liberation, de liberté, comme, dans l’Antiquité, à partir, bien entendu, d’un certain nombre de 
règles, styles, conventions, qu’on retrouve dans le milieu culturel.” (EE 733.) 
 
102
 “un objet de connaissance, de tekhnē , un objet d’art” (GEA 402). 
 
103
 “les pratiques par lesquelles les individus ont été amenés à porter attention à eux-mêmes […] 
comme sujets de désir, faisant jouer […] un certain rapport qui leur permet de découvrir dans le 
désir la vérité de leur être, qu’il soit naturel ou déchu. Bref, l’idée était, dans cette généalogie, de 
chercher comment les individus ont été amenés à exercer sur eux-mêmes, et sur les autres, une 
herméneutique du désir don’t leur comportement sexuel a bien été sans doute l’occasion, mais n’a 
certainement pas été le domaine exclusif. En somme, pour comprendre comment l’individu 
moderne pouvait faire l’expérience de lui-même comme sujet d’une “sexualité,” il était 
indispensable de dégager auparavant la façon don’t, pendant des siècles, l’homme occidental avait 
été amené à se reconnaître comme sujet de désir.” (UPL 11-12.) 
 
104
 “À travers quells jeux de vérité l’être humain, s’est-il reconnu comme homme de désir?” (UPL 
13). 
 
105
 “Pourquoi ce souci éthique, qui, au moins à certains moments, dans certaines sociétés ou dans 
certains groupes, paraît plus important que l’attention morale qu’on porte à d’autres domains 
pourtant essentials dans la vie individuelle ou collective, comme les conduits alimentaires ou 
l’accomplissement des devoirs civiques?” (UPL 16). 
 
106
 “à chercher du côté des instances d’autorité qui font valoir ce code, qui imposent 
l’apprentissage et l’observation, qui sanctionnent les infractions” (UPL 36-37). 
 
107
 Although these two aspects are present in all moral theories, Foucault sees the former type of 
morality as typical of the Christian moralities that brought about a strong codification of the moral 
experience, and the latter as familiar to the moral conceptions of Greek and Greco-Roman 
antiquity – which was more strongly oriented toward practices of the self and the question of 
askeesis than toward the codification of conducts or strict definitions of what is permitted and 
what is forbidden (UP 30.) Unlike the ascetics of Greek antiquity, which were detached from the 
scientific definitions of the self, and in which techniques of the self were associated with dietetics 
(the health of the body), economics (the husband’s running of the household) and eroticism 
(especially men’s love of boys), Christian moralities were strictly tied to the modes of subjection 
which, in the practices of confession and caring, became almost synonymous with self-
renunciation. (See also Simons 1995, 73.) 
 
108
 “d’un savoir-faire qui en tenant compte des principes généraux quiderait l’action dans son 
moment, selon son contexte et en fonction de ses fins” (UPL 73). 
 
109
  Foucault’s last lectures were held at the Collège de France between 29 February and 28 March 
1984 (Foucault died on 21 June 1984). These lectures have not yet been published. My references 
are based on Alexander Nehamas’ inquiries and translations of them, which are presented in his 
book The Art of Living (1998). For a more detailed analysis, see also Thomas Flynn 1994. 
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110
 This idea, as Nehamas points out, seems to be based on the words of Socrates: “If you care for 
yourselves you will please me and mine and yourselves the most, even if you don’t see the point 
right now” (Nehamas 1998, 167). 
 
111
 The purpose of the two last parts of Foucault’s history of sexuality is to document a number of 
different historical conceptions of and methods for constructing moral agents in different 
centuries. 
 
112
 “Le souci de soi est éthique en lui-même; mais il implique des rapports complexes avec les 
autres, dans la mesure où cet êthos de la liberté est aussi une maniere de ce soucier des autres” 
(EPL 714). 
 
113
 “L’êthos implique aussi un rapport aux autres, dans la mesure où le souci de soi rend capable 
d’occuper, dans la cité, dans la communauté ou dans les relations interindividuelles, la place qui 
convient – que ce soit pour exercer une magistrature ou pour avoir des rapports d’amitié.” (EPL 
714-715.) 
 
114
 “le risque de dominer les autres et d’exercer sur eux un pouvoir tyrannique ne vient 
précisément que du fait qu’on ne s’est pas soucié de soi et qu’on est devenu l’esclave de ses 
désirs” (EPL 716). 
 
115
 “Non, mais dis donc toi, tu veux gouverner la cité, tu veux donc t’occuper des autres, mais tu ne 
t’es même pas occupé de toi-même, et si tu ne t’occupes pas de toi-même, tu seras un mauvais 
gouvernant” (EPL 721). 
 
116
 Foucault was not, of course, the first to link philosophical writing with creative life. I suggest 
that a similar idea is to be found in Michel Montaigne’s sixteenth-century writings on the essay. 
Montaigne’s remarkable innovation was to see an essay not merely as one possible form of 
thinking and writing, but first of all an existential attempt to study one’s individual existence and 
its aesthetic form (j’essaie, je m’essaie, je me suis essayé). It was his view, in other words, that 
because nothing is self-evident, everything, including the self, must be constantly rethought in an 
“essayistic” existence (the French verb ‘essayer’ allied to the English ‘assay’, which had a variety 
of meanings: ‘to try to do something,’ ‘to experience a thing,’ or ‘to test something, putting it 
through trial runs’). What this demands is one’s development of what Montagne calls “a small 
wisdom,” that is wisdom that he also represents as a praxis that is engaged in the limited historical 
situation and in the experiencing, concrete subject. On Montaigne’s theory of the art of living, see 
Schmidt 1998 and Schmidt 1999. 
 
117
 “Ce qui m’étonne, c’est le fait que dans notre société l’art est devenu quelque chose qui n’est en 
rapport qu’avec les objects et non pas avec les individus ou avec la vie; et aussi que l’art est un 
domaine spécialisé fait par des experts qui sont des artistes. Mais la vie de tout individu ne 
pourrait-elle pas être oeuvre d’art? Pourqoui une lampe ou une maison sont-ils des objects d’art et 
non pas notre vie? (GEA 392.) 
 
118
 “Occupe-toi de toi-même,” c’est-à-dire: “Fonde-toi en liberté, par la maîtrise de toi” (EPL 729).  
 
119
  For a more detailed analysis of Foucault’s ideas concerning freedom, see especially Oksala 
2002. 
 
120
 “est donc en elle-même politique” (EPL 714). 
 
121
  “dans la mesure où le non-esclavage à l’égard des autres est une condition: un esclave n’a pas 
d’éthique.” But, Foucault adds, it is also political “dans la mesure où être libre signifie ne pas être 
esclave de soi-même et de ses appétits, ce qui implique qu’on établisse à soi-même un certain 
rapport de domination, de maîtrise, qu’on appelait archê – pouvoir, commandement.” (EPL 714.) 
 
122
 My interpretation of Foucault’s usage of the term ‘freedom’ is on much the same line as 
Johanna Oksala’s ideas. See especially her Freedom in the Philosophy of Foucault (Oksala 2002).  
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123
 “il se replie sur l’idée qu’il faut être soi-même et être vraiment soi-même” (GEA 392). 
 
124
 John Rajchman has also pointed out some similarities between Sartre’s and Foucault’s ethical 
accounts. In his view, Foucault’s ethics aims to further the modern ethical tradition, initiated by 
Sartre, which is focused around the question of a “modern praxis.” In Rajchman’s words: “A 
modern practical philosophy […] is the philosophy for a practice in which what one is capable of 
being is not rooted in prior knowledge of who one is. Its principle is freedom, but a freedom which 
does not follow from any postulation of our nature of essence” (Rajchman 1985a, 166-167.) 
 
125
 “En fait, le soi ne peut être saisi comme un existant réel: le sujet ne peut être soi, car la 
coïncidence avec soi, fait […] disparaître le soi. Mais il ne peut pas non plus ne pas être soi, 
puisque le soi est indication du sujet lui-même. Le soi représente donc une distance idéale dans 
l’immanence du sujet par rapport à lui-même, une façon de ne pas être sa propre coïncidence, 
d’échapper à l’identité tout en la posant comme unité, bref d’être en équilibre perpétuellement 
instable entre l’identité comme cohésion absolue sans trace de diversité et l’unite comme synthèse 
d’une multiplicité. C’est ce que nous appellerons la présence à soi.” (Sartre 1943, 119.) 
 
126
 “[L]’homme crée le Monde […] au-dessus-de-lui ou plutôt […] il se dépasse par cette création 
et il est ce dépassement même, il n’est rien que cet anéantissement absolu de soi pour que le 
monde existe. Il a la joie comme conscience d’être et de ne pas être à la fois sa creation. […] La 
monde c’est moi dans la dimension du Non-moi.” (Sartre 1983, 514.) 
 
127
 “c’est moi mais pour toujours dans une autre dimension d’Etre, pour toujours autre que moi” 
(Sartre 1983, 514). 
 
128
 “originellement, l’authenticité consiste à refuser la quête de l’être, parce que je ne suis jamais 
rien (Sartre 1983, 492). 
 
129
 “les caractéristiques de l’oeuvre d’Art puisque dans celle-ci aussi il faut une “matière à 
infirmer” qui prête son Etre (sans elle l’oeuvre reste subjective et rêvée) (Sartre 1983, 514). 
 
130
  I maintain that Foucault’s analysis of transgression and limits is also meant to support this kind 
of explanation of the ontological character of the subject/self as an existent that is not-fully-present 
in itself, but still posits itself as some sort of unity (self).  
 
131
 See, for example, Sartre’s Notebooks for an Ethics, p. 498. 
 
132
 “l’authenticité consistait à dévoiler l’être sur le mode de ne pas être” (Sartre 1983, 490). 
 
133
 “Il faut creuser pour montrer comment les choses ont été historiquement contingentes, pour 
telle ou telle raison intelligible mais non nécessaire. Il faut faire apparaître l’intelligible sur le fond 
de vacuité et mier une nécessité, et penser que ce qui existe est loin de remplir tous les espaces 
possibles.” (AC 167.) 
 
134
 “Dans le culte californien du soi, on doit découvrir en principe son vrai moi en le séparant de ce 
qui pourrait le render obscur ou l’aliéner, en déchiffrant sa vérité grace à une science 
psychologique ou psychoanalytique qui pretend être capable de vous dire quel est votre vrai moi” 
(GEA 402-403). 
 
135
 “[N]on seulment je n’identifie pas la culture antique de soi à ce qu’on pourrait appeler le culte 
de soi californien, mais je pense qu’ils sont diamétralement opposes (GEA 403). 
 
136
 [À] mon avis, le mouvement homosexuel a plus besoin aujourd’hui d’un art de vivre que d’une 
science ou d’une connaissance scientifique (ou pseudo-scientifique) de ce qu’est la sexualité. […] 
La sexualité est quelque chose que nous créons nous-mêmes – elle est notre propre création, bien 
plus qu’elle n’est la découverte d’un aspect secret de notre désir. Nous devons comprendre 
qu’avec notre désirs, à travers eux, s’instaurent de nouvelles formes de rapports, de nouvelles 
formes d’amour et de nouvelles formes de création. Le sexe n’est pas une fatalité; il est une 
possibilité d’accéder à une vie créatrice. (SPP 735.) 
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137
 With this in mind, Foucault formulates the following definition: 
 “If we are asked to relate to the question of identity, it must be an identity to our unique selves. 
But the relationships we have to have with ourselves are not ones of identity, rather, they must be 
relationships of differentiation, of creation, of innovation. To be the same is really boring. We 
must exclude identity if people find their pleasure through this identity, but we must not think of 
this identity as an ethical universal rule.” (SPPI 166.) 
The citation in French runs: “Si nous devons nous situer par rapport à la question de l’identité, ce 
doit être en tant que nous sommes des êtres uniques. Mais les rapports que nous devons entretenir 
avec nous-mêmes ne sont pas des rapports d’identité; ils doivent être plutôt des rapports de 
différenciation, de création, d’innovation. C’est tres fastidieux d’être toujours le même. Nous ne 
devons pas exclure l’identité si c’est par le biais de cette identité que les gens trouvent leur plaisir, 
mais nous ne devons pas considérer cette indentité comme une règle éthique universelle.” (SPP 
739.) 
138
  These ideas derive from an interview with Foucault that was conducted on July 10, 1978. The 
text was first published in Dutch in 1982 (“Vijftien vragen van homosexuele zijde san Michel 
Foucault,” in Interviews met Michel Foucault, eds. M. Duyves and T. Massen, Utrecht: De 
Woelrat), and in 1988 in French (“Le Gai savoir,” Mec Magazine). It has been translated into 
English, but it was omitted from the four-volume collection of Foucault’s texts and interviews Dits 
et écrits 1954-1988. The translation used here was done by David Halperin (Halperin 1995, 93-
94.)  
 
139
  David Halperin studies Foucault’s notions of pleasure and desire, and claims that pleasure, for 
Foucault, is an event at the limit of the subject, because intense pleasure is in some sense 
desubjectivizing or impersonal (Halperin 1995, 93-94. See also Oksala 2002, 180.) 
 
140
 “pour moi, le travail intellectuel est lié à ce que vous définiriez comme une forme d’esthétisme 
– par cela, j’entends la transformation de soi” (MFSR). 
 
141
 “Cette transformation de soi par son propre savoir est, je crois, quelque chose d’assez proche de 
l’expérience esthétique. Pourquoi un peintre travaillerait-il, s’il n’est pas transformé par sa 
peinture?” (MFSR 536.) 
 
142
 Therefore, as Kant concludes, it would not be correct to say that his own era was enlightened 
(aufgeklärten), but should rather be described as “Zeitalter der Aufklärung,” meaning that people 
still need to work on their spiritual growth despite the fact that they have better opportunities to 
work themselves free. (Kant 1996, 15.) 
 
143
 “Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit. 
Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu 
bedienen. Selbstverschuldet ist diese Unmündigkeit, wenn die Ursache derselben nicht am Mangel 
des Verstandes, sondern der Entschliessung und des Mutes liegt, sich seiner ohne Leitung eines 
anderen zu bedienen. Sapere aude! Habe mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen” ist 
also der Wahlspruch der Aufklärung. “Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?” (Kant 1996, 
9.) 
 
144
 At the same time, as I have suggested, Foucault’s studying of the freedom of the subject also 
implies the need to study (both ontologically and politically) the present time. In his own essay on 
enlightenment, Foucault crystallizes this modern/Kantian aspect of his own thought in the 
following words: “I shall thus characterize the philosophical ethos appropriate to the critical 
ontology of ourselves as a historic-practical test of the limits that we may go beyond, and thus as 
work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” (WE 47). 
 
145
 “le racisme fut formulé sur la base de la rationalité flamboyante du darwinisme social, qui 
devint ainsi l’un des ingrédients les plus durables et les plus persistants du nazisme. C’était une 
irrationalité, bien sûr, mais une irrationalité qui, en même temps, constituait une certaine forme de 
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rationalité.” (ESP 279.) 
 
146
 “différentes modifications par lesquelles des rationalités s’engendrent les unes les autres” 
(STPS 441). 
 
147
 As Christopher Norris notes, Foucault’s contestation requires that we read Kant’s philosophy as 
marked through and through by the error of mistaking culturally specific ideas for a priori valid 
truth-claims, or contemporary limits of the necessary for limits that are intrinsic to our very 
constitution as thinking and willing subjects (Norris 1995, 169). We could express the same idea 
by saying that, when coming to terms with rationality and Enlightenment thought, Foucault is on 
much the same lines as the so-called postmodern critics such as Jean-François Lyotard, whose 
incredulity toward meta-narratives (universal reason, universal art, universal morality and human 
nature, for example) corresponds to the crisis in metaphysical philosophy and the university 
institution that relied on it in the past (Lyotard 1987; Caroll 1987). 
 
148
 “en suivant les lignes de fragilité d’aujourd’hui, à parvenir à saisir par où ce qui est et comment 
ce qui est pourrait ne plus être ce qui est” (STPS 449). 
 
149
 With this in mind, I maintain that Foucault’s position is, primarily, perspectivist (in the 
Nietschean sense of the term) and not relativistic. 
 
150
 In Baudelaire’s view, on the other hand, the experience of the present demands both the archive 
that the past offers to us, and the actual experience of the present, for without this dialectic there is 
no such thing as an experience of the living present or, alternatively, of modernity. 
 
151
  In his commentary on the world exhibition of 1855 (“Méthode de critique. De l’idee moderne 
du progrès appliquée aux beaux-arts. Déplacement de la vitalité”), Baudelaire wrote that his idea 
of correspondence was to be taken as the opposite of all dogmatic definitions of art. In his view, 
perceptible beauty is “insaisissable,” that is, it exists either on one or the other side of reason: 
“Toute définition dogmatique, réductrice de la beauté ne produit que les prisons. Si on veut 
systématiser la beauté perceptible, l’essentiel de cette beauté se fait insaisissable. Cet essentiel est 
constitué par les correspondances; celles-ci établissent les rapports existant entre les êtres et les 
choses. Elles ne les cataloguent ni ne les analysent. Leur connaissance est de l’ordre de la 
sensation, de la perception, de l’intuition; c’est un au-delà ou un en deça de la raison.” (Baudelaire 
1999, 256, note 1.) 
 
152
 Baudelaire’s text in French runs: “Le mal se fait sans effort, naturellement, par fatalité; le bien 
est toujours le produit d’un art […] morale […] peut être transporté dans l’ordre du beau.” 
(Baudelaire 1999, 542.) 
 
153
 “[O]n veut faire valoir contre les prises du pouvoir, les corps, les plaisirs, les saviors, dans leur 
multiplicité et leur possibilité de résistance” (VS 208). 
 
154
 See, most notably, the following feminist critiques and analyses of Foucault: Bartky 1990, 63-
82; Butler 1990, 93-110; de Lauretis 1987; Diamond and Quinby 1988; Hartsock 1990, 157-75; 
Richlin 1991, 160-79; Thornton 1991, 181-93 and Greene 1996.  
 
155
 “[des vertues] ont en l’homme à la fois leur modèle accompli et achevé et le principe de leur 
mise en oeuvre” (UPL 98). 
 
156
 “[Être intempérant], c’est être incapable de cette attitude de virilité à l’égard de soi-même qui 
permet d’être plus fort que soi. En ce sens, l’homme de plaisirs et de désirs, l’homme de la non-
maîtrise (akrasia) ou de l’intempérance (akolasia) est un homme qu’on pourrait dire féminin, mais 
à l’égard de lui-même plus essentiellement encore qu’à l’égard des autres.” (UPL 98.) 
 
157
 Given the fact that Sappho’s poetry has been preserved and appreciated within the Western 
literary tradition up to our present era, it is indeed curious that Foucault omits any mention of her 
in his discussion of ancient Greek erotic and homosexual aesthetic practices of the self. As a result, 
women’s perspectives on the aesthetic subjectivity are, again, excluded from Foucault’s discussion 
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of limit-attitudes, and the female voices are kept strictly a little beneath his histories. 
 
158
 “La femme est un contraire du Dandy. Donc elle fait horreur. La femme a faim et elle veut 
manger, soif et elle veut boire. Elle est en rut et elle veut être foutue. […] La femme est naturelle, 
c’est-à-dire abominable. Aussi est-elle toujours vulgaire...” (Baudelaire cit. in Kempf 1977, 69.) 
 
159
 In his famous essay “Le Peintre de la vie moderne” (“The Painter of Modern Life”), Baudelaire 
writes: 
“À la porte d’un café, s’appuyant aux vitres illuminées par-devant et par-derrière, s’étale un 
de ces imbéciles, dont l’élegance est faite par son tailleur et la tête par son coiffeur. À côté 
de lui, les pieds soutenus par l’indispensable tabouret, est assise sa maîtresse, grande 
drôlesse à qui il ne manque presque rien (ce presque rien, c’est presque tout, c’est la 
distinction) pour ressembler à une grande dame. Comme son joli compagnon, elle à tout 
l’orifice de sa petite bouche occupé par un cigare disportionné. Ces deux êtres ne pensent 
pas. Est-il bien sûr même qu’ils regardent? À moins que, Narcisses de l’imbécillité, ils ne 
contemplent pas la foule comme un fleuve qui leur rend leur image. En réalité, ils existent 
bien pour le plaisir de l’observateur que pour leur plaisir propre.” (Baudelaire 1999, 546.) 
 
160
 It is rather common nowadays to associate the term ‘avant-garde’ primarily with the 20th 
century. The historical roots of this expression date back to the Middle Ages, however. 
The artistic avant-garde in its modern usage was brought into existence early in the 
nineteenth century by Olinde Rodrigues, a close friend of the famous utopian socialist Claude-
Henri Saint-Simon. As Matei Calinescu notes in his Five Faces of Modernity (1987), it was not by 
chance that the romantic use of avant-garde in a literary-artistic context was derived from the 
language of revolutionary politics. This occurred in 1825 when the term was applied to arts in 
Rodrigues’ dialogue “L’Artiste, le savant et l’industriel,” published in a volume entitled Opinions 
littéraires, philosophiques et industrielles (Paris: Galérie de Bossange Père, 1825). The reason 
why artists had previously performed only some sort of secondary role in social life was, in 
Rodrigues’ view, their lack of a “common impulse” and a “general ideal.” He tried to solve this 
problem by adopting the Saint-Simonian type of socialism, which “avant-garde artists” were called 
upon to popularize.  
 
161
 For a proposed list of such conditions, see Alexy 1990, 163-76. 
 
162
 “il y a une autocréation de la raison et c’est pourquoi ce que j’ai essayé d’analyser, ce sont des 
formes de rationalité: différentes instaurations, différentes créations, différentes modifications par 
lesquelles des rationalités s’engendrent les unes les autres” (STPS 441). 
 
163
 “Je dis liberté de choix sexuel, et non liberté d’acte sexuel, parce que certains actes, comme le 
viol, ne devraient pas être permis, qu’ils mettent en cause un homme et une femme ou deux 
hommes. Je ne crois pas que nous devrions faire d’une sorte de liberté absolue, de liberté totale 
d’action, dans le domaine sexuel, notre objectif. En revanche, là où il est question de la liberté de 
choix sexuel, notre intransigeance doit être totale. La liberté de choix sexuelle implique la liberté 
d’expression de ce choix. Par la, j’entends la liberté de manifester ou de ne pas manifester ce 
choix.” (CS 332.) 
 
164
 “[L]e problème à la fois politique, éthique, social et philosophique qui se pose à nous 
aujourd’hui n’est pas d’essayer de libérer l’individu de l’État et du type d’individualisation qui s’y 
rattache. Il nous faut promouvoir de nouvelles formes de subjectivité en refusant le type 
d’individualité qu’on nous a imposé pendant plusieurs siècles.” (SPO 232.) 
 
165
 By this I do not mean that she merely applies Foucault’s theory to the feminist problematic. Her 
insights also differ from Foucault’s on some key points. One of the most significant differences is 
that Foucault presupposes a certain pre-discursive body, or the body as a blank page, which 
appears prior to signification and form, while for Butler, the body is merely a signifying practice. 
However, for my purpose here, it may suffice to concentrate on the positive aspect of women’s 
power over their selves and bodies in Butler’s genealogical work, and to try to grasp the 
similarities between her and Foucault’s late aesthetics. 
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166
 The term ‘assemblange’ refers to 1) the act of assembling, or the state of being assembled; 2) a 
collection of people or things; a gathering; 3) a fitting together of parts, those in a machine.   
When referring to modern art, ‘assemblange’ means a sculptural composition consisting 
of an arrangement of miscellaneous objects or found materials. It is, thus, some sort of three-
dimensional “collage.” 
 
167
  On advertisement and resistance, see Leena-Maija Rossi 2002a and 2002b. 
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